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TECHNOLOGY ADRIFT: IN SEARCH OF A 
ROLE FOR ELECTRONIC WILLS 
ADAM J. HIRSCH* 
Abstract: This Article addresses the law and public policy of electronic wills. 
The Article analyzes state statutes that either apply explicitly, or might apply im-
plicitly, to wills of this type and concludes that judicial approval of electronic 
wills is already within the realm of possibility even in the many states that do not 
expressly allow them. The Article also examines the case law to date on this is-
sue, both in the United States and in foreign jurisdictions, including several cases 
that have not previously been noted by American commentators. The Article then 
addresses the merits and demerits of electronic wills and presents the results of 
the first large-scale empirical study of popular attitudes toward these wills. In 
light of this analysis, the Article proposes a new approach: to bar electronic wills 
in general, but to permit them for estate plans made under emergency conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
To update an old saying, the handwriting is on the screen. Electronic wills 
(e-wills) are coming, and we cannot resist the onslaught of technology—or its 
infiltration of law—any more than we can hold back the tide. Our distant de-
scendants will smile at wills inked upon paper as a quaint reflection of the 
times, just as today we smile at wills etched into clay tablets by our ancient 
ancestors.1 
Perhaps, perhaps. The day may come when all communication apart from 
oral speech is digitized for the reason that—like clay tablets—paper no longer 
exists, or at least ceases to be readily available.2 That day lies in the future, 
however. Lawmakers must act in, and for, the here and now—ours being, it 
would seem, a transitional age, when paper and screen stand side by side as 
alternative channels of communication. 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2020, Adam J. Hirsch. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, University of San Diego. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987 Yale University. 
My thanks to David Horton, Krista Jenkins, Julia Kelety, and Bruce Stone for helpful comments and 
to Sara Pike for research assistance. 
 1 Babylonian wills and related materials survive from the third millennium B.C., before papyrus 
was invented. See ASSYRIAN AND BABYLONIAN LITERATURE: SELECTED TRANSLATIONS 271–76 
(Robert Francis Harper ed., 1904).  
 2 The production of paper hinges on demand—but also on supply, in the face of looming defor-
estation. Paper wills cannot persist without trees! See Will Dunham, Earth Has Three Trillion Trees 
but They’re Falling at Alarming Rate, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
science-trees/earth-has-3-trillion-trees-but-theyre-falling-at-alarming-rate-idUSKCN0R21Z62015
0902 [https://perma.cc/R5AU-P9YZ]. 
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This Article addresses the public policy of electronic wills in the year 
2020. I will strive to assess the subject pragmatically—neither idolizing tech-
nology nor launching a tired tirade against it. As a springboard for its analysis, 
the Article presents the results of the first large-scale empirical study of de-
mand for, and popular assumptions concerning, e-wills. 
In the pages following, I will argue that, as a general proposition, elec-
tronic wills serve poorly to fulfill the functions of testamentary transfers. 
Therefore, lawmakers ought to disallow them, under ordinary conditions. Yet, 
analysis of prevailing statutory law leads to the surprising conclusion that 
courts have room to find e-wills valid without any changes of current legisla-
tive text in many jurisdictions. Accordingly, the prevailing statutes need revis-
ing to clarify legislatures’ intent to bar e-wills. 
At the same time, I will argue that electronic wills can play a useful role 
today—and increasingly so—within the confined sphere of emergency estate 
planning. Ultimately, then, I offer a schizophrenic perspective on e-wills. I 
shall advocate permitting them when made under exigent circumstances, but 
prohibiting them under other circumstances. 
The Article unfolds in stages. In Part I, I assess the prospects for judicial 
recognition of electronic wills under the traditional framework of inheritance 
law.3 In Part II, I ponder the same question in light of more recent embellish-
ments to that framework.4 In Part III, I survey and compare the emerging stat-
utes explicitly aimed at validating e-wills.5 In Part IV, I proceed to examine the 
extant body of case law on e-wills, both in the United States and abroad.6 Sev-
eral of those cases are noted (and two are translated) for the first time in the 
American legal literature.7 In Part V, I assess the public policy of e-wills, fur-
ther illuminated by an inaugural empirical study of popular attitudes toward 
these wills.8 Finally, in Part VI, I propose a new model for integrating e-wills 
into inheritance law.9 
I. CLASSICAL STATUTES 
Statutory law in the realm of inheritance is notoriously stagnant. If only 
because of “[g]eneral legislative disinterest,”10 the field is crawling with old 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See infra notes 10–77 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 78–117 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 118–153 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 154–218 and accompanying text. 
 7 Original translations of cases from France and Sweden appear in the Appendix. Additional 
recent cases from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are noted hereinafter. 
 8 See infra notes 219–295 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 296–428 and accompanying text. 
 10 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts, 52 CALIF. 
L. REV. 921, 921 (1964). 
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vines. Time and again, courts operating in this area have faced the challenge of 
applying moldy statutes to modern problems—for instance, fitting posthumous 
conception into schemes of intestacy laid down when the very notion of a 
posthumously conceived heir would have been inconceivable to lawmakers.11 
And now, in the absence of legislation expressly disposing of electronic 
wills, courts must wrestle with their permissibility under statutes regulating 
will formalities enacted in an age when quill pens and inkwells ruled the work-
station. Could a court pour the new wine of digital images into these old statu-
tory bottles? 
A. Statute of Wills 
Every state has established formalizing rules for wills, set out within the 
“wills act” or “statute of wills.” These acts set protocols that vary in their de-
tails from state to state and that lawmakers have tended to prune back over 
time.12 The essential requirements today are standardized. A testator can exe-
cute a will in writing that bears his or her signature, inscribed in the presence 
of at least two witnesses.13 Our first task is to consider whether an electronic 
will could qualify as properly executed under these strictures. On conventional 
principles of statutory construction, in five jurisdictions, the answer is appar-
ently so, although that result seems to have ensued by accident. And in other 
jurisdictions, the same result is within the realm of interpretive possibility. 
1. The Writing Requirement 
The key lies in the wording of the statute of wills. Whereas the language 
of these acts varies among the jurisdictions, practically every one of them, in-
cluding the one found in the Uniform Probate Code, requires testators to exe-
cute their wills “in writing.”14 Twenty-six states, as well as the Code, also al-
low unwitnessed holographic wills, whose terms appear in a “testator’s hand-
writing.”15 On orthodox construction, handwriting comprises a subset of writ-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002) (assaying the inher-
itance rights of posthumously conceived children under an intestacy statute that “has remained essen-
tially unchanged for 165 years”). 
 12 For a further discussion and references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1067–68 (1996). The trend in favor of trimming formalities began as early as the 
nineteenth century. See Adam J. Hirsch, Waking the Dead: An Empirical Analysis of Revival of Wills, 
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __ n.58 (forthcoming 2020). 
 13 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). For a dis-
cussion of variations in the details of these requirements, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmts. f–p (AM. LAW INST. 1999–2011). 
 14 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(1). Nuncupative (oral) wills are also permitted in fif-
teen states under limited circumstances. See infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 15 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 502(b). For a tally of the states, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 (statutory note). 
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ing. Accordingly, statutes authorizing holographic wills fail to open up new 
vistas for the authorization of electronic wills. But what constitutes a writing? 
More exactly, can it include communication appearing on a screen? 
First of all, no state requires that wills appear on paper; and in some in-
stances, they do not. Historically, courts have probated wills penned on bed-
room walls, chests of drawers, and other unlikely surfaces.16 Whether a screen 
likewise qualifies depends on the meaning of the word “writing” as a term of 
art. A computer screen differs from other surfaces in that it is protean: the im-
age appears when a computer file is downloaded, only to disappear when anoth-
er file replaces it. Whether this characteristic of superficial impermanence dis-
tinguishes a screen image from a writing depends on what elements lawmakers 
regard as definitive. 
Definitions of the term “writing” may appear in either the probate code or 
a definitional section applicable to all statutes, in any given jurisdiction. Thir-
ty-one states define the term in one way or another. Those definitions offer en-
couragement to advocates of electronic wills. 
In five jurisdictions—Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Utah, and Virginia—a defi-
nitional section applicable to all statutes construes the term “writing” to in-
clude electronic communications.17 Given their inclusion within general provi-
sions, these definitions’ implications for wills appear unintentional, and even 
unseen. Their obscurity is palpable in Florida, where lawmakers have bickered 
over substantive legislation to validate electronic wills.18 It dawned on no one 
to check definitional law, which indicates by its plain language that e-wills 
were already valid in the state.19 
In twenty-six additional states, statutes define the term “writing” without 
any express reference to electronic communication. Nevertheless, seventeen of 
those statutes suggest exhaustiveness. A “[w]riting may be made in any man-
ner,”20 including “any representation of words.”21 Such terminology suggests a 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 273–74 (8th ed. 2009) (in the 
8th ed. only). For other odd examples, see THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 
§ 63, at 295 (2d ed. 1953); Elmer M. Million, Wills: Witty, Witless, and Wicked, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 
335, 340–41 (1960). By the same token, any means of marking a surface will do. See, e.g., In re Will 
of Bradway, No. A-4535-16T3, 2018 WL 3097060, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 25, 2018) 
(giving effect to a codicil penned in the testator’s blood). 
 17 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01(4) (West 2014); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.15 (1999); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 4.1(39) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12.5(40) (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-257 
(2017). Professor David Horton was first to notice these statutes. See David Horton, Tomorrow’s 
Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 568–69 (2017). 
 18 See infra notes 261–263 and accompanying text. 
 19 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01(4) (stipulating that “‘writing’ also includes information which is 
created or stored in any electronic medium.”). 
 20 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-01-37 (2019). 
 21 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.59(J) (West 2004). The remaining statutes are: COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 2-4-401(17) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 302(23) (2011) (“or otherwise”); IND. CODE 
§ 29-1-5-2(a) (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 1, § 72(28) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. 1.020(22) (2016); N.H. REV. 
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legislative preference for inclusion within the category of “writings.” Seven 
more statutes are open-textured, stating things that a writing “includes.”22 Such 
phrasing admits of the possibility of organic growth. Notably, among the thir-
ty-one states that define a “writing” by statute, not one establishes a definition 
that is comprehensive. Only two appear by their wording to preclude electronic 
communication.23 
Nineteen states, together with the Uniform Probate Code, fail to define 
the term “writing” at all.24 Nonetheless, we can deduce that electronic wills fail 
to comprise writings in jurisdictions that have adopted the Code’s terminologi-
cal framework. The Code expressly defines the term “record” to mean “infor-
mation that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic 
or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”25 Thereafter, the 
drafters authorize “record[s]” when they intend to allow electronic communi-
cation.26 Several additional sections use the compound phrase “writing or other 
record.”27 By distinguishing writings from records, the drafters imply that the 
category of writings is less inclusive than records.28 Six states follow this no-
menclature, although in four of them it is overlaid upon preexisting general 
                                                                                                                           
STAT. ANN. § 21:23 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3(10) (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 28 (1910); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 43-3-16(b) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-2(35) (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-
105(36) (2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 312.011(17) (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 142 
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 2-2-10(c) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 990.01(48) (2018). 
 22 E.g., ALA. CODE § 1-1-1(2) (2019) (“The word ‘writing’ includes typewriting and printing on 
paper.”). One statute uses the phrase “may include, but is not limited to.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-61 
(2018). The remaining statutes are: ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(a)(14) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-215(45) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-3(23) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3q (2019); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 1-1-203(7) (2011). One of these states (Alaska) nevertheless excludes electronic com-
munication from the definition of “writing” by virtue of other nomenclature, and another (Arizona) 
expressly permits e-wills. See infra notes 29, 118. 
 23 See N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 56 (McKinney 2019) (“[W]riting and written include every 
legible representation of letters upon a material substance, except when applied to the signature of an 
instrument.”) (emphasis added); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991 (2019) (defining “written” as “[e]very 
legible representation of letters or numerals upon a material substance”) (emphasis added). Cf. W. 
VA. CODE § 2-2-10(c) (defining “in writing” to include “any representation of words” but simultane-
ously defining signature to include electronic signatures; whether the second definition creates a nega-
tive inference regarding the first is unclear).  
 24 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 46 (2013) (“General Defini-
tions”). The states lacking either an omnibus or a probate-code-specific definition of a “writing” are: 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming. One of those states (Nevada) expressly permits e-wills, however. See infra note 
118. 
 25 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(41) (emphasis added). 
 26 See id. §§ 2-120(f)(1), 2-121(e)(1), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 129, 135. 
 27 Id. § 2-1105(c), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 390; id. §§ 5B-102(7), 5B-109(b)–(c), 5B-114(h), 5B-119(d)(3), 
8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 290, 298, 304, 310. 
 28 See id. § 2-502 cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (qualifying “any reasonably permanent record” as a 
“writing”); id. § 2-609 cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 267 (using “a letter” as an example of a writing). 
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definitions of “writings” that are expansive—thus illustrating the risk of self-
contradiction when Uniform Acts are imported wholesale into state codes.29 
In the other states without statutory definitions, we are thrown back on 
general meanings. The primary definition for a “writing” in Black’s Law Dic-
tionary has evolved. In older editions, the definition appeared to preclude elec-
tronic wills. A writing comprised “letters or marks placed upon paper, parch-
ment, or other material substance.”30 Both by its plain meaning and under the 
ejusdem generis canon, this definition contemplates a physical surface. But in 
more recent editions, a “writing” is defined as “[a]ny intentional recording of 
words in a visual form, whether in handwriting, printing, typewriting, or any 
other tangible form . . . . This includes hard-copy documents, electronic docu-
ments on computer media, audio and videotapes, e-mails, and any other media 
on which words can be recorded.”31 
Of course, this more expansive definition was not in effect when the writ-
ing requirement for wills first appeared. For this reason, its relevance is doubt-
ful. In the absence of a state statute authorizing dynamic interpretation of legis-
lation, orthodox rules of construction require courts to construe statutory text 
according to its original meaning.32 That said, the problem has arisen before, 
and its resolution in the past suggests the potential for judicial acceptance of 
electronic wills. 
Consider typewritten wills. We take for granted today that these satisfy 
the writing requirement. Yet, when the statute of wills was enacted “the only 
means of writing a will was by pen and ink or pencil in the hands of the 
scrivener; there was then no such instrument as a typewriter.”33 In the wake of 
this innovation, a few states updated their statutes of wills expressly to validate 
typewritten wills.34 Most did not, leaving open the question whether “writings” 
included documents created by “manipulation of a typewriting machine.”35 
Even so, typewritten wills began to appear late in the nineteenth century.36 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.050(46) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-10-201(44.5) (2019); ME. 
STAT. tit. 18-C, § 1-201(47); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-201(43) (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 
§ 30.1-01-06 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(42) (West 2013). Notwithstanding these provi-
sions, Colorado, Maine, North Dakota, and Utah all set the statutory meaning of “writings” broadly 
within their general definitional law. See supra notes 17, 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 30 Writing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 31 Id. (10th ed. 2014). The change occurred in 2009. Compare id. (8th ed. 2004), with id. (9th ed. 
2009). 
 32 The Uniform Probate Code mandates purposive construction but makes no provision for dy-
namic construction. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102(a) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 35 (2013). 
 33 Adams’ Ex’x v. Beaumont, 10 S.W.2d 1106, 1107 (Ky. 1928); see also In re Dreyfus’ Estate, 
165 P. 941, 941–42 (Cal. 1917) (making the same observation). 
 34 See Roush v. Wensel, 15 Ohio C.C. 133, 134 (1897); see also Percy Bordwell, The Statute Law 
of Wills (pt. 1), 14 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (1928) (remarking three such statutes). 
 35 Dreyfus’ Estate, 165 P. at 941. 
 36 See Thompson v. Thompson, 68 N.W. 372, 373 (Neb. 1896); In re Hardenburg’s Will, 33 
N.Y.S. 150, 151–52 (Gen. Term 1895). 
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They were accepted without challenge.37 In effect, everyone read the statutes 
dynamically, and the meaning of a “writing” moved with the times. It could 
move again in our time, history suggests, without any revision of existing stat-
utes. As an early court remarked: 
There are cases where a word in a statute aptly describing a thing 
then well known has been extended so as to include some other 
thing afterwards invented or used to accomplish the same or a simi-
lar purpose and within the general statutory intent and object. For 
example, “carriage,” meaning a wheeled vehicle, has been held to 
include the subsequently invented bicycle.38 
At the end of the day, the issue could hinge on purposive analysis—to wit, 
whether construing “writings” to include electronic wills would “carry out the 
spirit and object of the statutory provision.”39 
And that, we can say with confidence, is debatable. In another early case, 
a court rejected a will written in chalk on a slate, because “[i]mpressions upon 
it are easily removed, and replaced, without leaving any trace of the change.”40 
In the opinion of the court, it was not a close question: “Writing upon such ma-
terial does not . . . even reasonably accomplish the purpose [of] . . . the statute 
[of wills].”41 The modern Restatement would construe “writings” less restric-
tively, but not boundlessly: they “require a medium that allows the markings to 
be detected. A will, for example, scratched in the paint on the fender of a car 
would be in writing, but one ‘written’ by waving a finger in the air would not 
be.”42 A computer screen produces detectable markings—just not indelible 
ones. For a court to find a screen image a “writing” would hardly qualify as 
judicial legislation. 
Finally, we may observe, in two jurisdictions, the relevant acts fail to 
stipulate that even an executed will must appear in writing. In Arkansas and 
Tennessee, the general statute of wills only requires signatures by the testator 
and witnesses.43 The language of these acts dates to 1947 and 1941, respective-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Thompson, 68 N.W. at 373; Hardenburg’s Will, 33 N.Y.S. at 151–52. Contemporary trea-
tises asserted that typewritten wills satisfied the writing requirement without citing to a single case. 
See WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 159 (1901); JOHN R. 
ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 246 (1904); see also Bordwell, supra note 34, at 10; cf. 
Dreyfus’ Estate, 165 P. at 941–42 (holding, in a case of first impression, that a will typed on a type-
writer by the testator’s own fingers did not qualify as a “handwrit[ten]” holographic will). 
 38 Dreyfus’ Estate, 165 P. at 942. 
 39 Id.; see also supra note 32. 
 40 Reed v. Woodward, 11 Phila. Rep. 541, 543 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1875). 
 41 Id. The court added that “[t]he purpose of the statute is obvious. It was to avoid the uncertainty 
and danger attending proof of n[u]ncupative wills.” Id. at 542. 
 42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. i. 
 43 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103(a) (West 2019) (“The execution of a will, other than holo-
graphic, must be by the signature of the testator and of at least two (2) witnesses.”); TENN. CODE 
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ly (although the second one was reenacted as recently as 2016). The same 
omission appears in a federal statute, establishing formalizing rules for the 
wills of members of the armed forces, expressly superseding state probate law 
by federal preemption.44 None of these acts includes any language or commen-
tary indicating that lawmakers eliminated the writing requirement as an ad-
vertent choice. Nevertheless, by their plain text, these statutes raise the possi-
bility that an electronic will in Arkansas and Tennessee, or by a member of the 
armed forces wherever domiciled, is valid if it meets the signature require-
ment—the matter to which we next turn. 
2. The Signature Requirement 
The writing requirement to one side, state statutes of wills invariably re-
quire testators to “sign” their wills.45 Once again, the validity of an electronic 
will turns on the meaning of this word as a term of art. Historically, courts 
have accepted alternatives, such as a fingerprint or a document stamp, to a sig-
nature by hand—but would an electronic facsimile suffice?46 
In most jurisdictions, the answer is unclear. The word “signed” or “signa-
ture” is left undefined in twenty-five states, again creating the potential for 
organic growth.47 In these states, if a court were to find electronic wills to 
comprise writings, then it could also find electronic signatures to comprise 
signatures—the two definitions could evolve pari passu. 
Among the twenty-five states that do define signatures, six authorize elec-
tronic ones.48 Five other states authorize e-signatures for records “other than a 
will,” thereby implicitly requiring traditional signatures for wills under the ex-
                                                                                                                           
ANN. § 32-1-104(a) (2016) (“The execution of a will, other than a holographic or nuncupative will, 
must be by the signature of the testator and of at least two (2) witnesses . . . .”). 
 44 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1044d(a), (c) (2016) (requiring that a will be “executed,” signed, witnessed, 
and notarized). 
 45 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(2) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). 
 46 See In re Romaniw’s Will, 296 N.Y.S. 925, 935–36 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1937) (accepting a finger-
print); Phillips v. Najar, 901 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (accepting a document stamp); see 
also Hassoun v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1353–55 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (accepting a 
thumbprint on a life insurance contract). 
 47 The states are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. None-
theless, two of these states (Indiana and Nevada) expressly validate e-wills. See infra note 118 and 
accompanying text. 
 48 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.06.050(50) (2019); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.15; IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 4.1(39); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 564-B:1-103(16) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(30) 
(defining signatures to include any “symbol or methodology executed . . . to authenticate a writing or 
record” where the same statute defines “record” to include electronic communication); W. VA. CODE 
§ 2-2-10(c). 
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pressio unius canon.49 This provision originated in the Uniform Probate Code 
and reinforces the conclusion that electronic wills cannot take effect under the 
Code.50 Seven more states likewise exclude e-signatures from the definition of 
signatures.51 In the remaining seven states, and under the United States Code, 
no inference can be drawn from the local definition.52 
Ultimately, then, the signature requirement fails to pose an insuperable 
obstacle to the validation of electronic wills in most states. Among those that 
define a “writing” expressly to include digital images, two explicitly define a 
“signature” in the same way;53 in the others, the meaning of the term “signa-
ture” is unclear.54 Among states that do not expressly require wills to be writ-
ten but do require signatures, one defines a “signature” to include digital imag-
es;55 the others define the term either vaguely or not at all.56 
B. Incorporation by Reference 
In most states today, a will can refer to unexecuted provisions and thereby 
incorporate those provisions into the will, even though they were physically 
absent when the will was executed.57 Incorporation by reference began as a 
common-law doctrine but today is widely codified.58 Could a conventional 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-10-201(47.5); ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 1-201(52); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45-1-201(46) (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-01-06; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(46). 
Nonetheless, two of these states set vague general definition of signatures without reference to e-
signatures, again illustrating the risk of amalgamating Uniform Acts into preexisting state codes. See 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-01-49(16); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12.5(28) (West 2019). 
 50 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(45) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 49 (2013). The Code fails 
to establish a definition of signatures that does apply to wills. See id. 
 51 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 302(23); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3q; MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-61; 
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.020(22) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3(10); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 142 (by 
implication); WIS. STAT. § 990.01(38) (except for a “person [who] is unable to write”).  
 52 See ALA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1(4); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-215(36); GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-
3(19); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-203(5); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-
2(25); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 312.011(14). One of these states (Arizona) expressly validates e-
wills. See infra note 118. The United States Code is silent on the matter of e-signatures. See 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2018). 
 53 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.15; IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.1(39); supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
 54 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01 (no definition); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(46) (authorizing e-
signatures for records); id. § 68-3-12.5(28) (stating what a signature “includes” without reference to e-
signatures); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-257, 59.1-481(b)(1) (2017) (failing to define signatures but defining 
writings to include ones “whether an electronic signature authorized by . . . Title 59.1 is or is not af-
fixed,” which could be read to limit e-signatures to ones validated by Title 59.1, which explicitly ex-
cludes wills).  
 55 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(30). 
 56 Federal law falls into the first category and Arkansas into the second. See 1 U.S.C. § 1; supra 
notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.6. 
 58 Incorporation by reference is today codified in twenty-eight states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
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will incorporate provisions found on a computer file simply by referring to 
them as disposing of part of the estate—forming what we can dub a semi-
electronic will? 
The answer depends on the limits of incorporation by reference. By tradi-
tion, a testator can only incorporate provisions (1) that exist when the will is 
executed, (2) that the will refers to expressly, and—crucially for present pur-
poses—(3) that are in writing.59 
The confinement of incorporation by reference to a “writing” under most 
of the state statutes means that semi-electronic wills raise no distinct issues. 
One’s validity, like that of a fully-electronic will, turns on how any given state 
defines the term “writing.” Still, in the moiety of states where incorporation by 
reference remains a common-law doctrine, the writing requirement associated 
with the doctrine can evolve more flexibly than its twin requirement as a will 
formality, which is bridled by universal codification. What is more, variations 
in the vocabulary of three state statutes raise the prospect that incorporation by 
reference operates under a more relaxed standard. In Indiana, Wisconsin, and 
Ohio, as elsewhere, a will must be in “writing.”60 In Indiana, by comparison, a 
will can incorporate by reference “a writing of any kind.”61 An incidental turn 
of phrase, or does the second term convey a broader meaning? Then in Wis-
consin, a will can incorporate by reference “another writing or document,” 
which suggests a broader scope than mere writings, although a “document” is 
left undefined in the state.62 Finally, in Ohio, more significantly, a will can in-
corporate by reference a “document, book, record, or memorandum.”63 Where-
                                                                                                                           
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In the remaining 
states, except for four where incorporation by reference has not gained acceptance, the doctrine takes 
effect as common law. The four outliers are: Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, and New York. See 
LAWRENCE P. KELLER, WILLS, at app. I (rev. ed. 2019); 2 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.19–.22 
(rev. ed. 2003 & Supp., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed. 2017) [hereinafter PAGE].  
 59 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-510 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 228 (2013); supra note 57. The 
Uniform Probate Code contains a second, exclusively statutory variant of incorporation by reference 
confined to tangible personal property that again requires a writing but also a signature, and which 
further allows the writing to postdate the will. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-513 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 
U.L.A. 231 (2013). Versions of this rule appear in thirty states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Only one of those 
states (Nevada) deviates from the writing requirement. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 60 IND. CODE § 29-1-5-2(a) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. 
§ 853.03 (2019). Indiana and Ohio make limited provision for nuncupative wills. See IND. CODE § 29-
1-5-4; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.60. Indiana today allows e-wills. See infra note 118. 
 61 IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(h). Among these three states, only Indiana makes special provision for 
references to tangible personal property and here reverts to the requirement of a “writing.” See id. 
§ 29-1-6-1(m).  
 62 WIS. STAT. § 853.32(1); see also id. §§ 851.01–.31, 990.01. 
 63 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.05 (West 2018). 
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as a “record” again goes undefined in Ohio, its ordinary meaning includes elec-
tronic communications.64 This tweak implies that semi-electronic wills could 
take effect in Ohio, even if fully-electronic wills could not. 
C. Living Trusts 
Wills are not the exclusive means of disposing of property upon death. By 
establishing a revocable “living” trust, persons can retain all incidents of own-
ership over all manner of property and provide for its delivery to beneficiaries 
upon death without going through probate. Under modern law, living trusts 
have become perfect substitutes for wills.65 But because they comprise inter 
vivos transfers, settlors who create living trusts need not comply with the stat-
ute of wills.66 
Does the irrelevance of the statute of wills make an electronic living trust 
valid? No published case has ever addressed the question. Nonetheless, as a 
general proposition in most jurisdictions, prior elements of trust law suggest 
that the answer is yes. Under the Uniform Trust Code, operative in thirty-four 
states,67 settlors of a living trust need abide by no formalities. All the Code re-
quires is a “declaration” by the settlor of the trust’s existence.68 Although the 
Code fails to define the term “declaration,” its plain meaning is not confined to 
any given medium of communication.69 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See id. § 1.59; Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. 
 65 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 6, gen. cmt. (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 545 (2006) (acknowledging 
that living trusts are the “functional equivalent” of wills). Under modern law, the trustee of a living 
trust owes no fiduciary duties to death beneficiaries, and if the settlor doubles as trustee, he or she 
need not retitle trust property in the name of the trust. See id. §§ 401 cmt., 603(b), 7C U.L.A. 478, 553 
(2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74(1) cmts. b–e (AM. LAW INST. 2003–2012); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 reporter’s notes (citing cases). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25. 
 67 These are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
 68 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 478, 489 (2006); see also IND. 
CODE § 29-1-5-9 (parroting this rule in a non-Uniform statute). By comparison, the Uniform Probate 
Code gives effect to living trusts set down in a “written instrument.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-101 
(amended 2019), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 354 (2013). This provision serves as a safe harbor and “does not in-
validate other arrangements by negative implication,” including “oral trust[s],” which the drafters 
observe are “already generally enforceable under trust law.” Id. § 6-101 cmt. This provision is in ef-
fect in thirteen states, although all except two of them are also Uniform Trust Code states: Alaska (not 
a Uniform Trust Code state), Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota (not a Uniform Trust Code state), Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
 69 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 413 (2006); Declaration, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. The Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, enacted in forty-seven 
states, gives effect expressly to an electronic “transaction” but, among trusts, the Act only applies to 
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Judicial doctrine parrots the Uniform Trust Code. The third Restatement 
of Trusts avers that all a settlor needs to do in order to create a living trust is to 
declare it.70 Case law confirms the Restatement.71 Although lawmakers tradi-
tionally have contraposed written and oral trusts, technological change sug-
gests a broader dichotomy between written and unwritten trusts.72 The absence 
of a writing requirement for living trusts implies the validity of electronic dec-
larations of trust, irrespective of how broadly or narrowly state law defines 
writings. 
Still, we must take note of statutory variations.73 In eight states, a settlor 
can only execute an inter vivos trust in a signed writing.74 The same is true in a 
ninth state, but only when the settlor doubles as trustee.75 In three more states, 
inter vivos trusts require a writing, but no signature need appear.76 All told, 
then, in twelve jurisdictions, the definitions of writings and signatures again 
become relevant to the validity of an electronic living trust. 
The same could be true in two more states whose statutes are unclear. 
Acts in these states render “oral trusts” unenforceable.77 Doubtless, the drafters 
again intended to contrapose written and oral trusts, without imagining that, in 
modern times, some trusts might be neither. 
                                                                                                                           
business trusts. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3(a) & cmt. 1 & Legislative Note Regarding 
Possible Additional Exclusions under Section 3(b)(4) cmt. 1 (1999), 7A pt. 1 U.L.A. 502, 504 (2017). 
 70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 20, 25(1). 
 71 See, e.g., Vander Molen v. Kennard, 169 N.W. 2d 662, 663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (finding 
evidence of an “oral revocable trust” sufficient to submit the question of the trust’s existence to a 
jury). 
 72 Although the Restatement titles one of the relevant sections “Validity of Oral Trusts,” the text 
of the provision frames the rule as a negative: “[A] writing is not necessary to create an enforceable 
inter vivos trust . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20. The accompanying comment states 
that “a property owner may declare a trust . . . during life . . . without a writing,” but then adds, “[t]hus 
. . . enforceable trusts . . . may be created orally.” Id. § 20 cmt. Other possibilities created by the ab-
sence of a writing requirement did not occur to the drafters—not, at least, in 2003, when this section 
was composed. See id. § 13 cmt. b (asserting that “the required manifestation of intention to create a 
trust may be by written or spoken words or by conduct,” which conceivably could include electronic 
communication) (emphasis added). 
 73 To the extent that it disposes of real property, an electronic living trust would again require a 
writing under the statute of frauds in all but a few jurisdictions. For a tally of these statutes, see 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§§ 61–64 (2d rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. Amy M. Hess et al., eds. 2014). 
 74 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(9) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.502(1), 736.0403(2)(b) 
(West 2019) (requiring “testamentary aspects” of a living trust to be executed with will formalities); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-20(a) (2019); IND. CODE § 30-4-2-1.5(b) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 633A.2103(1) (West 2003); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:1752 (2019); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1833 (2019) 
(also requiring witnesses and notarization); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38-407 (2013); TEX. PROP. CODE 
ANN. § 112.004 (West 1984). 
 75 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-401(a)(1)(ii) (2014). 
 76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3545(a) (2019) (applicable only to living trusts, and requiring 
witnesses); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:31-18 (West 2019); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.17(a) 
(McKinney 2019) (also requiring witnesses). 
 77 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7737 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 44D-4-407 (2011). 
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II. NEOCLASSICAL STATUTES 
Nor is that all. Today, many states grant courts a larger arsenal of powers 
with which to validate wills. Whether those powers create new pathways to 
probate for electronic wills merits analysis. 
A. Harmless Error 
As revised in 1990, the Uniform Probate Code relaxes the requirements 
for executing a will by offering relief for testators who fail to execute their 
wills properly. Under the Code’s so-called dispensing power, “[a]lthough a 
document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance 
with [the statute of wills], the document or writing is treated as [valid]” if 
“clear and convincing evidence [shows] that the decedent intended the docu-
ment or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”78 This doctrine is exclu-
sively statutory.79 Six states have enacted the Code’s provision verbatim,80 and 
five others have adopted modified versions of it.81 
Could a court in one of those jurisdictions give effect to an electronic will 
by recourse to the dispensing power? Although the power is remedial, wielded 
to excuse “harmless error[s]” of formality,82 the power does have limits. A 
court cannot approve a will created by oral declaration under this provision of 
the Code. That is the implicit message—which the drafters ought to have made 
explicit—of language stating that the dispensing power applies to “a document 
[that] was not executed in compliance” with the formal requirements for a 
will.83 An oral will is not a document, hence the court has no power to approve 
one by virtue of the dispensing power in jurisdictions that require a writing. 
Even in a jurisdiction that allows witnessed, oral wills—as fifteen states do, 
two of which also grant courts a dispensing power—a court cannot use the 
power to cure an oral will that was improperly witnessed.84 
                                                                                                                           
 78 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
 79 See Litevich v. Prob. Court, No. NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *22 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. May, 17, 2013). 
 80 HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2019); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 72-2-523 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 1998). 
 81 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(2) (West 2019); COLO. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.238 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2012). 
A more widespread judicial analogue is the substantial-compliance doctrine, but it cures only insub-
stantial failures to comply with formal requirements. The absence of a writing is not insubstantial. See 
Quinn v. Quinn, 498 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (concerning an insurance contract, to 
which a branch of the substantial-compliance doctrine applies, and citing earlier cases). 
 82 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
 83 Id. § 2-503. 
 84 See infra note 314. The overlapping states are Ohio and Virginia, but their versions of the dis-
pensing power fail to cover oral wills. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2017.24; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
404. 
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Whether a court could validate an electronic will by dint of the dispensing 
power turns on whether such a will comprises a “document” under this section 
of the Code.85 Like a “writing,” the term “document” fails to appear in the 
Code’s definitional section.86 Still, conventional principles of construction 
suggest that the dispensing power covers wills other than ones in “writing.” 
Whenever drafters differentiate terms, we presume that those terms refer to 
different things.87 Moreover, by stating that the dispensing power covers a 
“document or writing,” the drafters imply that the power is more expansive, 
sprawling beyond mere writings.88 
Nonetheless, on further analysis, we can surmise that the terms “docu-
ment” and “writing,” as used in the Code, were intended to function as syno-
nyms. The comment accompanying the section creating the dispensing power 
says not a word about the drafters’ variance of terminology, implying its insig-
nificance.89 Furthermore, in other sections of the Code the drafters switch from 
the term “writing” to the term “document” as though the two were inter-
changeable.90 Finally, as noted earlier, the Code employs a different term ex-
pressly to refer to communications that may be either tangible or electronic—
namely, the term “record.”91 But that term fails to appear anywhere in the sec-
tion of the Code creating the dispensing power.92 
But why, then, did the drafters confuse matters by introducing a new term 
into this provision when the word “writing,” as previously employed in the 
Code, would have sufficed? We can guess the answer from the context: As 
used in this section, the phrase “a document or writing added upon a docu-
ment” refers to two different things—original wills and interlineations, where a 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Horton, supra note 17, at 569 (suggesting this possibility). 
 86 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 46 (2013). 
 87 See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 224 (1975) 
(referring to this canon as the “presumption of formal consistency”). 
 88 See supra text accompanying note 78. Similarly, many state statutes, including at least one 
inheritance-related statute, employ the phrase “written document,” implying that some documents are 
unwritten. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2510 (2019). 
 89 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
 90 Compare id. § 2-502(a)(1), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013), with id. § 2-502(c); compare id. § 2-510, 
8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 228 (2013), with id. § 2-510 cmt.; compare id. § 2-513, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 231 (2013), with 
id. § 2-513 cmt. 
 91 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 92 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 & cmt. (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013); see also 
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT §§ 2(4), 6 (Alternative A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) [hereinafter UNIF. E-
WILLS ACT] (using the term “record readable as text” in a section establishing a dispensing power 
applicable to e-wills). The drafters of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act assume, albeit without analy-
sis, that the Uniform Probate Code’s dispensing power fails to apply to e-wills. See UNIF. E-WILLS 
ACT § 6 (Alternative B) & Legislative Note (extending the dispensing power to e-wills in jurisdictions 
that already have that power for paper wills); see also ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 191 (10th ed. 2017) (concluding that the Uniform Probate Code’s 
dispensing power does not apply to e-wills on the basis of other items of evidence). 
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testator adds new language onto a preexisting will.93 Subsequent references to 
a “document or writing” comprised shorthand for original wills and interlinea-
tions.94 Still, the drafters could have expressed that idea simply and clearly, 
without recourse to two different terms. The phrase “a writing, or writing upon 
a writing,” if not pretty, would have gotten the point across. The drafters’ 
avoidance of repetition in their version of the text exemplifies what Henry 
Fowler called elegant variation—a suitable practice for literary prose, but an 
elementary blunder when formulating statutes.95 Alertly, the Oregonians 
cleaned up the language of this section by banishing the term “document” from 
their rendition of the state’s dispensing power.96 
Ultimately, we must brand the Uniform Probate Code provision on harm-
less error as ambiguous—but an ambiguity courts should resolve by deeming 
electronic wills ineligible for reformation. These are not “writings,” nor are 
they “documents” that a court can reform. Insofar as e-wills are concerned, the 
Code’s arsenal of powers, properly construed, contains only blank cartridges, 
and the same is true of non-Uniform versions of the dispensing power.97 
Still, in the face of statutory ambiguity, we have no assurance that a court 
will interpret this provision properly. And in those states that have adopted the 
dispensing power where “writings” are defined more broadly than under the 
Code’s terminological framework, the power could apply to electronic wills—
but it would then be superfluous, because the local statute of wills would itself 
suffice to validate an e-will. Only if a state defined a “writing” broadly to in-
clude electronic communication but a “signature” narrowly to exclude elec-
tronic signatures could the Code’s version of the dispensing power at last make 
a difference. 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
 94 See id. 
 95 H.W. FOWLER & F.G. FOWLER, THE KING’S ENGLISH 184–89 (3d ed. 1931); see also DICKER-
SON, supra note 87, at 224–25. 
 96 See OR. REV. STAT. § 112.238(1) (2019) (“[A] writing may be treated as if it had been executed in 
compliance with [the statute of wills] if the proponent of the writing establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended the writing to constitute . . . [t]he decedent’s will . . . .”); cf. OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.02, 2107.01, 2107.011, 2107.03, 2107.24 (employing the term “writing” exclu-
sively in the statute of wills and the term “document” exclusively in the state’s version of the harm-
less-error provision, without defining either term). 
 97 In several foreign jurisdictions, however, lawmakers expressly define documents more broadly 
than writings in connection with the dispensing power. See infra notes 197, 201; cf. Gökalp Y. Gürer, 
Note, No Paper? No Problem: Ushering in Electronic Wills Through California’s “Harmless Error” 
Provision, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1974–79 (2016) (arguing that the dispensing power in Cali-
fornia could be construed to validate e-wills). 
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The dispensing power applies only to wills—living trusts fall outside the 
statute’s purview.98 Therefore, this remedial rule could not possibly operate to 
give effect to an electronic living trust were one required to be written. 
B. Choice of Law 
Another possible avenue for the enforcement of electronic wills lies open 
to testators. Under the common law, a will must conform to the formalizing 
rules of the testator’s domicile at death; in addition, a will’s validity in respect 
of any real property located in another jurisdiction turns on the law of the si-
tus.99 By statute, however, most states have relaxed these rules. 
In forty-six states today, a will may be validated according to the formal-
izing rules of another state.100 The details of these statutes vary. Under the Uni-
form Probate Code’s version, enacted in twenty-one states, any “written will” 
that complies with the formalizing rules “at the time of execution of the place 
where the will [was] executed,” or the formalizing rules currently in effect in 
“the place where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is 
domiciled, has a place of abode, or is a national” is valid.101 This provision 
contains flaws.102 But the advent of choice-of-law legislation does raise the 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). No counterpart of 
this provision appears in the Uniform Trust Code. For an argument that lawmakers ought to extend the 
dispensing power to trusts, see Horton, supra note 17, at 583–88. 
 99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 239, 263 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 100 The four outliers are: Georgia, Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 101 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 221 (2013). This provision is 
replicated in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1999–2011) (advocating the Code’s 
approach as judicial doctrine). For antecedents of the Code’s provision, see LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL 
E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE § 50 (1946) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL CODE]; UNIF. WILLS ACT, FOREIGN EXECUTED (1910), quoted in 7 AUSTIN WAKEMAN 
SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 45.4.1.1, at 3185 n.14 (5th ed. 2010). 
 102 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 221 (2013). The drafters rational-
ize this provision as protecting “the expectations of testators” who assume they have properly execut-
ed their wills. Id. § 2-506 cmt. With this end in view, the statute should not require compliance with 
the current rules for formalized wills in the state where the testator was domiciled or owned real prop-
erty when he or she executed the will. See id. § 2-506. Non-Uniform versions correct this flaw. See 
IND. CODE § 29-1-5-5 (2019); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.053 (West 2015); WIS. STAT. 
§ 853.05(1)(b) (2019). The Code’s version of the provision also fails to cover the reverse problem of 
revocation of a will by act, or by operation of law. The drafters of the Code had considered extending 
the provision to this structurally analogous problem but ultimately declined to do so. See UNIF. PROB. 
CODE § 2-506 cmt. (pre-1990 Art. 2), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 524 (2013). Non-Uniform provisions in two 
states do cover revocation. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(e) & (f) (McKinney 2019); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 71 (2019); see also Edward W. Rothe, Recent Decisions, 48 MICH. L. REV. 
699, 700 n.6 (1950) (citing four more former statutes). Still another difficulty is raised by the provi-
sion’s interconnection with another one dealing with multijurisdictional probate. See UNIF. PROB. 
CODE § 3-408 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 101 (2013). Under this provision, a “final order” by a 
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prospect that an electronic will could take effect in a state where one would 
otherwise fail if a testator travels, migrates, or owns real property outside of 
his or her domicile. 
Because the predominant version of this legislation is limited to written 
wills, it proves insignificant in most jurisdictions—if the domicile were to de-
fine writings expansively, then the statute of wills in the domicile should suf-
fice to validate an electronic will.103 Vice versa, if the domicile defines writ-
ings narrowly, then the choice-of-law rule excludes e-wills executed outside 
the domicile. In eleven jurisdictions, however, non-Uniform choice-of-law 
statutes give effect to wills executed in other states whether or not they are in 
writing.104 In these jurisdictions, another issue arises: how does the statute de-
fine the place where a will was executed? Could a testator validly execute an 
e-will in a state that expressly allows them by creating one remotely, assisted 
by an e-wills firm operating in that state? Lawmakers in states that permit e-
wills have addressed this issue, as we shall see,105 but their choice-of-law rules 
fail to apply in other jurisdictions. The remaining states with choice-of-law 
statutes that could apply to unwritten wills need to amend their laws to clear up 
this question. Thus far, only one has done so.106 
                                                                                                                           
court in the domicile as concerns, inter alia, determinations of proper execution of a will is binding on 
a court in the state where probate of real property occurs. See id. & cmt. But if a court in the domicile 
holds that a will has been improperly executed under the law of the domicile (including its choice-of-
law rule), and that finding binds a court in the situs state which has adopted the Code, then Section 3-
408 conflicts with Section 2-506, which allows a court in the situs state to apply other formalizing 
rules. This conflict could arise in seventeen states that have enacted Section 3-408: Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. The conflict is inadvert-
ent: neither section cross-references the other. See id. §§ 2-506 cmt., 3-408 cmt; cf. CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 12522 (limiting its non-Uniform analogue of Section 3-408 to instances where the court in the dom-
icile validates the will, thereby avoiding the conflict). For other criticism of Section 2-506, see Jeffrey 
A. Schoenblum, Multijurisdictional Estates and Article II of the Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. 
REV. 1291, 1291–301 (1992). 
 103 Nonetheless, if disparities in definitions of signatures arise, then the choice-of-law rule could 
remain relevant. 
 104 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-251 (West 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502(2) (West 
2003) (but barring nuncupative and holographic wills); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 
1976) (but requiring a signature); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.120 (West 
1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:5 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-46 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2107.18 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 71; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504.1 (2019); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.020 (West 1990). The remaining fourteen out of the forty-six states with 
choice-of-law statutes have enacted non-Uniform statutes that, in addition to the twenty-one states 
with Uniform statutes, require a writing: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
 105 These include one of the eleven states (Indiana) cited in note 104. See infra note 149 and ac-
companying text. 
 106 That is the Ohio statute, as amended in 2019. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.18 (giving 
effect to wills that were valid at the time of execution under the law of the state where testators were 
“physically present” when they executed their wills). E-wills may nonetheless be valid in Ohio under 
its definition of “writings.” See infra notes 165–175 and accompanying text. 
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The Uniform Probate Code’s choice-of-law provision pertains exclusively 
to wills.107 Under judicial doctrine, analogous rules governing the validity of 
non-testamentary trusts—including living trusts—give effect to a trust, as re-
gards personal property, under the law of any state the settlor designates in the 
governing instrument as determinative of the trust’s rules “provided that this 
[designated] state has a substantial relation to the trust and that the application 
of its law does not violate a strong public policy of the state with which . . . the 
trust has its most significant relationship . . . .”108 Again, however, the law of 
the situs governs the validity of a trust with respect to any real property con-
tained in the trust.109 These choice-of-law principles should readily permit e-
trusts funded with personal property, so long as the settlor is willing to name as 
trustee an individual or corporate fiduciary from a validating state.110 An e-
trust is unlikely to offend a state’s strong public policy, given the validity of 
trusts created by mere oral declaration in most states.111 Today, twelve states 
operate under these judicial rules.112 
The remaining states have enacted statutory choice-of-law provisions for 
non-testamentary trusts, most of which are sufficiently broad to validate elec-
tronic trusts. Although the Uniform Trust Code’s choice-of-law provision fails 
to allow the settlor to name a state whose law governs the trust, the provision 
remains capacious, validating a trust under either the law of any state where 
the settlor is domiciled or has a place of abode, or where a trustee is domiciled 
or has a place of business, or where any trust property is located.113 Again, set-
tlors can easily validate e-trusts under this provision by naming a trustee in a 
validating state. This provision exists today in thirty-four jurisdictions.114 Only 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 221 (2013). Article 6 of the 
Uniform Probate Code, which covers living trusts, contains no analogous provision. See id. art. 6, 8 pt. 
3 U.L.A. 347 (2013). 
 108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 270; see also id. reporter’s note (citing 
cases). 
 109 Id. § 278. 
 110 Such an appointment forges a significant relationship to the designated state. See id. § 270 
cmt. a. 
 111 See supra Part I.C. 
 112 These are: Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, New York, Okla-
homa, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Texas. 
 113 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 403 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 483 (2006). For a criticism of this 
provision, see 7 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 101, § 45.4.2.1, at 3239–42. 
 114 Those are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland (with variations), Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska (with variations), New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon (with variations), Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont 
(with variations), Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Non-Uniform 
legislation in Georgia codifies the judicial rule allowing designation of the state whose trust law gov-
erns. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-4(b)(1) (2019); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.045(2) (2019) 
(ambiguous provision made irrelevant by passage of separate e-trust legislation). 
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in two states today are e-trusts less easily validated under non-Uniform choice-
of-law statutes: Florida and Iowa.115 Statutory law in both of these states also 
requires settlors to formalize living trusts in a writing.116 Nevertheless, courts 
could hold valid an e-trust in either state because electronic documents come 
within the meaning of a “writing” under definitional law in both states.117 
III. MODERN STATUTES 
We come now to the emerging body of statutory law on e-wills. As of 
2020, four states—Arizona, Florida, Indiana, and Nevada—have enacted legis-
lation expressly validating these wills.118 Nevada’s act took effect in July, 
2017, Indiana’s in July, 2018, Arizona’s in July, 2019, and Florida’s goes into 
effect in July, 2020.119 Another four states—California, New Hampshire, Tex-
as, and Virginia—have considered electronic will legislation, but it is not cur-
rently on the statute book in any of those states.120 
The model lawmakers, too, have gotten into the thick of things. The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners approved a Uniform Electronic Wills Act 
in July of 2019.121 Although the Act functions as a freestanding Uniform Law, 
the drafters contemplate grafting their product into the Uniform Probate Code 
in due course.122 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0403(1) (West 2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.1108(1) (West 
2005). 
 116 See supra note 74. 
 117 See supra note 17. 
 118 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.522 (West 2019); IND. 
CODE § 29-1-21-4 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017). 
 119 See supra note 118. Nevada’s 2017 act supersedes an earlier one from 2001 that was never 
implemented because it required software that did not yet, and still does not, exist. See Gerry W. Bey-
er & Katherine V. Peters, Sign on the [Electronic] Dotted Line: The Rise of the Electronic Will 1–2 
(2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278363 [https://perma.cc/6ZFK-XJGP]. 
 120 See A.B. 1667, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (referred to committee); H.B. 3848, 
86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (referred to committee); A.B. 3095, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2018) (withdrawn); H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018) (failed in committee); S.B. 40, 
2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017) (failed in committee); H.B. 1643, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) 
(failed in committee); see also Council B22-0169, 22nd Council (D.C. 2017) (under review); Editor’s 
Message, 30 PROB. L.J. OHIO 33, 33 (2019) (noting that a proposal to validate e-wills will come be-
fore the Ohio State Bar Association Council of Delegates in May, 2020 and could become part of an 
omnibus bill due to be enacted later in 2020). 
 121 See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92. For promotional materials on the act, see Why Your 
State Should Adopt the Uniform Electronic Wills Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.
org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=3f29eae0-789f-66fe-
4a27-0b76b0fe42e2&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/MHX2-HUG4] [hereinafter Unif. Act white 
paper]. 
 122 Memorandum from Susan Gary, Reporter, to the Drafting Comm. on Elec. Wills (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=eba692fe-ab9b-8848-2ad9-d36dcc079de8&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/67TF-2SDG]. 
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Comparative analysis of the enacted legislation highlights issues that stat-
utory drafters have needed to address. One concerns the formalities associated 
with electronic execution of a will. In Florida and Indiana, the same formal 
requirements apply to paper wills and electronic wills.123 In Arizona, however, 
e-wills must be dated, a formality that fails to apply to paper wills.124 Likewise 
in Nevada, e-wills require a date, unlike other wills; and whereas testators 
must execute paper wills in the presence of witnesses, those who execute e-
wills can formalize them either with witnesses, or with a notary, or with just 
“[a]n authentication characteristic of the testator.”125 Only Arizona’s act re-
quires electronic signatures that are “unique” to the signatories.126 Under the 
remaining statutes, and under the Uniform Act, a typed signature suffices.127 
In Arizona and Indiana, witnesses must be physically present for the exe-
cution of an electronic will.128 In Nevada and under an optional provision of 
the Uniform Act, however, witnesses can participate remotely, via audio-visual 
links.129 The drafters of the Uniform Act sought thereby to eliminate “hurdles” 
to validating e-wills, on the assumption that contacting witnesses electronically 
might be easier than assembling them physically.130 Conceding that the bodily 
presence of witnesses suits their traditional role as sources of evidence con-
cerning a testator’s state of mind and as bulwarks against duress or undue in-
fluence, the drafters of the Uniform Act claim, without adducing any evidence, 
that “remote attestation will not create excessive risks.”131 By contrast, the Flo-
                                                                                                                           
 123 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.522(3). Compare IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(b), with id. § 29-1-21-
4(a) (2018). The formal requirements in the Uniform E-Wills Act match those found in the Uniform 
Probate Code. Compare UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013), 
with UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 5. 
 124 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518(A)(4) (2019), with id. § 14-2502(A). 
 125 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.040 (2017), with id. § 133.085(1)(b). An authentication 
characteristic is “a characteristic . . . that is capable of . . . recognition in an electronic record as a 
biological aspect of or physical act performed by that person . . . [such as] a fingerprint, a retinal scan, 
voice recognition, facial recognition, video recording, [or] a digitized signature.” Id. § 133.085(5)(a). 
 126 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1201(20). The Arizona statute also requires additional authenti-
cating evidence: an image of “a government-issued identification card of the testator.” Id. § 14-
2518(5); cf. IND. CODE § 29-1-21-4(a)(6) (permitting but not requiring “identity verification evi-
dence”). 
 127 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.521(3), 732.522(1); IND. CODE §§ 29-1-21-3(9), 26-2-8-102(10); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 132.118; UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 2(5) & cmt. ¶ 5. 
 128 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518(A)(3)(a); IND. CODE §§ 29-1-21-3(1), 29-1-21-4(a)(1). 
 129 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.088(1)(a); UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 5(a)(3) & Legis-
lative Note. 
 130 UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 5 cmt. 
 131 UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Discussion Draft, Apr. 27-28, 2019), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=6a75029a-73a3-3fca-cd8e-512f17c4420e&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/99TN-RL4Z] [here-
inafter UNIF. E-WILLS ACT (2019 Discussion Draft)]. The final draft of the Act rephrased this asser-
tion to sound less threatening: “remote attestation should not create significant new evidentiary bur-
dens.” UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 5 cmt. 
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ridians offer a more refined approach to this issue. Florida’s e-wills act permits 
remote witnessing only under the supervision of a notary public and only if a 
testator does not qualify as a “vulnerable adult.”132 In addition, the testator 
must personally affirm that he or she is not under the influence of drugs or al-
cohol, has no long-term disability, and does not require daily care—thus carv-
ing out an exception for cases where a testator’s capacity was in question, or 
where he or she might benefit from hands-on protection.133 
None of the existing electronic will statutes provide a mechanism for dis-
pensing with formalities, and none of the existing e-will states has enacted a 
dispensing-power statute applicable to wills generally that could be interpreted 
to apply to e-wills.134 The Uniform Act, however, contains an optional provi-
sion creating a dispensing power that would allow a court to waive the wit-
nessing and signature requirements for e-wills.135 
The statutes also prescribe methods for revoking an electronic will. All 
permit revocation of an e-will by act, introducing in unison the new action of 
rendering text “unreadable.”136 In states that allow testators partially to revoke 
paper wills by act, the same is true of e-wills.137 Using different terminology, 
the Uniform Act allows a testator to revoke an e-will by act, either by destroy-
ing the drive, or by deleting the file, or by typing language of cancellation, 
such as the word “revoked,” onto the electronic document.138 
The drafters of the Uniform Act add that “[i]f a testator prints a copy of 
an electronic will, writing ‘revoked’ on the copy would be a physical act” that 
likewise can operate to revoke the will.139 This last nuance appears problemat-
ic. Unexecuted copies of wills fail to qualify as performative documents, and 
                                                                                                                           
 132 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 117.285(5)(c), 732.522(2) (West 2019). A “vulnerable adult” is a term of 
art defined under Florida law. See id. § 415.102(28). 
 133 See id. § 117.285(5)(a)–(b). In order for remote witnessing to be valid, the testator must also 
reveal his or her location and identify “[w]ho is in the room with” the testator. Id. § 117.285(5)(d). 
 134 See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 135 See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 6 & Legislative Note. 
 136 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.506; IND. CODE § 29-1-21-
8(c); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(2)(b); cf. S.B. 40, 2017 Leg., 165th Sess. § 551-B:5(I) (N.H. 2017) 
(unenacted) (disallowing revocation of an e-will by act). 
 137 Florida, Indiana, and Nevada permit only complete revocation by act. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 732.506; IND. CODE §§ 29-1-5-6, 29-1-21-8(c); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120(1)(a), (2)(b). Arizona 
and the Uniform Acts permit partial revocation by act. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2507(A)(2); 
UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 7(b)(2); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-507(a)(2) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 
1 U.L.A. 222 (2013). 
 138 See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 7(b)(2) & cmt. The drafters had considered allowing 
revocation of an e-will only by subsequent executed writing but rejected the idea because “many peo-
ple would assume that they could revoke their wills by deleting them.” Memorandum from Suzanne 
Brown Walsh et al., to Unif. Law Comm’n (May 30, 2019), at 3, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=134c0ae2-a0ae-2752-1497-
f47d8c1d9d75&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/AG4J-8ZEZ] [hereinafter May 2019 Memo]. 
 139 UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 7 cmt. (emphasis added). 
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their handling by a testator is inconsequential.140 The drafters’ assertion there-
fore implies that a printout of an electronic will qualifies as an executed copy 
under the Uniform Act. Under traditional law, the revocation by act of one 
among a number of executed duplicates suffices to revoke a will.141 Yet, a tes-
tator might well view the printout of an e-will as a copy for review and thus 
treat it carelessly, or refer to it when considering changes. If the printout disap-
pears, is the e-will again revoked by act? If a testator makes individual dele-
tions in pen on the printout, is the e-will partially revoked by act? On the theo-
ry that the printout represents an executed document, the answer to both ques-
tions must be yes. The drafters of the Uniform Act are thereby asking for trou-
ble—and those who ask for trouble usually get it. 
The existing statutes vary in their breadth. Both Indiana and Nevada make 
separate provision for e-trusts, whereas Arizona’s and Florida’s act, together 
with the Uniform Act, are confined to wills.142 In Arizona, Florida, and Indi-
ana, statutory provisions for incorporation by reference remain unchanged, 
suggesting that a testator cannot incorporate electronic records into a paper 
will (although the existing statutes in Florida and Indiana could be read more 
broadly).143 In Nevada, incorporation by reference remains a common-law 
doctrine, leaving unclear the validity of a semi-electronic will.144 Nonetheless, 
Nevada does, by a statute, permit wills to refer to a list disposing of tangible 
personal property, which the legislature amended to permit references to “a 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. f 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999–2011); see also UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 7 cmt. (“Sending an 
email that says ‘I revoke my will,’ is not a physical act performed on the will itself because the email 
is separate from the will.”). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. f 
(“The testator need not perform a revocatory act on all the duplicates.”); see also UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, 
supra note 92, § 7 cmt. (repeating this rule and offering examples in the context of e-wills). 
 142 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2518; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.521(4); IND. CODE § 30-4-1.5-
1 to -13; NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.0095; UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 2(3). The drafters of the 
Uniform Act confined its scope on the erroneous assumption that e-trusts were already valid under 
another uniform act. According to the drafters, the “UETA [Uniform Electronic Transactions Act] 
does not exclude inter vivos trusts, so this [E-Wills] Act is limited to wills.” UNIF. E-WILLS ACT 
(2019 Discussion Draft), supra note 131, prefatory note. In reality, “[b]y virtue of the definition of 
transaction, trusts used outside the area of business and commerce would not be governed by this 
Act.” UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3 cmt. 1 (1999), 7A pt. 1 U.L.A. 491, 504 (2017). 
 143 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2510, 14-2513 (allowing a will to incorporate “a written 
document” or “written statement”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.512, 732.515 (requiring a writing in a 
jurisdiction that defines “writings” broadly, see supra note 17 and accompanying text); IND. CODE 
§ 29-1-6-1(h) (allowing incorporation of “a writing of any kind”); cf. IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(m) (con-
fining incorporation of a list disposing of tangible personal property to “a written statement”). The 
Uniform Act contains no provision related to incorporation by reference. See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, 
supra note 92. 
 144 See Soady v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev. (In re Estate of Foster), 411 P.2d 482, 484 (Nev. 1966) 
(dicta). 
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written statement or list contained in an electronic record,” thereby expressly 
warranting some semi-electronic wills.145 
A common denominator in all four of the existing acts is their provision 
for a “custodian” of electronic wills, contemplated to comprise a firm in the 
business of storing these wills.146 Under the Arizona, Florida, and Nevada stat-
utes, self-proof of an e-will requires the participation of a custodian.147 The 
Indiana statute merely grants testators the option of storing an e-will with a 
custodian.148 
One oddity in the Arizona and Indiana statutes, and in the Uniform Act, is 
their inclusion of a restrictive choice-of-law provision. In common, these pro-
visions indicate that an electronic will must comply with the formal require-
ments of the place where the testator is “physically” or “actually” present 
when he or she executes the will, not “the place where the will is executed,” as 
the Uniform Probate Code more vaguely reads in respect of wills in general.149 
These provisions are supposed to clarify that a testator domiciled in a state that 
bars e-wills cannot execute one remotely in a jurisdiction that permits them.150 
Florida’s and Nevada’s e-will bills contemplate exactly this sort of remote exe-
                                                                                                                           
 145 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.045(1) (2017) (emphasis added). See supra note 59. California’s 
aborted e-wills act from 2018 would have amended both the incorporation-by-reference statute and 
the tangible personal property statute to permit semi-electronic wills, see A.B. 3095, 2017–2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. §§ 10–11 (Cal. 2018) (withdrawn), but the 2019 successor to this act fails to replicate these 
provisions. See A.B. 1667, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (referred to committee). 
 146 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1201(53), 14-2520; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.524–.525; IND. 
CODE § 29-1-21-3(4); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 132.286, 133.320. A similar provision was dropped from 
the Uniform Act. See infra note 269. 
 147 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2519(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.523; NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 133.086(1)(b) (2017); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2505(B) (requiring that wills have dis-
interested witnesses if they are not self-proved). 
 148 See IND. CODE § 29-1-21-10 (2019); cf. H.B. 1643, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 64.2-403.1(C)(1) 
(Va. 2017) (unenacted) (requiring the participation of a qualified custodian, without which an e-will is 
invalid). 
 149 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2506, IND. CODE § 29-1-21-7 (2018), and UNIF. E-
WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 4(1), with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 
221 (2013). Ohio has also amended its choice-of-law statute to include this restriction. See supra note 
106. Unlike the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform E-Wills Act validates an e-will if (1) it complies 
with current law in the state where the testator was “physically located” when he or she executed the 
e-will, not with the law as it existed at the time when the testator was physically located in that state; 
and (2) if it complies with the law of the state where the testator is “domiciled or resides,” not the state 
where the testator is domiciled or “has a place of abode.” Compare UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 
92, § 4(2), with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 221 (2013). The accom-
panying comment neither remarks nor explains these inconsistencies. See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra 
note 92, § 4 cmt. 
 150 The Uniform Act offers the following example of the application of its choice-of-law rule: 
“Gina lived in Connecticut and was domiciled there . . . . While at home she goes online, prepares a 
will, and executes it electronically using Nevada law. The will is valid in Nevada but not in Connecti-
cut, unless Connecticut adopts the E-Wills Act.” UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 4 cmt. 
2020] In Search of a Role for Electronic Wills 851 
cution.151 But what the drafters of the Uniform Act, along with the Arizonans 
and Indianans, fail to grasp is that tacking such a restriction onto an e-wills 
statute is pointless: All states adopting the Uniform Act intend to validate e-
wills. More thematically, Nevada’s e-will bill provides that “[a]n electronic 
will that is executed or deemed to be executed in or pursuant to the laws of 
another state . . . is a valid electronic will in this State.”152 A restrictive choice-
of-law provision would have its desired impact only if enacted in a jurisdiction 
that rejects the Uniform Act and disallows e-wills. 
Nevada goes a step further even than to permit remote execution. Its stat-
ute purports to grant courts in Nevada jurisdiction over, and thus the right to 
probate, electronic wills deemed to have been executed in Nevada, even by 
nonresidents.153 Were other states to accede to this claim of jurisdiction, Neva-
da could become a hub for e-wills created by citizens regardless of where they 
are domiciled. 
IV. THE CASE LAW 
A. American Decisions 
Cases testing the validity of electronic wills in the United States are 
sparse. The e-will statutes are too novel to have generated even a single suit, as 
of yet. In states operating under traditional statutes, varieties of e-wills have 
featured in three cases, although none has reached a high court. In other states, 
the matter remains unprecedented.154 
In the first case, Taylor v. Holt, decided in 2003, the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee assessed the validity of a will prepared on a computer by a testator 
who had affixed to the will electronically “his stylized cursive signature” in the 
presence of witnesses.155 The testator then printed out the will and witnesses 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.522(4); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.088(1)(e) (2017). Nevada’s provi-
sion for remote execution requires either witnesses, a notary, or a qualified custodian to be physically 
located or organized in Nevada. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.088(1)(e); see also S.B. 40, 2017 Leg., 165th 
Sess. § 551-B:6(IV) (N.H. 2017) (unenacted) (similar provision). 
 152 NEV. REV. STAT. § 136.185(4) (2017); see also H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 64.2-
403.1(R) (Va. 2018) (unenacted) (similar provision). An earlier version of Florida’s e-will legislation 
had included a similar provision, see H.B. 277, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess., § 732.527 (Fla. 2017) (ve-
toed), but it was omitted from the version enacted in 2019. Florida’s choice-of-law statute remains 
unamended and is ambiguous on this issue. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502(2). 
 153 NEV. REV. STAT. § 136.185(1); see also H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 64.2-443(C) (Va. 
2018) (unenacted) (similar provision). 
 154 In several cases, will drafts discovered on computers have been introduced as evidence of the 
contents of alleged paper wills that have gone missing. See In re Last Will and Testament of Sand-
strom, No. 8948-MA, 2016 WL 1304841, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2016); In re Estate of Steed, 152 
S.W.3d 797, 814–16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
 155 Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830, 830–31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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added their own signatures in pen.156 The court found that this manner of sign-
ing met the statutory definition in Tennessee, which allows “any other symbol 
or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to authenticate a 
writing or record.”157 On that basis, and without further analysis, the court held 
the will validly executed.158 
Although the will at issue in Taylor was eventually committed to paper, 
the court’s sufferance of this unusual mode of execution represents a straw in 
the wind. If the court was disposed to construe an open-textured definition of 
“signatures” broadly to permit electronic ones, would it be equally amenable to 
reading an open-textured definition of “writings” broadly? We cannot know, 
but the opinion does suggest one court’s preparedness to validate electronic 
methodology in the absence of an express warrant from the state legislature.159 
Along the way, Taylor also featured a new twist on an old problem that 
escaped notice by the court: In what order must the formalities of execution 
proceed? Courts have long divided on this question as it regards the order of 
signatures.160 If a witness signs before the testator does, some courts hold the 
resulting will valid. “[T]he whole transaction must be regarded as one continu-
ous uninterrupted act,” and “[i]n acts substantially contemporaneous it cannot 
be said that there is any substantial priority,” the Supreme Court of Michigan 
ruled, even though “the usual and more orderly way of executing a will is for 
the testator to sign first . . . .” 161 To hold otherwise, the court added, would be 
“to sacrifice substance for mere form.”162 Other courts have made the sacrifice, 
giving effect to a will only if the testator signs first. “[U]ntil the testator signs, 
there is nothing [for witnesses] to attest,” the Supreme Court of Georgia rea-
soned.163 
In Taylor, the parties did sign in the proper order. Rather, it was the com-
mitment of the will to writing that was disorderly. Here, the testator signed 
before materializing the will. These facts present not an electronic will prob-
lem, but an electronic production problem. By extension, courts could resolve 
it in either of two ways. As the Michiganders might say, the sequence of events 
in Taylor occurred substantially contemporaneously, even though the testator 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See id. (“[The witnesses] then each signed their name below [the decedent’s] and dated the 
document next to their respective signatures.”). 
 157 Id. at 832–33 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105 (1999)). 
 158 Id. at 833–34. 
 159 See id.; cf. Litevich v. Prob. Court, No. NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *22 & 
n.17 (Conn. Super. Ct. May, 17, 2013) (holding that an “authentication and confirmation process” 
required by a firm that offered online legal drafting services did not in itself qualify as a signature). 
 160 See PAGE, supra note 58, § 19.139 (collecting cases). 
 161 Horn’s Estate v. Bartow, 125 N.W. 696, 698 (Mich. 1910) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Brooks v. Woodson, 13 S.E. 712, 712 (Ga. 1891); see also, e.g., Marshall v. Mason, 57 N.E. 
340, 340 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J.) (finding that this ordering requirement is “founded on good 
sense and the plain meaning . . . of the statute”). 
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would have proceeded in a more orderly fashion by printing out the will before 
signing it. Still, as the Georgians might respond, until the testator printed out 
the will there was nothing to sign. 
The court’s silence on this issue in Taylor suggested that it regarded the 
order of signing and materialization as irrelevant. Otherwise, the court would 
have had to rule on whether the will already comprised a “writing” when the 
testator signed electronically—a ruling that could have implied the validity of 
a fully-electronic will—but the court failed to reach that question. Yet, prior 
courts in Tennessee had followed the Georgians’ lead and insisted on conven-
tional ordering, at least in respect of testators’ and witnesses’ signatures.164 
Against this background, Taylor could only muddy the legal waters, and we 
can fault the opinion on that account. 
In the next American case, In re Estate of Castro,165 decided by a probate 
court in Ohio in 2013, the testator never materialized the will at all—here, a 
true electronic will lay at issue.166 Lacking “any paper or pencil,” the testator 
composed his will on a tablet computer, using a stylus pen, a month before his 
death, when he was mortally ill.167 Both he and the witnesses added their cur-
sive signatures to the tablet while the testator lay in hospital.168 Survivors 
thereafter offered it for probate.169 
A will in Ohio must be “in writing.”170 Ohio’s probate code fails to define 
this term.171 The court neglected, though, to cite the general statutory definition 
of a writing, which in Ohio “includes any representation of words.”172 With 
little to go on, the court ruled that data stored on a tablet qualified as a writing. 
“To rule otherwise would put restrictions on the meaning of ‘writing’ that the 
General Assembly never stated,” the court concluded.173 On the same basis, 
and in the absence of a definition of “signed” or “signature” anywhere in the 
Ohio statutes, the court held this requirement met as well.174 Hence, the court 
admitted the will to probate.175 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See Simmons v. Leonard, 18 S.W. 280, 282 (Tenn. 1892) (“There is no will to witness until it 
has been signed by the testator.”); In re Estate of Archer, No. 3, 1989 WL 67198, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. June 21, 1989). 
 165 In re Estate of Castro (Ohio C.P. Prob. Div. 2013), reprinted in 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 412 
(2014) [hereinafter Estate of Castro]. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 414. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 414–15. 
 170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2011). 
 171 See id. § 2107.01. 
 172 Id. § 1.59(j). Instead, the court in Castro quoted a definition of “writing” found in the criminal 
code, while conceding that it was “not necessarily controlling.” Estate of Castro, supra note 165, at 
416. 
 173 Estate of Castro, supra note 165, at 416. 
 174 Id. at 417. 
 175 Id. at 418. 
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Like Taylor, Estate of Castro stands for the proposition that a court can 
read definitional provisions to include electronic methodologies without ex-
plicit warrant. Whereas Taylor was confined to signatures, Estate of Castro 
extended this liberality to writings. The instant case appears another straw in 
the same breeze. 
Finally, in the most recent American case, In re Estate of Horton,176 de-
cided by an appellate court in Michigan in 2018, a testator left behind a suicide 
note that included testamentary instructions which he typed, ending with a 
typed signature, on his cell phone.177 The court observed that “an electronic 
note, which was unwitnessed [contrary to the statute of wills] and undated 
[contrary to the requirements for holographic wills in Michigan], does not 
meet . . . the formal requirements” for a will.178 The court failed to address 
whether a will preserved electronically met the definition of a “writing,” as 
also required by the statute.179 
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that admitted the 
will to probate.180 The judges achieved this result by invoking the dispensing 
power, which in Michigan tracks the Uniform Probate Code.181 This provision 
empowered the court to waive formal requirements for execution so long as 
evidence confirmed the testator’s intent to create a will.182 
Still, a court can invoke the dispensing power only to ratify a “document 
or writing.”183 In Estate of Horton, the court assumed without analysis that a 
digital image qualified, although the term “writing” is vaguely defined, and the 
term “document” nowhere defined, in the Michigan statutes.184 By referring to 
the instant will as a “document” or an “electronic document,” the court may 
have accepted implicitly the interpretation that the term “document” means 
                                                                                                                           
 176 In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (per curiam). 
 177 Id. at 209. 
 178 Id. at 212; see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(1)(c) & (2) (2019). 
 179 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(1)(a) & (2). In a footnote, the court accepted that “the 
electronic note does not contain a handwritten signature,” as required for holographic wills. Estate of 
Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 214 n.7; see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(2) (requiring a “signature . . . in 
the testator’s handwriting”). The statute likewise requires the testator and witnesses to have “signed” 
an executed will. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(1)(b). Although ventured without analysis, the 
court’s conclusion comports with Michigan’s general definition of signatures, mandating that they be 
in “the proper handwriting of the person.” See id. § 8.3q. 
 180 Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 215. 
 181 Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503, with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (amended 2019), 8 
pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
 182 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 211–15. 
 183 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503. 
 184 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 212 (acknowledging this requirement). In Michigan, 
“[t]he words . . . ‘in writing’ shall be construed to include printing, engraving, and lithographing.” 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3q (2019); see also id. §§ 8.3a–8.3w, 700.1103, 700.1108 (failing to establish 
any additional definitions). 
2020] In Search of a Role for Electronic Wills 855 
something broader than a “writing.”185 But the court dropped a stitch in failing 
to engage in any exercise of construction, and the likely explanation is bad 
lawyering. Neither party to the suit briefed this issue.186 
Estate of Horton illustrates the potential of remedial statutes to give effect 
to an electronic will, at least when they are liberally construed. In fact, all of 
these cases point in the same direction. Courts are salvaging the resources they 
need to validate electronic wills out of existing law—and, although scarcely 
incontrovertible, the opinions are proving sufficiently credible to fend off ap-
peals.187 
B. Foreign Decisions 
When we venture past our shores, more cases appear. Electronic wills 
have featured in reported cases in six foreign countries, operating under both 
common and civil law. Although none of those countries authorizes e-wills by 
statute, four of the six have used foreign versions of the dispensing power to 
give effect to them. 
The earliest of the cases came down in the Canadian province of Québec 
in 1996.188 This case tested the validity of a will contained on a floppy disk—
technology that is obsolete today.189 Derived from French civil law, Québec’s 
code permits testators to create either notarial, witnessed, or holographic wills.190 
Despite its continental origins, Québec’s code includes a dispensing power.191 
The Québécois version provides that “[a] holograph will or a will made in the 
presence of witnesses that does not fully meet the requirements of that form is 
valid nevertheless if it meets the essential requirements thereof and if it unques-
tionably and unequivocally contains the last wishes of the deceased.”192 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 212–15; supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Petitioner Brief, Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207 (No. 339737); Brief in Support of 
Standing and Recognition of Will, Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207 (No. 339737); Petitioner Reply 
Brief, Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207 (No. 339737). 
 187 Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 844 (denying appeal); Taylor, 134 S.W.3d at 830 (noting denial 
of appeal by state Supreme Court on May 10, 2004). No appeal was reported in Estate of Castro. 
 188 Rioux v. Coulombe (1996), 19 E.T.R. 2d 201 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.), noted in Nicholas Kasire, 
From Written Record to Memory in the Law of Wills, 29 OTTAWA L. REV. 39 (1997). 
 189 Id. ¶ 2. 
 190 Civil Code of Québec, C.C.Q. 1991, art. 712 (Can.). 
 191 Eight additional Canadian provinces and territories have enacted other versions of the power. 
See Wills Act, C.C.S.M. 2014, c W150, s 23 (Can.); Wills and Succession Act, R.S.A. 2010, c W-
12.2, s 37 (Can.); Wills, Estates and Succession Act, R.S.B.C. 2009, c 13, s 58 (Can.); Wills Act, 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 505, s 8A (Can.); Consolidated Wills Act, R.S.N.W.T (Nu) 1988, c W-5, s 13.1 
(Can.); Wills Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c W-9, s 35.1 (Can.); Probate Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c P-21, s 70 
(Can.) (requiring the testator’s signature); Wills Act, S.S. 1996, c W-14.1, s 37 (Can.). Canada’s other 
four provinces and territories have failed to enact a dispensing power. 
 192 Civil Code of Québec, C.C.Q. 1991, art. 714 (Can.). 
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On one hand, this provision is not limited to instruments that meet any 
one or more of the formal requirements for holographic or witnessed wills, 
including the type of surface on which a will must appear. On the other hand, 
the provision does demand “essential” conformity with the formal require-
ments, and courts could thereby read it to implement something more like a 
substantial-compliance doctrine.193 Finding that prior courts had interpreted the 
provision haphazardly, either allowing or precluding waivers of basic formali-
ties, the instant court resolved on a liberal approach and gave effect to the will 
by virtue of the dispensing power.194 Under the facts of the case, the court was 
“quite convinced, and even certain, that the disk . . . reflects . . . without ambi-
guity the last wishes” of the testator.195 
The most recent electronic-will case worldwide came down in the Cana-
dian province of British Columbia in 2019.196 Unlike Québec’s version of the 
dispensing power, the one in effect in British Columbia explicitly applies to 
“data that . . . is recorded or stored electronically.”197 Thus armed, the court 
gave effect to a document stored on the testator’s home computer as a will.198 
In Australia, courts have had to judge the validity of electronic wills eight 
times, and in seven of those instances probated the wills at issue. Australia 
spearheaded the dispensing power—the original statute dated to 1975 in the 
state of South Australia.199 Today, the power exists in all eight Australian states 
and territories.200 And in all of them, the power expressly covers digital imag-
es.201 Resting on this textual foundation, in decisions between 2002 and 2018, 
Australian courts have probated e-wills contained in an unsent text message, 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id.; see supra note 81. 
 194 See Rioux, 19 E.T.R. 2d 201, ¶¶ 9–20, 30. 
 195 Id. ¶ 29 (translated from the original French). 
 196 See Hubschi Estate (Re) (2019), 52 E.T.R. 4th 216 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). In a third Canadian 
case heard in the province of Saskatchewan, the court declined to invoke the dispensing power to give 
effect to a putative will contained in an e-mail message on the ground that it only gave directions for 
the decedent’s funeral and disposition of his remains rather than for the distribution of the decedent’s 
property. See Buckmeyer Estate (Re) (2008), 42 E.T.R. 3d 80, ¶¶ 5, 18–33 (Can. Sask. Q.B.). 
 197 Wills, Estates and Succession Act, R.S.B.C. 2009, c 13, s 58 (Can.). 
 198 See Hubschi Estate, 52 E.T.R. 4th 216, ¶¶ 1, 27, 59–60. 
 199 See Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1975 (SA) s 9 (Austl.). 
 200 See Wills Act 2008 (Tas.) s 10 (Austl.); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8 (Austl.); Wills Act 
2000 (NT) s 10 (Austl.); Wills Act 1997 (V) s 9 (Austl.); Succession Act 1981 (Qd) s 18 (Austl.); Wills 
Act 1970 (WA) ss 32, 34 (Austl.); Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A (Austl.); Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12 
(Austl.). 
 201 In Queensland, for example, the dispensing power applies to “any paper or other material on 
which there are marks,” together with “any disc, tape or other article or any material from which 
sounds, images, writings or messages are capable of being produced or reproduced (with or without 
the aid of another article or device).” Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qd) s 36 sched. 1 (Austl.); see also 
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Dictionary pt. 1 (Austl.) (similar provision); Interpretation Act 1987 
(NSW) s 21 (Austl.) (same); Wills Act 2015 (NT) s 10(1) (Austl.) (same); Acts Interpretation Act 1915 
(SA) s 4 (Austl.) (same); Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas.) s 24 (Austl.) (same); Interpretation of 
Legislation Act 1984 (V) s 38 (Austl.) (same); Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32(1) (Austl.). 
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on a USB stick, on a smart phone, on a lap top, on a notebook, and on a hard 
drive unit.202 In one case, however, the court denied probate to an e-will, de-
clining to wield the dispensing power for want of sufficient evidence of testa-
mentary intent.203 
The validity of electronic wills likewise arose in a pair of South African 
cases from 2002 and again in 2010. South Africa, too, has imported the dis-
pensing power, confining it to “document[s],” which go undefined in the re-
public.204 Both South African courts utilized the power to probate wills set out 
in an e-mail and on a personal computer respectively, assuming without analy-
sis that each qualified for remediation.205 
In New Zealand, a court in 2012 ruled that a decedent’s e-mail directed to 
her drafting attorney, together with handwritten notes by that attorney, could 
take effect via the dispensing power.206 A more recent decision from New Zea-
land suggests a creative theory whereby courts might give effect to an electron-
ic will even under limited versions of the dispensing power. “Adopting a pur-
posive approach,” a court in 2018 gave effect to an audio-will on the ground 
that a postmortem transcript of the audio recording qualified as a writing sub-
ject to the dispensing power.207 This theory would apply equally to e-wills, 
assuming other courts construe dispensing-power statutes as inapplicable to 
electronic records but pertinent to transcripts. 
In the absence of a dispensing power, foreign courts have rebuffed bene-
ficiaries’ efforts to probate electronic wills thus far. The issue has arisen twice 
under civil law—first in Sweden in 2012, and again in France in 2018.208 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See In re Currie [2015] NSWSC 1098, ¶ 32 (Austl.) (USB stick); Yazbek v. Yazbek [2012] 
NSWSC 594, ¶¶ 24–25 (Austl.) (laptop); In re Nichol [2017] QSC 220, ¶ 3 (Austl.) (unsent text mes-
sage); In re Yu [2013] QSC 322, ¶ 1 (Austl.) (document stored on smartphone); Re Michael [2016] 
126 SASR 299, ¶¶ 3, 36 (Austl.) (laptop); Montgomery v. Taylor (In re Will of White) [2018] VSC 16, 
¶¶ 28, 73–74 (Austl.) (notebook); In re Trethewey [2002] VSC 83, ¶ 8 (Austl.) (hard drive unit). 
 203 See Mahlo v. Hehir [2011] QSC 243, ¶¶ 1, 41–45 (Austl.) (document found on a home com-
puter). 
 204 See Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 § 2 (S. Afr.); Wills Act 7 of 1953 §§ 1, 2(3) (S. Afr.). 
 205 See Van der Merwe v. The Master 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at 544, 545, 548–49 (S. Afr.) (e-
mail), noted in Sylvia Papadopoulos, Comment, Electronic Wills with an Aura of Authenticity: Van 
der Merwe v. Master of the High Court and Another, 24 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 93 (2012); Mac-
donald v. The Master 2002 (5) SA 64 (N) at 64, 68–71 (S. Afr.) (personal computer), noted in Michael 
C. Wood-Bodley, Macdonald v. The Master: Computer Files and the ‘Rescue’ Provision of the Wills 
Act, 121 S. AFR. L.J. 34 (2004). 
 206 See In re Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [21, 24–26] & exhibits B, C (HC) (N.Z.) 
(requesting parties’ consent before issuing a declaration, which the parties provided, see id. [2012] 
NZHC 2074 at [3–4]). The dispensing power in New Zealand applies to a “document,” which the 
statute defines as “any material on which there is writing.” Wills Act 2007, ss. 6, 14 (N.Z.). The court 
ruled that an e-mail came within this definition. Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [15]. 
 207 Pfaender v. Gregory [2018] NZHC 161 at [32–34, 54] (N.Z.). The court acknowledged that an 
audio recording fell outside the scope of New Zealand’s dispensing power. See id. at [30]. 
 208 See Appendix (translating both cases). 
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The Swedish case concerned an alleged will transmitted to one of the 
beneficiaries via a text message sent on a smart phone.209 Swedish law allows 
wills that are self-written and signed by the testator under some circumstanc-
es.210 The district court held in 2012 that it could read these protocols, codified 
in 1958, purposively and dynamically in light of technological change.211 On 
this basis, the district court held the text message valid as a will. The appellate 
court reversed this decision in 2013, insisting on a strict interpretation of the 
Swedish code.212 Although the text message qualified as “self-written,” the 
court observed that “it is not possible to sign a text message,” and it was there-
fore ineffective as a will.213 
The French case came before the court of the city of Metz in 2018.214 
Once again, the purported will appeared in a text message transmitted by the 
testator to a beneficiary, which the solicitor refused to honor.215 Rather than 
seek a dynamic interpretation of the formal requirements for a holographic 
will, which is valid only if “entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of 
the testator,”216 a beneficiary challenged this provision as contravening the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, an element of the French constitu-
tion, on the theory that it infringed on freedom of testation.217 Characterizing 
this argument as “frivolous,” the court held holographic will formalities consti-
tutional as serving to protect testators from fraud and mistake.218 Because a 
text message fails to meet those formalities, it could not qualify as a will under 
French law. 
Like American courts, foreign courts are giving effect to e-wills under ex-
isting law, although not invariably so. As we shall see, foreign cases also hold 
                                                                                                                           
 209 Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (Swed.). 
 210 ÄRVDABALK [ÄB] [INHERITANCE CODE] 10:3 (Swed.). 
 211 “Due to the unprecedented technological development that has taken place since the introduc-
tion of the current provisions . . . and the impact of those developments on the way people communi-
cate, it should, in the opinion of the District Court, be possible in this way to declare one’s will.” 
Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (translated from the original Swedish). 
 212 Hovrätt [HovR] [Court of Appeals] 2013-06-13 T11306-12 (Swed.) (“According to [the Swe-
dish code] the will must be self-written and signed by the testator. The law permits no exception from 
these requirements.”) (translated from the original Swedish). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Metz, civ., Aug. 17, 
2018, 17/01794 (Fr.). 
 215 Id. The text message sought to disinherit the testator’s wife as beneficiary of part of his estate. 
Texting Is Not an Acceptable Way of Writing Will, French Court Rules, BBC (Aug. 17, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45228513 [https://perma.cc/4HBE-R3AR]. The testator and his 
wife were in the process of divorcing, and she asserted that “[m]y husband divorced me by text.” Id.; 
see also Isabelle Corpart, High Court of Metz, 17-08-2018, no. 17/01794, Summary (on file with 
author) (reporting additional background information). 
 216 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 970 (Fr.). 
 217 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Metz, civ., Aug. 17, 
2018, 17/01794. 
 218 Id. (translated from the original French). 
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significance as data points—revealing fact patterns that can guide our policy 
analysis of the issues at hand. 
V. VIRTUES AND VICES OF ELECTRONIC WILLS 
“Hail happy Times, when speculators weep, 
And undisturb’d, inactive lawyers sleep!”219 
Such is the state of the law in 2020. But, as always, law remains malleable. 
The scholar’s remit is to probe public policy, so that we may re-form, 
and reform, our law. Would granting citizens the opportunity to create electronic 
wills contribute to the public good? This question has already occasioned much 
discussion, some of it fair-minded and some of it not. A number of firms—
LegalZoom, Willing, among others—stand to profit from the legalization of e-
wills. Their voices have injected a polemical element into the debate.220 
A. Theory 
One disarmingly simple justification offered for allowing electronic wills 
is that they satisfy popular demand. “Many potential testators want to execute 
a will online. Many more will want to in the future,” the drafters of the Uni-
form Act aver.221 This reasoning calls to mind Professor Lewis Simes’s ra-
tionale for freedom of testation: “A compelling argument in favor of it is that it 
                                                                                                                           
 219 PETER MARKOE, THE TIMES, A POEM 5 (Philadelphia, Prichard & Hall 1788). 
 220 For an industry white paper posted by Willing, see Modernizing the Law to Enable Electronic 
Wills, https://willing.com/learn/modernizing-the-law-to-enable-electronic-wills.html [https://perma.cc/
T6HE-BGC4] [hereinafter Modernizing the Law]. For major recent analyses, see LAW COMMISSION 
OF ENGLAND AND WALES, MAKING A WILL 105–29 (2017), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/
lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2017/07/Making-a-will-consultation.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9VT8-N39T] [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION]; Horton, supra note 17, at 563–77; Michael J. Millo-
nig, Electronic Wills: Evolving Convenience or Lurking Trouble?, 45 EST. PLAN., May 2018, at 27; 
Developments in the Law—More Data, More Problems, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1714, 1790–811 (2018). 
For earlier analyses, see Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for 
Wills to Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865 (2007); Scott S. Boddery, Electronic 
Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 197 (2012); 
Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Elec-
tronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105 (2008); Christopher J. Caldwell, Comment, Should E-Wills 
Be Wills: Will Advances in Technology Be Recognized for Will Execution?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 467 
(2002). References to other analyses shall appear hereinafter. 
 221 Turney P. Berry, Update on ULC Activity in Estate Planning, TR. & EST., Feb. 2018, at 11, 
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accords with human wishes.”222 In a democracy, citizens should get what they 
want. 
It is not quite so easy as that. Whereas freedom of testation embodies a 
political right, electronic wills comprise merely one means of exercising a right 
that testators already enjoy. These wills fail to realize any novel political aspi-
ration. By analogy, citizens have the right to vote—but if they favored exercis-
ing that right electronically from their homes, would democratic values compel 
lawmakers to bow to this desire? In a representative democracy, lawmakers 
need not accommodate popular preferences at a granular level. Debate over e-
voting has thus addressed its utility, not its popularity.223 By the same token, 
lawmakers should focus first and foremost on the objective merits of e-wills. 
One virtue of electronic wills is the ease with which testators can create 
them. As the drafters of the Uniform Act remark, “electronic devices . . . are 
handy or comfortable” for people to use.224 By making testation “quick, inex-
pensive and convenient,” e-will legislation “could encourage more testators to 
make their wills,” industry advocates chime in, and the drafters of the Uniform 
Act are now touting e-wills explicitly on this basis.225 When citizens exercise 
their right of testation, they produce social benefits, all else being equal.226 
Upon analysis, though, the potential gain appears small. Testators can en-
joy the comforts and convenience of digital technology without creating elec-
tronic wills. Nowadays, surely, most wills begin as paperless drafts on a com-
puter file, sometimes created with will-drafting software. Only as a final step, 
when a will is ready for execution, does a testator print a hard copy onto pa-
per.227 By allowing testators to execute e-wills, lawmakers would forego the 
last step. Under such a legal regime, testators no longer need to own, or have 
access to, a printer. That represents an advantage, but a marginal one. It could 
spur testation, but probably not to a significant extent. 
Nor is all else equal. Firms specializing in electronic wills are poised to 
promote them as instruments they can help to create and store, for a fee. Firms 
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intend to target individuals who “find traditional estate planning . . . expensive 
or burdensome.”228 Whether firms would be doing those individuals a favor is 
hardly clear. F. Scott Fitzgerald observed that the “rich . . . are different from 
you and me.”229 So are the poor. While the rich fret about estate taxes, the poor 
respond to transaction costs. The price of executing a will, which causes you 
and me to yawn, represents a significant expense when one struggles to make 
ends meet. Fortunately for the less fortunate, intestacy law offers citizens a 
costless estate plan. It remains imperfect, but the price is right. If firms can 
convince poor individuals to purchase e-wills they could do without, they 
would not produce a social benefit. What is more, the do-it-yourself wills cre-
ated online are widely regarded as weak products.230 
A second argument for allowing electronic wills is that doing so accords 
with popular expectations about what the law already provides. The drafters of 
the Uniform Act posit that as “[p]eople increasingly turn to electronic tools to 
accomplish life’s tasks, including legal tasks[,] . . . . some . . . assume that they 
will be able to execute all their estate planning documents electronically 
. . . .”231 By matching the law with common assumptions, we avoid instances 
where a naïve testator executes an e-will in the false belief that one is valid. 
Lawmakers thereby reduce error costs. 
Lawmakers have pursued this strategy before. The doctrine of revocation 
by act, for instance, clashes with the stricter formalizing rules for executing 
wills that went into effect in Great Britain in the nineteenth century.232 Law-
makers chose to leave the doctrine intact because it reflected “the habit[s] of 
Englishmen,” as a contemporary commentator observed.233 
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Turn the clock forward two centuries, and we find digital technology 
molding new habits as it enters all walks of life—nowadays, men and women 
seek love at first site. But whether, in truth, those habits have fostered expecta-
tions about the validity of electronic wills remains uncertain. Unlike revocation 
by act, e-wills have no history, so any assumptions people make about them 
derive from logic. And, it seems safe to say, most people are used to perform-
ing legal tasks offline. The question demands empirical inquiry, and we shall 
return to it presently.234 
The key difference between paper and electronic wills is not the process 
of their formulation—at least so long as both must be executed—but the man-
ner of their preservation. E-wills lie in cyberspace instead of physical space. 
Industry advocates maintain that the “safe harbor for the creation and storage 
of electronic documents by a reliable custodian” functions to preserve the in-
tegrity of e-wills “just as well as, if not better than, paper documents.”235 Firms 
offering encrypted storage of e-wills as part of their service would undertake to 
guard them effectively. 
Still, dangers are lurking here. An electronic record deteriorates more rap-
idly than paper records do, and it relies on data-processing formats that be-
come obsolescent, and possibly lost, over time.236 Nor can we rest assured that 
e-will firms will remain in business for an extended period. Many of them are 
start-ups with uncertain futures;237 if they dissolve, the wills they store could 
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get lost in the shuffle, just as paper wills retained by attorney scriveners some-
times vanish when the attorneys retire. Finally, the risk of hacking hangs over 
these firms, which could prove a target for tampering, ransomware, or privacy-
infringement. Capital One, Equifax, Facebook, Marriott—and the list goes 
on—have all fallen victim to data breaches in the recent past.238 Hackers al-
ways manage to stay a step ahead of the encryptors.239 If behemoths like Face-
book are vulnerable, then so too are e-will firms. Cognizant of the danger, one 
prospective e-will firm seeks to absolve itself of any potential liability.240 
There could still be an element of truth to the industry’s talking point, in-
sofar as electronic wills stored with a firm are safer than paper wills strewn 
about testators’ residences. But even a true fact deceives when it is broadened 
into a false generalization. On one hand, testators might fail to inform anyone 
that a firm is storing their e-wills, and the firm itself might never learn of their 
deaths. And on the other hand, testators might decline a firm’s offer to store 
their e-wills—the extent of this preference needs inquiry.241 If kept on a home 
computer’s hard drive, or on a memory stick, e-wills stand at risk of accidental 
loss or want of discovery, no less than paper wills. Just as some testators hide 
their paper wills, testators executing e-wills have sometimes protected them 
with a password, hindering access post mortem.242 But the other, darker side of 
the coin is extrinsic fraud, if interested parties do have access. To be sure, pa-
per wills can also be falsified: allegations of page-substitution fraud arise from 
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time to time.243 But e-wills magnify the problem—now testators face the novel 
risk of word-substitution fraud. If “[t]he statute of wills is a statute against 
fraud,” then e-wills appear incompatible with lawmakers’ objectives.244 
Furthermore, testators who produce paper wills have at their disposal de-
pendable means of protection, both from accidental loss and extrinsic fraud, if 
they have the wisdom to use them. Testators can store their wills in a fire-proof 
safe (either their own or a box at their bank). Or, in twenty-eight states today, 
testators can deposit their wills with the probate court for safekeeping until 
death.245 Either alternative offers greater security and likelihood of discovery 
than electronic storage, whether with a firm or at home. 
Industry advocates claim that electronic wills promise “more certainty in 
property succession, speedier distributions of property and fewer estate dis-
putes”—a legal panacea!246 None of these claims stands up to analysis. The 
means by which a will is communicated has no effect on the certainty of the 
communication. A will is as clear as its scrivener, whether the words appear in 
print or in silica. Likewise, distribution occurs as speedily or slowly as probate 
occurs. We have no reason to anticipate more rapid probate of any particular 
kind of will. 
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Surely, lawmakers should seek to avert estate disputes. Survivors, and 
taxpayers who subsidize the court system, are made better off when “undis-
turb’d, inactive lawyers sleep.”247 Unfortunately, electronic wills are bound to 
foment litigation, not to forestall it. 
The principal difficulty emerges from the protean nature of electronic 
files which, when one contains a will, parties would have to prove in probate 
as an accurate representation of the performative document. If a testator writes 
over a paper will, the interlineation is apparent. If a testator revises an electron-
ic will, metadata reveals when the file was last modified, hence whether the 
change postdated the will’s execution, but unless the user activates a track-
changes program metadata does not reveal the nature of the change.248 This 
opaqueness can doom e-wills to disputation. If a testator adds material, then a 
court must disallow the change. But if a testator deletes a clause from an e-
will, then he or she effects a partial revocation by act, which some e-will stat-
utes do allow.249 Or if a testator makes a revision without any substantive sig-
nificance—capitalizing or correcting the spelling of a word, let us say—then 
the change is inconsequential. In want of evidence about the nature of a revi-
sion, an e-will is proof-proof, so to speak. 
Industry advocates are not unaware of this problem and they offer a facile 
response: 
[A]n evidentiary examination of metadata may result in the denial of 
probate to many electronic documents whose data history is insuffi-
cient to authenticate an uncorrupted will. We would not object to 
this result—indeed, it is merely a consequence of a stringent eviden-
tiary inquiry. . . . This fact should not prevent the admission of those 
electronic wills that do pass muster.250 
In other words, so long as probate courts act as gatekeepers to police electronic 
wills, we can breathe easily. But that argument is casuistry. Quite apart from 
the litigation needed to resolve these issues, which industry advocates gloss 
over at this juncture, we face a second concern—the amplification of error 
costs. Ignorant testators sometimes seek to amend their wills informally. When 
a testator writes over the words of a paper will, the court can strike the inter-
lineations.251 But if e-wills are legalized, and a testator modifies one in un-
known ways, then the court will have no choice but to reject the will in its en-
tirety. In short, by inviting testators to create e-wills, lawmakers would con-
demn more estate plans to failure in probate. Contrarily, by confining wills to 
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paper, lawmakers improve the odds that their contents are eventually suscepti-
ble to proof. 
Still another problem stems from the replicability of an electronic will. If 
a testator makes a Xerox copy of a paper will, courts can distinguish the copy 
from the original document. By contrast, copies of e-wills are identical, and if 
a testator makes a back-up on a different drive immediately after executing a 
will—as computer users might do reflexively—it could bear an identical time 
stamp.252 Which one, then, comprises the performative document? If testators 
completely or partially delete one but not the other, have they effectively re-
voked their wills in whole or in part? Again, we face evidentiary uncertainty, 
the very lifeblood of litigation.253 
Possibly the most disturbing dimension of electronic wills concerns their 
commercial ramifications. An industry white paper asserts that firms intend to 
“[m]ake the benefits of the legal system more accessible to vulnerable popula-
tions . . . . This benefit would be particularly applicable to elderly or ill people 
. . . .”254 And the narrative concludes with a disclaimer: “This white paper re-
lates to general information only and does not constitute legal advice.”255 
If all of this sounds familiar, it should. In the later decades of the twenti-
eth century, firms exploited the enthusiasm for living trusts by aggressively 
marketing boilerplate products through seminars held at retirement communi-
ties and even door-to-door solicitations.256 Some firms got sued for the unau-
thorized practice of law.257 E-will firms promise to become the trust mills of 
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Scam That Keeps on Taking, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN.: CONSUMER PROTECTION REP., May 1999, 
at 1. For a (very) early warning, see SUGDEN, supra note 233, at 17 (anticipating that changes to the 
British statute of wills in 1837 would “introduce into the country a set of pettifoggers, not attorn[eys] 
or professional persons, but a description of persons calling themselves agents, and I know of no char-
acter more dangerous”). 
 257 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens All., Inc., 689 So.2d 255, 256–59 (Fla. 1997). One 
critic has even questioned whether living trusts drafted by such firms are legally valid. See Steven G. 
Nilsson, Are Living Trusts Void When Commercially Formed Through the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law?, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1995, at 24. But see Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873, 877 (S.C. 2007) (giv-
ing effect to a will drafted by a nonlawyer). 
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the twenty-first century.258 (Of course, door-to-door solicitations have become 
passé—my own visit to the Willing website earned me an advertisement for 
the firm and its products on my Facebook account.) Firms hope to exploit the 
current enthusiasm for all things electronic, edged with old-fashioned hostility 
to the legal profession. They offer clients the chance to make their wills (as 
Willing’s advertisement soothingly assured me) “the modern way—at your 
own pace, from the comfort of your home. Answer simple questions. Print and 
sign.”259 Or just sign, if the movement for e-wills comes to fruition. 
In a word, these firms hope to make a killing on death. And when profits 
are on the line, problems of public choice enter the picture. Intent on traffick-
ing their products in states with large retirement populations, e-will firms have 
engaged lobbyists to press for validating legislation.260 When The Florida 
Bar’s statutory drafting committee refused to propose an e-wills act, the lobby-
ists bypassed it, proceeding directly to the state legislature with open purse 
strings.261 The act passed in 2017 but was vetoed by the governor.262 Undaunt-
ed, legislators enacted a new version of the bill in 2019, with a different gover-
nor in office who signed the legislation.263 Strikingly, voting on this non-
ideological measure broke down along party lines, not only in Florida but in 
Arizona as well—a telltale of strategic lobbying.264 It is no coincidence, then, 
                                                                                                                           
 258 Whether preparation of wills online constitutes unauthorized practice of law has yet to be 
resolved through litigation. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document 
Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 passim (2002). The 
drafters of the Uniform Act nonetheless aver that the e-wills planned online will be crafted by “quali-
fied professionals.” Unif. Act white paper, supra note 121, at 1. 
 259 Willing advertisement (on file with author). 
 260 See Sam Harden, Electronic Wills, Access to Justice, and Corporate Interests, LAWYERIST 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://lawyerist.com/electronic-wills-access-justice-corporate-interests [https://perma.
cc/D6JF-36RT]; Millonig, supra note 220, at 29. Willing acknowledges engaging in “efforts to pass 
the Electronic Wills Act in a number of states.” Modernizing the Law, supra note 220, preamble (“A 
Note from Willing”). 
 261 See REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. LAW SECTION FLA. BAR, WHITE PAPER ON PROPOSED EN-
ACTMENT OF THE FLORIDA ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT, https://www.flprobatelitigation.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/206/2017/05/RPPTL-Electronic-Wills-Act-White-Paper-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LTA-
42KH]. 
 262 See Letter from Rick Scott, Governor of the State of Fla., to Ken Detzner, Sec’y of State of the 
State of Fla. (June 26, 2017), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/HB-277-Veto-
Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFJ6-NP69]. 
 263 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 264 See Roll Call: FL H0409, 2019, Regular Session, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/FL/rollcall/
H0409/id/850770 [https://perma.cc/9TMW-WVCK]; Roll Call: AZ HB2656, 2018, Fifty-Third Legis-
lature 2nd Regular, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/AZ/rollcall/HB2656/id/748264 [https://perma.cc/
F885-WA7G]. In California, proposed e-will legislation is officially sponsored by LegalZoom, see 
Hearing on A.B. 1667 Before the A. Comm. on Judiciary, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2019), 
and the bill’s author summarized its purpose by paraphrasing Willing’s promotional materials. Com-
pare id. at 4, with Modernizing the Law, supra note 220, text above n.145. LegalZoom is continuing 
its efforts to promote e-will legislation in California. See LegalZoom Comments in Response to CJA 
Probate Committee Comments of 2.28.2020 (on file with author). 
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that the existing e-will statutes display similarities of drafting, and even of no-
menclature.265 Firms have hijacked the legislative process, shaping the acts to 
their liking. 
Enter the Uniform Law Commission. The drafters of the Uniform Act 
acknowledge “[p]ressure from companies wishing to expand services” while 
maintaining their determination “not [to] enshrine a particular company or 
business model in the statute[,]”266 unlike what they describe as the “industry-
drafted bills.”267 In point of fact, the drafters of the Uniform Act have succeed-
ed in producing a more neutral product.268 The Act’s provision for remote wit-
nessing could be viewed as favorable to the industry, but the Act contains no 
provision for remote execution by a non-domiciliary of the enacting state, and 
the current draft also strikes out provisions for a “qualified supervisor” that 
had appeared in an earlier draft.269 
Yet, if the drafters of the Uniform Act imagine that they are taking the 
wind out of the industry’s sails, they could not be more wrong. Promulgation 
of this act will add momentum to electronic-will legislation generally, and 
even states that adopt model laws have a long tradition of tinkering with them. 
Doubtless, industry lobbyists will be back in the cloakroom, bending ears and 
twisting arms to tweak the legislation.270 If anything, this Uniform Act plays 
into the industry’s hands. 
All of which raises the specter of industry influence behind the scenes.271 
This Uniform Act has an unusual legislative history. The Joint Editorial Board 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See supra notes 136, 146 and accompanying text. 
 266 UNIF. E-WILLS ACT (2019 Discussion Draft), supra note 131, prefatory note (capitalization 
omitted); see also Oct. 2017 Memo, supra note 221, at 2. Nonetheless, the final draft of the Act dis-
cretely omitted any reference to pressure from companies. See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, 
prefatory note. 
 267 Memorandum from Suzanne Walsh et al. to Unif. Law Comm’n (June 8, 2018), at 3, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=442
fc3a6-ba53-f1db-fce6-c52d81340e0c&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/2C6B-7FHZ]. 
 268 See id. at 1 (“The drafting committee has taken advice and counsel from estate planning law-
yers, notaries, software companies and others in developing this Act.”). 
 269 Compare UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, §§ 1–12, with UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT §§ 5, 7 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Discussion Draft, Mar. 2–3, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/
System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=fcdfd231-d8cf-45ad-51aa-b49ce86d8c1b
&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/WP4Q-2GHM]; see also supra notes 146–148, 153 and accompa-
nying text. 
 270 For an acknowledgment by a member of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Es-
tates Acts that these model laws are “subject to capture from . . . interest groups” prior to enactment 
by state legislatures, see Thomas P. Gallanis, The Dark Side of Codification, 45 ACTEC L.J. 31, 32–
35 (2019) (quotation at 34). For an example of a Uniform Act that has undergone widespread tinker-
ing by the enacting states, see Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers: How States Are Modifying the 
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 46 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 325 passim (2011). 
 271 Scholars assert that some acts developed under the aegis of the Uniform Law Commission 
have fallen under the sway of special interests even before they were promulgated. Grant Gilmore 
characterized Article 4 of the U.C.C. as resembling the work product of “a committee of dogs [as-
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for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts, which proposes projects, voted in 2016 to 
recommend appointment of a study committee “to examin[e] the feasibility of 
an electronic will . . . .”272 By the time it reached the Committee on Scope and 
Program a month later, however, the Joint Editorial Board’s recommendation 
had mutated into a proposal for formation of a drafting committee, skipping 
the customary first step of a study committee.273 
When and how the recommendation got altered goes unexplained in the 
minutes of the two committees. As a consequence of the change, the Uniform 
Law Commission plunged ahead without first contemplating in a methodical 
way the merits of electronic-will legislation.274 That decision is all the more 
surprising in light of the project’s exceptionality: The guidelines of the Uni-
form Law Commission call for “avoid[ing]” subject areas that are “entirely 
novel and with regard to which neither legislative nor administrative experi-
ence is available” along with those that are “controversial because of dispari-
ties in . . . policies . . . among the states.”275 Electronic wills are nothing if not 
controversial.276 Moreover, when this Uniform project began, only a single 
state—Nevada—had an e-will statute, and even the Nevadans had, and contin-
                                                                                                                           
signed] to draw up a protective ordinance for cats.” Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson 
(Oct. 8, 1980), quoted in Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law 
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 104 (1993); see 
also Patchel, supra, at 98–101, 120–45 (discussing the influence of interest groups); Robert E. Scott, 
The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1822–51 (1994) (same). 




 273 See Midyear Meeting of the Committee on the Scope and Program: Minutes, at 7 (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=904b2437-5173-3fb9-6017-70f9f304f2f7&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/EPS2-BMBZ]. 
Study committees ordinarily precede drafting committees. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs, State-
ment of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of Acts, 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N § 4(c), https://www.uniformlaws.org/projects/overview/newprojectcriteria [https://
perma.cc/ASK7-K6A2] [hereinafter Statement]. 
 274 The Uniform Law Commission is supposed to undertake projects only after first determining 
that they would “produce significant benefits to the public through improvements in the law.” State-
ment, supra note 273, § 1(c)(3). 
 275 Id. § 1(f)(1) & (2) (section heading omitted). The drafters justify this Act as useful to promote 
uniformity of the law. See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, prefatory note. Yet, so long as a large 
majority of states forbids e-wills, a Uniform Act validating them will have the opposite effect. What is 
more, states adopting e-will statutes are already crafting fairly similar acts as a consequence of indus-
try influence. See supra Part III. 
 276 See supra note 220 (citing to scholarly discussions). Even industry sources concede that the e-
wills have occasioned “both strong support and strong opposition.” Modernizing the Law, supra note 
220, preamble (“A Note from Willing”). Likewise, the drafters of the Uniform E-Wills Act: “This 
controversy [over e-wills] is widespread, evidenced among drafting committee members, members of 
our advisors, and lawyers in audiences whom we have addressed about this topic.” Turney P. Berry & 
Suzanne B. Walsh, Ready or Not, Here They Come: Electronic Wills Are Coming to a Probate Court 
Near You, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2019, at 62, 63. 
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ue to have, no experience whatsoever with the legislation.277 A secondary ef-
fect of the decision to proceed immediately to the drafting stage was to expe-
dite the project. Finally, it cannot go unmentioned that two members appointed 
to serve on the drafting committee have had an association with Willing.278 Of 
course, irregularities of process alone prove nothing—but neither do they in-
still confidence in the impartiality of decisions made in connection with this 
project. 
Among all of these concerns, perhaps most frightening is the drafters’ ab-
sence of fear. They have produced a product that the Uniform Law Commis-
sion touts as ideal legislation, meriting enactment throughout the nation—and 
they dare to paint on a blank canvas. 279 
B. Empirical Evidence 
To glean further insight into the public policy of electronic wills, I have 
conducted (appropriately enough) an electronic survey of public attitudes to-
ward these vehicles. I collected data over a series of months in 2018 via e-
questionnaires circulated by Qualtrics, a market-research firm, generating just 
over one thousand responses each month. 
“We hear that people want to be able to execute wills electronically,” the 
drafters of the Uniform Act report.280 Such demand would not in itself justify 
e-will legislation, given alternative outlets for the exercise of freedom of testa-
tion. Still, the nature and extent of this demand is worth investigating, if only 
                                                                                                                           
 277 The first e-will in Nevada was executed in January of 2019. See Mary Gopalan, Trust & Will 
and Notarize Partner to Deliver End-to-End Digital Will, WEALTHADVISOR (Jan. 25, 2019), https://
www.wealthadviser.co/2019/01/25/272422/trust-will-and-notarize-partner-deliver-end-end-digital-
will [https://perma.cc/ZK5E-HQTJ]; see also Dan DeNicuolo, The Future of Electronic Wills, 38 
BIFOCAL 75, 78 (2017) (noting that Nevadan estate planners unanimously disclaim any experience 
with e-wills). The absence of widespread legislation was noted in the minutes of the meeting that had 
recommended the study committee. See Minutes, supra note 272, at 4. 
 278 These are Professors John Langbein and Robert Sitkoff, respectively. Willing’s website lists 
both as having “endorsed” Willing’s white paper on e-wills. See Modernizing the Law, supra note 
220, preamble (text above “A Note from Willing”). The website also lists both as members of Will-
ing’s Legal Advisory Board, see id., although Professor Sitkoff reports that this Board is “defunct.” E-
mail from Robert Sitkoff, Professor of Law, to Adam J. Hirsch (Apr. 30, 2019) (on file with author). I 
have made multiple inquiries to Willing about the current composition of its Legal Advisory Board 
and have received no replies. At any rate, the Uniform Law Commission’s conflicts-of-interest policy 
is limited to barring committee members from “accepting compensation . . . for influencing the work 
of the Conference.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY (Jan. 18, 
1998) (on file with author). 
 279 The drafters freely concede their own ignorance: “In the next few years, we should begin to 
have empirical evidence of whether remote witnesses are boon or folly to buttress our various unsup-
ported instinctual reactions.” Turney P. Berry & Suzanne Walsh, Uniform E-Wills Act Approved, 
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Oct. 23, 2019) (para. titled “E-Will Requirements”), https://www.wealth
management.com/print/111492 [https://perma.cc/Y2CM-9RSN]. Nevertheless, “your state should 
enact” this untested act now! See Unif. Act white paper, supra note 121. 
 280 Oct. 2017 Memo, supra note 221, at 1. 
2020] In Search of a Role for Electronic Wills 871 
to determine whether commercial interests—which hope to create demand—
have had a hand in manipulating the situation. 
What the drafters ‘heard’ was a report of data from a pair of entrepreneurs 
assessing the feasibility of a start-up electronic storage firm for e-wills, who 
sat in on one of the drafting committee meetings as observers.281 The data con-
sisted of a survey of 220 persons conducted on SurveyMonkey (a do-it-
yourself online survey tool).282 This survey found that a striking 53.6% of re-
spondents would be “interest[ed]” in having an e-will.283 The question, howev-
er, was framed—properly for commercial purposes—in marketing terms: “Im-
agine there was a service that allowed you securely and reliably to store your 
estate plan in the cloud, so that it could never be lost or destroyed . . . . Assum-
ing the price was reasonable, is this something that would interest you?”284 
Additional questions followed to gauge the price elasticity of demand.285 
Framed as a disinterested inquiry, my own survey suggests weaker public 
demand for e-wills.286 The survey was conducted twice (with different follow-
up questions), but we cannot consolidate the data because a handful of the re-
spondents may have overlapped between the two surveys. Among the first 
group of respondents, 33.2% preferred an e-will, while 66.8% preferred a pa-
per will. Interest in an e-will appeared higher among the second group: 43.5% 
versus 56.5%. These data probably overestimate demand for e-wills for two 
reasons. One is sample bias: Despite deep internet penetration in the United 
States, the subpopulation that can take an e-survey overrepresents those who 
might prefer to have an e-will.287 The second, more significant, reason is pref-
erence endogeneity: The fact that my survey raised the possibility of an e-will 
suggested an idea that might never have occurred to respondents otherwise. 
Intriguingly, an age bulge appeared within both groups taking the survey. 
Both the oldest and the youngest respondents expressed stronger preferences 
for paper wills than those in middle age.288 We can only speculate about the 
                                                                                                                           
 281 E-mail from Susan N. Gary, Reporter, to Adam J. Hirsch (July 9, 2018) (on file with author). 
 282 Private survey by Jonathan Gosting and Anh-Kiet Ngo (on file with author). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 My question read: “Suppose wills that are written and signed electronically on computers were 
legally valid, even if they were never printed out and signed by hand. Would you rather make a com-
puter will, or would you prefer to make a traditional will that is written on paper and signed by hand?” 
The order of clauses in the last sentence were rotated randomly. The raw data are on file with author. 
 287 See generally Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L STAT. REV. 161 
(2010) (discussing “methodological problems” with electronic surveys). 
 288 Within the first group of respondents (with a mean age of 43.8), those aged thirty and younger 
preferred a paper will over an e-will by a margin of 61% to 39%. For those aged above thirty but be-
low fifty: 56% to 44%. For those aged fifty and older: 82% to 18%. This pattern was even more pro-
nounced among the second group of respondents (with a mean age of 43.9). Those aged thirty and 
younger preferred a paper will over an e-will by 59% to 41%. For those aged above thirty but below 
fifty: 44% to 56% (a different majority choice). For respondents aged fifty and older: 69% to 31%. 
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origins of this phenomenon. Perhaps middle-aged respondents wish to feel 
youthful by emulating what they assume would be the preferences of younger 
individuals—known in psychology as an “identification” effect—whereas the 
oldest ones are too set in their ways to emulate the young.289 Or perhaps mid-
dle-aged respondents are less wary than younger, more active, computer users, 
who better appreciate (either through acquaintances’ experiences or their own) 
the risks that would hang over an electronic will. 
Overall, these data scarcely evoke an image of unstoppable hydraulic 
pressure for electronic wills by the American citizenry. No consumer groups 
are clamoring for this innovation,290 and any narrative positing a grass-roots 
movement for e-wills is fanciful. Lower interest by younger respondents also 
casts doubt on the Uniform Law Commissioners’ assumption that demand will 
grow over time.291 In truth, the impetus for e-wills traces singularly to com-
mercial interests, and the stronger preference for e-wills expressed in the sales-
oriented survey, noted earlier, suggests that skillful marketing could succeed in 
ginning up demand.292 
Also meriting exploration is the Uniform Law Commissioner’s concern 
that citizens may wrongly assume electronic wills to be valid.293 If this mis-
conception is common, lawmakers would forestall legal error by validating e-
wills. To test this hypothesis, I asked one group of over 1,000 respondents 
whether “[i]n your opinion” a will written, signed, and witnessed on a comput-
er but “never printed out on paper and never signed by hand” would be valid. 
65.5% of respondents answered yes, and 35.5% answered no. This statistic 
suggests a significant risk of legal error—but it is not the end of the story. I 
asked the same group a follow-up question: “Did you base your answer on ac-
tual knowledge of the law, or on a logical assumption of what the law is?” On-
ly 22% claimed to know the law. A further 52% had based their responses on a 
“logical assumption of what the law is,” while 26% had merely taken “a 
guess.” 
These responses led me to ask a different question of another group of 
over 1,000 respondents: “Would you investigate the legal validity of a comput-
er will before making one, or would you assume that a computer will is legally 
valid?”294 Filtering the data to include only the responses of those who ex-
                                                                                                                           
 289 “Identification occurs as individuals conform to an attitude or behavior . . . to derive satisfac-
tion from the feeling of being similar to the model.” TERRELL G. WILLIAMS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
419 (1982). Older Americans have tended to use technology more selectively than the young. See 
Katherine E. Olson et al., Diffusion of Technology: Frequency of Use for Younger and Older Adults, 
36 AGEING INT’L 123, 142 (2011). 
 290 See Millonig, supra note 220, at 32. 
 291 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 292 See supra text accompanying notes 281–285. 
 293 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 294 The order of the clauses within the question was randomized. 
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pressed an interest in having an e-will, 66% indicated they would investigate 
before making an e-will, whereas 34% said they would take its validity for 
granted. These data suggest that legal error, although possible, is unlikely in 
this connection. 
Finally, I inquired among the subset of respondents interested in having 
an electronic will whether they would prefer to “create . . . and store it on [a] 
home computer,” or instead “go to a company specializing in the creation and 
storage of computer wills, such as LegalZoom.”295 Although each option has 
risks, the problems of proof for self-stored e-wills appear greater. From this 
perspective, the results were worrisome: 59% indicated they would prefer to 
create and store their own e-wills, whereas 41% preferred to employ a compa-
ny. Hence, if current legislative initiatives breathe life into the e-will industry, 
they may exhale even larger numbers of self-stored e-wills. These threaten to 
throw probate litigators into the briar patch. 
VI. TOWARD A POSTMODERN STATUTE 
“Of course, people do go both ways!”296 
“When you come to a fork in the road, take it!”297 
Having concluded that electronic wills should meet with disapproval, the 
question remains how broadly our indictment should extend. They are the 
worst of wills, but are they also the best of wills? Lawmakers need not march, 
headlong and headstrong, down a single path of the law. By making excep-
tions, lawmakers can pursue two paths at once. In this spirit, we may ponder 
whether any circumstances exist under which e-wills satisfy social needs. On 
reflection, I submit, the answer is yes. E-wills prove useful, and should be al-
lowed, as a legal safety-net, when a testator has lost the ability to execute an 
ordinary will. 
A. E- for Emergency 
In medieval times, dictation of a will formed part of the last confession.298 
The habit persisted, and as late as the nineteenth century in the United States, 
testation remained typically a last-minute affair.299 Today, of course, estate 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Again, the order of clauses within the question was randomized. 
 296 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (scene in which the Scarecrow gives di-
rections to Dorothy). 
 297 YOGI BERRA & DAVE KAPLAN, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT! (2001). 
 298 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
318–20, 340 (2d ed. 1968). 
 299 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th Century: A Study of Essex Coun-
ty (New Jersey) Wills, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 37–39 (1964). 
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planning earlier in life has grown commonplace. Still, many persons remain 
reluctant testators, for psychological or other reasons. The thought of perishing 
is terrifying—so they perish the thought. They avoid situations, such as estate 
planning, that force them to confront their own mortality.300 On top of that, a 
longstanding superstition warns against will making as a self-fulfilling prophe-
cy, causing some to put it off.301 
The problem arises that when an individual neglects to execute a will 
while well and then suddenly falls ill, he or she must endeavor to make a will 
in a hurry. For some, death arrives too quickly, and intestacy results. Others 
execute their wills in the nick of time. Both scenarios feature regularly in the 
published reports.302 
It seems unlikely that lawmakers could do much to overcome procrastina-
tion (putting aside the legitimacy of any such effort). The aversion to estate 
planning runs deep, and even those who devote themselves to the field are not 
immune.303 Lawmakers can contend with the problem indirectly, however, by 
easing the process of emergency testation. 
Doing so is not without dangers. Testators who plan their estates as death 
nears might operate under the impairment of pain or fear, and they may lack 
time to contemplate their choices with care. The end is often the bitter end.304 
Historically, lawmakers in some states placed limitations on freedom of testa-
tion that applied exclusively to emergency wills. Under mortmain statutes, a 
testator could not bequeath to charitable organizations when close to death “as 
a protection against hasty and improvident gifts,”305 and also “to protect [fami-
lies] from any improper influences that might [be] exercised over him when in 
                                                                                                                           
 300 See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1047–51 (2004) (discussing the psychological literature on “terror manage-
ment”). 
 301 See In re Estate of Gutierrez, 11 Cal. Rptr. 51, 54 (Ct. App. 1961); Hirsch, supra note 300, at 
1048 & n.61. The superstition has British roots. See Gillow v. Bourne [1831] 162 Eng. Rep. 1417, 
1419. 
 302 See, e.g., In re Estate of Dellinger v. 1st Source Bank, 793 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (Ind. 2003) 
(concerning a will executed one day before death); In re Estate of Robinson, 477 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 
(App. Div. 1984) (thirty-two minutes before death); cf., e.g., Franicevich v. Peterson, No. A138435, 
2014 WL 126098, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014) (concerning a testator who died before she 
could execute an intended will); Babcock v. Malone, 760 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(same); In re Will of Kern, 158 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (Sur. Ct. 1956) (same). 
 303 The author of a renowned nineteenth-century treatise on wills, Thomas Jarman, died intes-
tate—a story his embarrassed publishers sought to suppress. See R.E. MEGARRY, MISCELLANY-AT-
LAW 172 (1955). 
 304 For an early recognition, see Statute of Uses 1536, 27 Hen. 8 c. 10, preamble (Eng.) (observ-
ing that testators “visited with Sickness, in their extreme Agonies and Pains,” may plan their estates 
“indiscreetly and unadvisedly”); see also, e.g., McKee v. McKee’s Ex’r, 160 S.W. 261, 264 (Ky. 
1913) (citing similar concerns about wills executed near death). 
 305 In re Dwyer’s Estate, 115 P. 242, 245 (Cal. 1911). 
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extremis.”306 These statutes are extinct today.307 Lawmakers instead rely on 
doctrines of testamentary capacity and undue influence to protect against poor-
ly planned or tainted estate plans.308 
Prevailing doctrines aim rather to facilitate emergency estate planning. 
One example appears within the law of gifts. Persons ordinarily cannot make a 
gift revocable.309 But lawmakers have carved out an exception for persons who 
anticipate imminent death. Those persons, and those alone, are free to make 
revocable gifts, known in acknowledgment of their distinctness as gifts causa 
mortis.310 These gifts serve, in effect, as a form of estate planning.311 And 
whereas courts have long expressed misgivings about gifts causa mortis as “an 
invasion into the province of the statute of wills,”312 they are justified on the 
ground of exigency: “A person who fears he or she is about to die should have 
available some simple means of having his or her final wishes effectuated in 
regard to the disposition of personal property in the event of death.”313 
In the same vein, in a quarter of the states, lawmakers have relaxed the 
rules of testation for those who need it most urgently. Whereas wills ordinarily 
must be committed to writing, fifteen jurisdictions make an exception, allow-
ing testators to create their wills by oral declaration (a nuncupative will) when 
their lives are in jeopardy.314 As with gifts causa mortis, courts have expressed 
unease about the doctrine. “[T]he policy of the law . . . declares that a nuncu-
pative will is never favored,” the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania averred.315 
Far more states acknowledged nuncupative wills in the past than do today.316 
                                                                                                                           
 306 Bell v. Miss. Orphans Home, 5 So.2d 214, 217 (Miss. 1941). 
 307 The last American mortmain statute was repealed in 1997. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-10 
(repealed 1997). 
 308 See Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 299–315, 346–55 
(2017). 
 309 WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES § 4.5 (5th ed. 2017). 
 310 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. zz 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999–2011). 
 311 See, e.g., Foster v. Reiss, 112 A.2d 553, 556 (N.J. 1955) (“[A] gift Causa mortis is essentially 
of a testamentary nature . . . .”). 
 312 Id.; see also, e.g., Bessett v. Huson (In re Estate of Bessett), 39 P.3d 220, 222 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 313 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1992). 
 314 These are: Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Caroli-
na, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. 
Three of the fifteen confine nuncupative wills to small estates, and seven more limit them to soldiers 
and sailors in harm’s way. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6 (repealed 2018); id. tit. 14, § 7 (amended 
2018); Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 851–52 nn.272–73 (2014). 
 315 Mellor v. Smyth, 69 A. 592, 595 (Pa. 1908); see also ATKINSON, supra note 16, § 76, at 367 & 
n.37. 
 316 In 1960, forty-two states authorized nuncupative wills. See John B. Rees, Jr., American Will 
Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 637–38 (1960). Whereas early model lawmakers approved of nuncu-
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Once again, their rationale lies in exigency. Blackstone ventured that “favour 
ought to be shewn to [a nuncupative will], when the testator is surprized by 
sudden and violent sickness,” but not otherwise.317 American courts reiterate 
this sentiment. Nuncupative wills represent a “special indulgence, as a last re-
sort . . . which has no foundation but necessity.”318 And again: “The law wisely 
discriminates between written and unwritten wills, and permits the latter only 
in cases of urgent necessity.”319 
Another genre of will also finds justification in this concern. Twenty-six 
states today permit testators to produce handwritten wills without witnesses, 
known as holographic wills.320 Unlike nuncupative wills, holographic wills are 
not confined to the eleventh-hour, and they can function as cheap alternatives 
to executed wills for testators of modest means.321 Still, commentators recom-
mend holographic wills only as vehicles for emergency estate planning.322 
Within this precinct, their value derives not from economy but from the ease 
and speed with which a testator can create them, forgoing an execution cere-
mony. Given their more widespread validity, holographic wills have eclipsed 
their nuncupative counterparts as vehicles for testation near death.323 
The United States is not alone in having set off emergency estate planning 
as a discrete problem. Civil law jurisdictions have put in place rules identifying 
the same problem. Ordinarily under German law, a testator must either declare 
a will before a notary or prepare a holographic will.324 At the same time, “[i]f it 
is feared that the testator will die sooner than it is possible to make a will be-
                                                                                                                           
pative wills, see MODEL CODE, supra note 101, § 49, their successors did not. See UNIF. PROB. CODE 
§ 2-502 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). 
 317 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *501. 
 318 Martin v. Rutt (In re Rutt’s Estate), 50 A. 171, 171 (Pa. 1901) (quoting the opinion below). 
 319 Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 502, 515 (N.Y. 1822). 
 320 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 statutory 
note (tallying the states). 
 321 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). For a 
further discussion see Hirsch, supra note 12, at 1073–75. 
 322 See GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS LAW OF WILLS § 19:12 (4th ed. 2018); Stephen Clowney, In 
Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP., TR. 
& EST. L.J. 27, 58 (2008); Thomas E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 343, 361–62 
(2016) (polling attorneys); see also In re Estate of Brackenridge, 245 S.W. 786, 788–89 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1922) (observing that “[t]he provisions as to holographic wills were evidently enacted to enable 
a person to prepare his own will, when he cannot procure the assistance of others . . . .”), rev’d, 
Brackenridge v. Roberts, 267 S.W. 244 (Tex. 1924). 
 323 See Clowney, supra note 322, at 58–59 (tabulating the frequency of emergency holographic 
wills); see also David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1137–38 (2015) 
(noting anecdotal examples). For a famous Canadian example, see W.M. Elliott, Wills—Writing 
Scratched on Tractor Fender—Granting of Probate, 26 CAN. B. REV. 1242 (1948). Cf. Hirsch, supra 
note 314, at 853 n.283 (remarking a continuing stream of published cases concerning nuncupative 
wills, suggesting their persistence into modern times).  
 324 See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB][CIVIL CODE], §§ 2231, 2247, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html [https://perma.cc/76W7-J4CR] (Ger.). 
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fore a notary,” the Germans allow a testator to create what they describe as an 
“emergency will” by declaring it before three witnesses.325 Similarly under 
Swedish law, a testator must ordinarily sign a written will in the presence of 
two witnesses.326 Nonetheless, if “illness or other emergency” intervenes, a 
testator can recite the will before two witnesses or “self-writ[e]” and sign it 
without witnesses.327 
By bending over backward to facilitate emergency wills, lawmakers ex-
pand freedom of testation. At the same time, any relaxation of the requirements 
set by the statute of wills threatens the policies that will formalities advance. 
Those formalities guard wills against stale evidence or fraud, while certifying, 
via their ritual component, that any alleged expression of testamentary intent 
represented a finalized estate plan.328 
We may observe, however, that this tension prevails irrespective of the 
circumstances. By relaxing the requirements for everyday wills, we would 
likewise promote freedom of testation, again at the expense of lowering our 
guard against error and fraud. In this light, how can we justify distinguishing 
emergency wills from other wills? Why not resolve the tension consistently, 
one way or the other? 
On reflection, we can posit that the ex ante effect of adjustments of will 
formalities sets the two situations apart. If lawmakers loosened the formaliza-
tion requirements applicable to everyday wills, fewer testators would trouble 
themselves to execute their wills in optimal ways. By contrast, if lawmakers 
carved out an exception for emergency wills, easing the requirements that per-
tain only to those wills, lawmakers would create no perverse incentives. Testa-
tors who make their estate plans under exigent circumstances fail to formalize 
them optimally out of necessity, not out of laxity. 
What is more, the backdrop of an emergency will—its proximity to 
death—serves in part to compensate for waivers of formalities. Those with one 
foot in the grave appreciate the graveness of their actions—they realize they 
                                                                                                                           
 325 See id. §§ 2249–2252.  
 326 See ÄRVDABALK [ÄB] [INHERITANCE CODE] 10:1 (Swed.). 
 327 Id. 10:3. The French code provides for emergency testation only for military personnel, per-
sons under quarantine, persons on sea voyages, and persons on isolated islands. See CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 967–1001 (Fr.). In Great Britain, except for military personnel, neither nun-
cupative nor holographic wills are allowed under modern law, but gifts causa mortis remain valid. See 
An Act for the Amendment of the Laws with Respect to Wills 1837, 1 Vict. c. 26, §§ 9, 11 (Eng.). See 
generally ANDREW BORKOWSKI, DEATHBED GIFTS: THE LAW OF DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA (1999). 
Nuncupative wills are also permissible in China “in an emergency situation.” Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jicheng Fa (中華人民共和國繼承法) [Law of Succession of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 10, 1985, effective Oct. 1, 1985), art. 17, 1985 
P.R.C. LAWS (China) [hereinafter P.R.C. Law of Succession]. 
 328 For a classic discussion, see Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratu-
itous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 5–13 (1941). 
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must take a stand and finalize their estate plans.329 And when an estate plan 
comes to fruition on the heels of death, less time remains for evidence to dete-
riorate or for would-be perpetrators to commit fraud. 
Whether nuncupative wills nonetheless implicate too many risks for law-
makers to tolerate remains a question.330 Be that as it may, advancing technol-
ogy now offers lawmakers the opportunity to reconfigure the category of 
emergency will-making. Electronic wills are unlikely to alter tropisms toward 
procrastination earlier in life. Estate plans are intimidating irrespective of their 
media of communication. But e-wills can serve usefully as vehicles for emer-
gency estate planning, providing greater protection against error or fraud—
greater, at least, than the low-tech alternative of a nuncupative will. 
An electronic will is an alterable writing, but still something that people 
read. No resort to the memory of auditors is required to reconstruct one. But 
lawmakers need not stop there, for the same can be said of other modern com-
municative technologies. Testators could audio- or video-record emergency 
wills on portable devices that afford greater safety from misreporting or fraud 
than a nuncupative will. Indeed, these wills appear easier to authenticate than 
an e-will, and these, too, could ease the process of emergency estate planning 
for testators who must do it themselves, yet who have lost the use of their 
hands, or who simply lack skills of composition. One testator explained that he 
had prepared an emergency video-will, rather than a written one, because he 
was “no good with paperwork.”331 In a string of foreign cases, courts have val-
idated audio- and video-wills under foreign versions of the dispensing power.332 
                                                                                                                           
 329 See Sykes v. Sykes, 2 Stew. 364, 369 (Ala. 1830) (observing that if an alleged maker of a 
nuncupative will had sensed imminent death “he would have evinced something of that hurried anxie-
ty which fearful necessity seldom fails to produce”); In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 214 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (per curiam) (“The fact that decedent wrote a note providing for disposition of 
his property in anticipation of his impending death supports the conclusion that it was a final docu-
ment . . . .”); In re Russell [2016] SASC 56, ¶ 19 (Austl.) (inferring performative intent to make a 
video-will from the circumstance “that he knew his death was imminent”); Montgomery v. Taylor (In 
re Will of White) [2018] VSC 16, ¶ 71 (Austl.) (inferring performative intent to make an e-will from 
testator’s “imminent suicide”).  
 330 Some inheritance scholars have favored abolishing nuncupative wills altogether, given “the 
frailties of oral proof,” see, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 16, § 76, at 367, whereas others advocate 
“afford[ing] a dying man who has no opportunity to make a formal will the privilege of making a last 
minute oral disposition . . . .” Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 328, at 14. For references to additional 
discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 314, at 853 nn.280–83. 
 331 Mellino v. Wnuk [2013] QSC 336, 1. 19 (Austl.); see also In re Wai Fun Chan [2015] NSWSC 
1107, ¶ 38 (Austl.) (explaining that the testator “expressed a strong desire to speak to her children in 
making her intentions known to them”); Radford v. White [2018] QSC 306, ¶ 5 (Austl.) (“As I am too 
lazy [to write a will], I’ll just say it.”). 
 332 See Wai Fun Chan [2015] NSWSC 1107, ¶ 67; Treacey v. Edwards (In re Estate of Edwards) 
[2000] NSWSC 846, ¶ 37 (Austl.); In re Quinn [2019] QSC 99, ¶ 45 (Austl.); Radford [2018] QSC 
306, ¶ 26; In re Estate of Carrigan [2018] QSC 206, ¶ 26 (Austl.); Mellino, [2013] QSC 336, ll. 5–8; 
Russell [2016] SASC 56, ¶ 20 (dicta); In re Wilden [2015] SASC 9, ¶ 22 (Austl.); In re Will of Lad-
duhetti (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, McMillan, J., 20 Sept. 2013) (Austl.); Pfaender v. 
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With the possible exception of Indiana and Nevada, the modern American e-will 
acts fail to allow audio- or video-wills, by comparison, and the one American 
case on point held a tape-recorded will void for want of due execution.333 
The drafters of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act expressly disallow au-
dio- and video-wills, but their policy analysis fails to explore the utility of 
these vehicles as emergency wills.334 The drafters’ principal concern was un-
certainty, both of performative intent and substantive meaning: “[W]riting em-
phasizes seriousness of intent,”335 and “[p]eople are likely to be less precise 
when talking than when writing, and oral ramblings may be difficult to fol-
                                                                                                                           
Gregory [2018] NZHC 161 at [53] (N.Z.); see also Cassie v. Koumans [2007] NSWSC 481, ¶¶ 9, 14–
15 (Austl.) (dicta that a video-will could be held valid, but finding an absence of testamentary intent); 
In re Estate of Standish [2018] VSC 629, ¶ 46 (Austl.) (dismissing motion for summary judgment by 
contestant of audio-will); Elphinstone Estate (Re) (2017), 31 E.T.R. 4th 252, ¶ 11 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) 
(leaving issue of validity to a subsequent hearing). Under Chinese law, audio-wills created in the pres-
ence of two or more witnesses are valid per se. See P.R.C. Law of Succession, supra note 327, art. 17. 
 333 See Buckley v. Holstedt (In re Estate of Reed), 672 P.2d 829, 831–32 (Wyo. 1983). The exist-
ing e-will statutes all require electronic signatures, and none has any form of dispensing power. See 
supra notes 126–127, 134 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, in Indiana and Nevada the “electronic 
signature” of the testator and witnesses formalizing an e-will can comprise, inter alia, “an electronic 
sound.” See IND. CODE §§ 26-2-8-102(10), 29-1-21-3(9)–(10) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 132.118, 
133.085(1)(b) (2017); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1201(20) (2019) (defining an “electronic sig-
nature” without reference to sound); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.521(3) (West 2019) (same). In lieu of 
witnesses, an e-will in Nevada can contain an “authentication characteristic of the testator,” which can 
comprise, inter alia, a “video recording.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(1)(b)(1) & (5)(a) (2017). An e-
will must appear in an “electronic record,” which both Indiana and Nevada define broadly to include 
any record “stored by electronic means.” IND. CODE §§ 26-2-8-102(9), 29-1-21-3(8), (10); NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 132.117, 133.085(1)(a). But cf. IND. CODE § 29-1-21-5 (contemplating the videotaping of the 
execution of an electronic will for evidentiary purposes). 
 334 The will-execution and dispensing power provisions found in the Uniform Act both require a 
“record that is readable as text.” UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, §§ 5(a)(1), 6 (Alternative A). But 
cf. Unif. Act white paper, supra note 121, at 1 (claiming that “[t]he Uniform E-Wills Act is technolo-
gy-neutral”). 
 335 UNIF. E-WILLS ACT (2019 Discussion Draft), supra note 131, § 5 cmt; cf. UNIF. E-WILLS 
ACT, supra note 92, § 5 cmt. (omitting discussion of the rationale for this restriction). The drafters had 
raised the issue of whether a testator who left “instructions on the lawyer’s voicemail” could thereby 
make a valid will. Memorandum from Suzanne Walsh et al. to Drafting Comm. on Elec. Wills (Jan. 
21, 2019), at 2, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
DocumentFileKey=c8544002-3652-a2e7-2ba5-30204a4fffc7&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/PSS9-
F2M2] [hereinafter Jan. 2019 Memo]. Such instructions might or might not reflect testamentary in-
tent. Yet, this problem is hardly unique to audio-wills: It also arises when a testator pens holographic 
instructions to an attorney for a will, see Price v. Huntsman, 430 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1968), and it could arise again in connection with e-wills if a testator emailed instructions to an attor-
ney for a will which beneficiaries seek to probate under the Uniform Act’s dispensing power. See In 
re Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [17–18] & exhibits B, C (HC) (N.Z.) (giving effect under 
the dispensing power to an e-mail from decedent to attorney together with attorney’s notes); see also 
infra note 421 and accompanying text. The drafters also fretted that “issues of proof and preservation 
of oral-only records would be too much for the legal system to adapt to now.” Berry & Walsh, supra 
note 276, at 62. Yet, courts admit sound recordings routinely into evidence today. See 2 MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 215, at 35–39 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013). 
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low.”336 The drafters also worried that “if the statute authorizes video wills, 
people are likely to create companies to use that idea as a business model.”337 
In point of fact, if a testator creates an audio- or video-will in anticipation 
of imminent death, the setting itself indicates seriousness of intent.338 What is 
more, homemade written wills also suffer from defects of expression, as count-
less courts have complained,339 and those same defects would bedevil courts 
construing electronic wills. Modern technology further blurs the distinction: 
the Uniform Act validates e-wills that appear as text which a testator created 
by voice-activation software.340 It is not the medium of communication but the 
want of professionalism that gives rise to incoherence. Finally, the drafters are 
doubtless correct about the commercial ramifications of validating audio-and 
video-wills. Companies that videotape will execution ceremonies for eviden-
tiary purposes already exist.341 But if this concern drove the drafters of the 
Uniform Act to forbid audio- and video-wills, then why did the same concern 
not cause them to tear up their act validating e-wills?342 
By limiting electronic wills to emergencies, lawmakers would stymie 
their commercialization. And lawmakers would also sidestep another danger of 
high-tech estate planning—namely, that by the time an e-will matures it will 
have become inaccessible. Technology marches at a furious pace, which could 
prove the undoing of an e-will formatted with some soon-to-be-forgotten pro-
gram.343 This risk disappears in connection with emergency estate planning. If 
an e-will matures on the heels of its execution, its technological currency is 
assured. 
Of course, low-tech holographic wills present another option for testators 
who are pressed for time. Even in jurisdictions that prefer to bar holographic 
wills generally, lawmakers might allow them singularly as vehicles of emer-
gency testation. But the difficulty now emerging is that fewer citizens possess 
the ability to handwrite documents. American schools no longer teach cursive 
                                                                                                                           
 336 Jan. 2019 Memo, supra note 335, at 2. 
 337 Id. 
 338 See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 339 See, e.g., In re Burtt’s Estate, 44 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1945) (describing the holographic will at 
issue as “a jumble of words”); White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tenn. 1977) (observing that “as 
in so many other cases involving wills drafted by lay persons . . . the words chosen by the testatrix are 
not specific enough to clearly state her intent”). A court faced with an audio-will that contained “va-
garies” observed that this attribute was unremarkable: “[T]estamentary intentions need not be ex-
pressed perfectly. . . . Wills are sometimes vague and uncertain.” Estate of Standish [2018] VSC 629, 
¶ 43. 
 340 See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 5 cmt. 
 341 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS 68 (2009). 
 342 For additional commentary on audio- and video-wills, published prior to the advent of smart 
phones, see ATKINSON, supra note 16, § 63, at 296; Gerry W. Beyer & William R. Buckley, Vide-
otape and the Probate Process: The Nexus Grows, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 43, 49–61, 74–75 (1989). For a 
modern British perspective, see LAW COMMISSION, supra note 220, at 127–28. 
 343 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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handwriting, and it is gradually becoming a lost art.344 Even those who still 
command the art may fail to keep pen and paper readily at hand.345 These fac-
tors help to explain resort to electronic wills in several published cases.346 And 
as incumbent vehicles of emergency estate planning grow less well adapted to 
a changing social environment, we need replacements to fill the legal niche. E-
wills and audio-wills recorded on portable devices can serve that end—
imperfectly, to be sure, but more serviceably than the holographic and nuncu-
pative wills of old. 
A glance at the trickle of published electronic-will cases suggests the im-
portance of this element. Out of the eighteen cases reported globally thus far, 
nine involved e-wills made under clear conditions of urgency; in seven of 
those nine cases, the authors of e-wills committed suicide.347 Cases addressing 
                                                                                                                           
 344 See Anne Chemin, Handwriting vs. Typing: Is the Pen Still Mightier Than the Keyboard?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/dec/16/cognitive-benefits-hand
writing-decline-typing [https://perma.cc/4VMV-EBAE]; Ewen Hosie, The Uncertain Future of 
Handwriting, BBC (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20171108-the-uncertain-future-
of-handwriting [https://perma.cc/HZH6-EP4A]; Katie Zezima, Can You Read This? It’s Cursive, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at A15. 
 345 As a Swedish court weighing the validity of an e-will observed, “[t]hose who have a mobile 
phone in their pocket are probably far greater in number than those with paper and pen.” Tingsrätt 
[TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (Swed.) (translated from the original Swedish). A British 
survey of two thousand persons in 2014 found that one in three had written nothing “by hand in the 
previous six months.” See Chemin, supra note 344. 
 346 See Estate of Castro, supra note 165, at 414 (“Because they did not have any paper or pencil, 
[the testator’s brother] suggested that the will be written on his Samsung Galaxy tablet.”). In Estate of 
Horton, the decedent (aged 21) penned his suicide note, referring to an electronic document, in indi-
vidually printed letters. Whereas the note was four sentences long, the electronic document was three 
full pages in length, which would have taken quite a while to write out in printed letters. See Estate of 
Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209 (noting the testator’s age); Exhibits 1 & 2, Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 
207 (No. 339737). 
 347 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209 (will created in anticipation of suicide); Estate of 
Castro, supra note 165, at 414–15 (will created one month before death); In re Currie [2015] NSWSC 
1098, ¶¶ 28, 32 (Austl.) (will created three years before death); Yazbek v. Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594, 
¶¶ 4, 23, 49 (Austl.) (will created just prior to holiday, but over a year before death by suicide); In re 
Nichol [2017] QSC 220, ¶¶ 3, 13 (Austl.) (will created in anticipation of suicide); In re Yu [2013] 
QSC 322, ¶ 1 (Austl.) (will created on same day as suicide); Mahlo v. Hehir [2011] QSC 243, ¶¶ 1, 
34–35 (Austl.) (document created two weeks before apparent suicide); Re Michael [2016] 126 SASR 
299, ¶¶ 2, 10–14 (Austl.) (will create on the same day as attempted suicide, followed by successful 
suicide four months later); Montgomery [2018] VSC 16, ¶¶ 19–27 (will created on the same day as 
suicide); In re Trethewey [2002] VSC 83, ¶¶ 1–2 (Austl.) (will created five months before death); 
Hubschi Estate (Re) (2019), 52 E.T.R. 4th 216, ¶¶ 13, 17 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (document containing 
will modified on the date of death, while suffering complications from surgery); Rioux v. Coulombe 
(1996), 19 E.T.R. 2d 201, ¶ 2 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.) (will created three months before suicide); Buck-
meyer Estate (Re) (2008), 42 E.T.R. 3d 80, ¶ 5 (Can. Sask. Q.B.) (document indicated that decedent 
was “very sick and in his last days”); Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Metz, civ., Aug. 17, 2018, 17/01794 (Fr.) (will created on same day as suicide, see 
Corpart, supra note 215); Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [2] & exhibit C (e-mail sent 48 days 
before death);Van der Merwe v. The Master 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at 545–46 (S. Afr.) (will created 
eight months before death); Macdonald v. The Master 2002 (5) SA 64 (N) at 67 (S. Afr.) (will created 
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the validity of audio- and video-wills echo the same theme. Out of the fourteen 
cases to date worldwide, eight involved wills recorded close to death, and four 
of those eight anticipated suicide.348 The fraction of conventional wills 
prompted by emergencies is far lower, as American and British studies at-
test.349 
The Swedish district court hearing one of these cases took the position 
that technological convenience justified electronic wills only under conditions 
of emergency.350 And one cannot but wonder whether American courts have 
                                                                                                                           
at uncertain time prior to suicide); Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (will created 
on same day as suicide).  
 348 See Buckley, 672 P.2d at 830–32 (audio recording, circumstances unclear); Wai Fun Chan 
[2015] NSWSC 1107, ¶ 35 (DVD recorded 3½ months before death); Cassie [2007] NSWSC 481, ¶ 1 
(video recorded two years before death); Edwards [2000] NSWSC 846, ¶¶ 2, 6 (audio recorded six-
teen days before death); Quinn [2019] QSC 99, ¶ 1 (video recorded four years before eventual sui-
cide); Radford [2018] QSC 306, ¶¶ 2, 4–5 (video recorded fourteen months before death, prompted by 
risk of an accident that did ensue on the same day as the video was recorded); Estate of Carrigan 
[2018] QSC 206, ¶¶ 1, 9–14 (audio recorded on the day of suicide); Mellino [2013] QSC 336, ll. 10–
12 (video recorded at unknown time while contemplating suicide); Russell [2016] SASC 56, ¶¶ 6, 12 
(video recorded within one day of suicide); In re Wilden [2015] SASC 9, ¶¶ 2–3 (Austl.) (DVD rec-
orded 8½ years before death); Estate of Standish [2018] VSC 629, ¶ 1 (audio recorded one week be-
fore death); Will of Ladduhetti (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, McMillan, J, 20 Sept. 2013) 
(two web-cam videos recorded within one week of suicide); Elphinstone Estate, 31 E.T.R. 4th 252, 
¶ 4 (video recorded two days before death); Pfaender [2018] NZHC 161 at [11–12] (audio recorded 
two weeks before death). For the most recent example, which has not yet generated judicial proceed-
ings, see Travis Fedschun, Canadian Manhunt Killers Recorded “Last Will and Testament” on Phone 
Before Killing Themselves, FOX NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/world/canadian-
manhunt-killers-suicide-video-message-will [https://perma.cc/MX8X-6PLS] (video recorded on iPhone 
prior to double suicide). 
 349 See JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND FAMILIES 57–58 (1996) (finding that 
11% of British wills and one-third of British codicils were created within one year of death); Mark 
Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J. 221, 258–60 (2019) (finding that 3.4% of wills submit-
ted for probate in Hamilton County, Ohio were created within one month of death); Horton, supra 
note 323, at 1129–30 (finding that 7% of wills submitted for probate in Alameda County, California 
were created within one month of death). Professor David Horton also noticed the disproportionate 
number of suicidal authors of e-wills and speculated that “[i]f that trend continues, electronic will 
cases may also degenerate into disputes over capacity.” Horton, supra note 17, at 575–76; see also 
UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 6 cmt. (repeating this observation). In fact, in two of the e-will 
cases, a suicidal testator’s capacity was challenged unsuccessfully. See Montgomery [2018] VSC 16, 
¶¶ 4, 55–68; Nichol [2017] QSC 220, ¶¶ 47–57; see also Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 
T5746-11 (concluding that the testator was not suffering from a “mental disorder” due to alcohol 
consumption that would have disempowered him from making a will). Even when testamentary ca-
pacity is not contested, no presumption of capacity exists for improperly formalized wills under Aus-
tralian law. See, e.g., Estate of Carrigan [2018] QSC 206, ¶ 17. Nonetheless, suicidality is not in itself 
indicative of testamentary incapacity under American law. See, e.g., Finkler v. Purcell, 46 P.2d 149, 
153 (Cal. 1935) (“[A]ll persons who commit suicide are aberrant, abnormal, and therefore insane. But 
such is not the insanity which the law [of inheritance] has in mind.”); Roche v. Nason, 77 N.E. 1007, 
1009 (N.Y. 1906) (similar observation). 
 350 “It should be emphasized that this reasoning does not in any way refer to ordinary wills but 
should only apply in cases where the testator is in distress.” Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-
16 T5746-11 (translated from the original Swedish). 
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also responded, sotto voce, to the equities presented by individual cases. Both 
Estate of Castro and Estate of Horton concerned testators who were at death’s 
door—and, both times, courts chose to read vague definitional provisions 
broadly, upholding last-ditch efforts at estate planning.351 Would those same 
courts have taken a permissive stance in the face of less sympathetic facts? 
Who can say? But, at a minimum, all of these cases demonstrate the potential 
of e-wills to save the day when emergencies arise. 
Were lawmakers to set out a new category of emergency wills, it could 
borrow a requirement applicable to nuncupative wills to secure them further. 
Under a longstanding rule, witnesses must reduce nuncupative wills to writing 
within a short space of time.352 This requirement appears useful in connection 
with electronic wills for the same reason: to safeguard evidence. Here, though, 
the risk is less deterioration of memory than vulnerability to tampering, alt-
hough both could now be implicated. In one of the e-will cases, where the con-
testant questioned the provability of the will at issue, the court observed that an 
individual who had discovered and read the e-will testified that she “would 
‘[a]bsolutely’ recognize if the [will] had been changed.”353 Obviously, paper 
evidence would provide greater security than recollections. This requirement 
appears less relevant to audio- or video-wills, which would require great so-
phistication to doctor—yet even those wills remain vulnerable to partial eras-
ure by interested parties. 
A key issue remaining is whether emergency e-wills should require a sig-
nature or witnesses, as under modern e-will legislation.354 Nuncupative wills 
have always required multiples witnesses.355 Holographic wills have never re-
quired any, but testators do have to sign them.356 Neither requirement appears 
well adapted to the purpose of emergency testation, where time is of the es-
sence. A dying testator might be alone; and the difficulty of generating a cur-
sive signature argues against anything more than a typed name. Among the 
eighteen published cases to date, only a single one has involved an e-will 
                                                                                                                           
 351 See supra notes 165–187 and accompanying text. 
 352 This requirement appeared in the British statute of frauds of 1677 and was replicated in the 
Model Probate Code. See Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 19 (Eng.); MODEL CODE, supra 
note 101, § 49(a)(2). It persists today in seven nuncupative-will jurisdictions in the United States. See 
Hirsch, supra note 314, at 854 n.287. 
 353 Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213 n.5. 
 354 See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
 355 This requirement traces to the British statute of frauds. See Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2, 
c.3, § 18 (Eng.). Traditionally, gifts causa mortis in the United States have not required witnesses, 
although the absence of such a requirement has caused courts to brand them as “dangerous things.” 
Foster v. Reiss, 112 A2d 553, 557 (N.J. 1955) (quoting Dunn v. Houghton, 51 A. 71, 78 (N.J. Ch. 
1902)). Statutes in two states do require witnesses for gifts causa mortis. See Hirsch, supra note 314, 
at 848. 
 356 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). 
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signed and witnessed longhand on a tablet.357 None of the others were wit-
nessed, “[a]s can be expected,” one court observed.358 Five of the others in-
cluded no signature, eight more included a typed signature (or initials), one 
included a digital facsimile of the testator’s signature, one included a handwrit-
ten signature on a label upon the electronic record, and in two cases the nature 
of the signature was unclear.359 
In point of fact, when the will at issue appears on a smart phone, as in five 
of the cases, typing becomes the only option. And, of course, when the will is 
audio- or video-recorded, as in another sequence of cases, no manner of sign-
ing is possible. If lawmakers wish to allow these kinds of emergency wills, 
then necessity dictates procedural lenity. At the same time, the presence of a 
handwritten signature or other handwriting on a label, envelope, or side docu-
ment should remain relevant to the authentication of electronic wills, even if 
not obligatory.360 
In this respect, the current generation of e-will statutes is ill-suited to 
emergency testation. All require signatures and witnesses and none includes a 
dispensing power.361 Only the Uniform Act could serve in this capacity. Its op-
tional provision creating a dispensing power for e-wills would permit a court 
to validate an emergency e-will that lacked a signature and witnesses, a provi-
sion the drafters added (at least in part) with emergency wills in mind.362 
Assuming they confined electronic wills to emergency estate planning, 
lawmakers would need to define that concept. They could do so in either of 
two ways. Lawmakers could establish a clear rule, allowing testators to create 
e-wills within a specified number of days of death. Mortmain statutes formerly 
                                                                                                                           
 357 See Estate of Castro, supra note 165, at 415. 
 358 Macdonald 2002 (5) SA 64 (N) at 64, 69. 
 359 No signature: Mahlo [2011] QSC 243, ¶¶ 6, 41; Hubschi Estate, 52 E.T.R. 4th 216, ¶ 15; Van 
der Merwe 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at 546; Macdonald 2002 (5) SA 64 (N) at 69; Tingsrätt [TR] [Dis-
trict Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11. Typed signature: Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209; Yazbek 
[2012] NSWSC 594, ¶ 26; Nichol, [2017] QSC 220, ¶ 14 (initials); Yu, [2013] QSC 322, ¶ 9; Mont-
gomery [2018] VSC 16, ¶ 37; Trethewey [2002] VSC 83, ¶ 21; Buckmeyer Estate, 42 E.T.R. 3d 80, 
¶ 5; Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [21] & exhibit C (HC) (first name only). Facsimile signa-
ture: Michael [2016] 126 SASR 299, ¶ 7. Signature on label: Rioux, 19 E.T.R. (2d) 201, ¶ 3. Unclear: 
Currie [2015] NSWSC 1098, ¶ 49 (“[T]he document was ‘signed’ by [the testator] . . . .”) (probably 
implying by the use of punctuation marks that the signature was typed); Tribunal de grande instance 
[TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Metz, civ., Aug. 17, 2018, 17/01794 (no discussion of 
the presence or absence of a signature). 
 360 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213 n.5 (emphasizing the importance of a handwritten, 
but not signed, journal entry indicating the location of the e-will for the same purpose); Rioux, 19 
E.T.R. 2d 201, ¶ 28 (emphasizing the importance of the signature on a label attached to the floppy 
disk to authenticate the document); see also Edwards [2000] NSWSC 846, ¶ 8 (noting that the testator 
signed labels both on an audio-will and on its container). 
 361 See supra notes 123–127, 134 and accompanying text. Nor do any of these states have a gen-
eral dispensing power that could be interpreted to apply to e-wills. See supra notes 80–81 and accom-
panying text. 
 362 See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 6 & cmt. 
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adopted this formula.363 Alternatively, lawmakers could impose a standard, al-
lowing testators to create electronic wills when “in peril of death,” or some such 
language, as under existing gift causa mortis and nuncupative will statutes.364 
On reflection, the second approach appears preferable from the standpoint 
of public policy. At a structural level, the characteristics of rules versus stand-
ards are well known. Although sometimes arbitrary, a bright-line rule produces 
certainty, which both facilitates planning and reduces litigation; by contrast, a 
standard does justice case by case, albeit at the cost of greater litigation.365 
Oddly, emergency wills fail to implicate the usual tradeoff. Because testators 
cannot predict exactly when they will die, a formalizing rule limited to those 
expiring within a fixed time still generates uncertainty ex ante. And an elec-
tronic or recorded will could even engender uncertainty ex post (and thereby 
litigation) if the date of its creation was unclear. 
At the same time, a standard can limit uncertainty by importing the preex-
isting store of precedents for determining emergency conditions applicable to 
either gifts causa mortis or nuncupative wills. Although sometimes analogized, 
these two instruments have operated historically according to different stand-
ards.366 And between the two, public policy is better served by looking to gifts 
causa mortis for guidance. These have produced a larger body of living law; 
the nuncupative-will cases are fewer, older, and moribund.367 
Irrespective of whether we follow a rule or a standard, a problem remains: 
How do we determine when an electronic will came into existence? If it was 
prepared all at once, the answer will likely be clear; but a case could arise 
where a testator drafted a will on a computer, intending to paperize it eventual-
ly, and then finalized it electronically during an emergency. If lawmakers in-
sisted that testators execute e-wills in the presence of witnesses, evidence of 
finalization would be available—that is one benefit of imposing an execution 
requirement. But in the absence of that requirement, which would impede 
emergency estate planning, the time when—if at all—the testator decided to 
render an electronic draft legally performative could present an issue of fact. 
                                                                                                                           
 363 Statutory windows ranged between one month and one year prior to death. See Note, Standing 
to Contest Wills Violating Charitable Bequest Statutes, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94 nn.2–3 (1950). 
 364 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-3-201 (2019) (“in contemplation, fear, or peril of death,” 
applicable to gifts causa mortis); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-106(a) (2019) (“in imminent peril of 
death,” applicable to nuncupative wills). Exact phrasing varies from state to state. 
 365 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590–93 
(1988). 
 366 See Hazleton, 20 Johns. Cas. at 513–14 (Chancellor Kent) (“a very close analogy”). Gifts 
causa mortis are valid within a wider temporal range of peril than nuncupative wills. See Irish v. Nut-
ting, 47 Barb. 370, 387 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867); Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 17, 22–23 (Pa. 1836); 
Smith v. Sandt (In re Estate of Smith), 694 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 367 They also produced conflicting precedents concerning the extent of the peril required to vali-
date a nuncupative will. See Baird v. Baird, 79 P. 163, 165–67 (Kan. 1905) (remarking the conflict). 
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The same problem can arise in connection with holographic wills, which 
require no witnesses. In want of evidence regarding when a testator penned a 
holograph, courts face the difficulty of assessing the testator’s state of mind at 
a time unknown, or even the difficulty of determining which among multiple 
candidates comprised the testator’s last will.368 Three jurisdictions that allow 
holographic wills compensate for the lack of witnesses by requiring testators to 
date the will;369 and two more create adverse presumptions in the absence of 
date.370 
Lawmakers could pursue a similar strategy for unexecuted emergency 
wills. In lieu of witnesses, the statute could require that a date appear on the 
face of the will.371 The testator’s act of opening an older electronic document 
and then adding a date during the period of the emergency would, through this 
semi-formal act, both suggest his or her intent to render the document legally 
performative and reveal the time when that intent crystalized. In want of a 
date, lawmakers could require a reference to the emergency within the contents 
of the electronic document or, alternatively, metadata showing that the testator 
initially created the document during the emergency—thereby allowing a court 
to infer performative intent from the circumstances. More flexibly, lawmakers 
might authorize courts to probate an electronic document shown to have been 
accessed during an emergency, or one identified in a paper document that ei-
ther includes a date or evinces the emergency, such as a suicide note. Again, 
lawmakers could deem the act of accessing (and presumably reviewing) an 
electronic document at a fraught time, or of producing a referential paper doc-
ument at such time, as sufficient to signal performative intent in respect of the 
electronic document.372 
The extant electronic will cases suggest the adequacy of such rules. 
Among the eighteen published cases to date, both in the United States and 
elsewhere, one concerned an electronic record created in the presence of wit-
nesses;373 seven concerned dated records;374 two concerned dated records 
whose subsequent date of modification was shown by metadata;375 six con-
                                                                                                                           
 368 See In re Estate of Rozsypal, Nos. B181023, B181024, 2006 WL 1000118, at *16 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 18, 2006) (raising this problem). 
 369 See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2883(a) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(2) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.090(1) (2017). 
 370 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111(b) (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2328 (West 1980). 
 371 Cf. supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
 372 See Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594, ¶ 57 (“I infer from this evidence that Daniel opened [the 
document eighteen days before committing suicide] and looked at it. . . . He was content to leave [the 
document] on his laptop as it was and as it was later found.”). 
 373 See Estate of Castro, supra note 165, at 414. 
 374 See Currie [2015] NSWSC 1098, ¶ 33; Nichol [2017] QSC 220, ¶ 13; Yu [2013] QSC 322, 
¶ 9; Michael [2016] 126 SASR 299, ¶¶ 9, 14; Trethewey [2002] VSC 83, ¶ 8; Buckmeyer Estate, 42 
E.T.R. 3d 80, ¶ 5; Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [14] & exhibit C. 
 375 See Montgomery [2018] VSC 16, ¶¶ 19–21, 33; Rioux, 19 E.T.R. (2d) 201, ¶ 27. 
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cerned undated records whose date of creation, last amendment, and last access 
could be shown by metadata;376 one concerned an undated record identified in 
an undated, handwritten note, both of which identified the emergency;377 and 
one concerned a record identified in a dated, handwritten note.378 As for the 
fourteen audio- and video-will cases, two concerned dated recordings;379 four 
concerned witnessed recordings;380 one concerned a recording that referred to 
an emergency;381 one concerned an undated recording whose metadata indicat-
ed the time of creation;382 four concerned undated recordings whose time of 
creation was approximated through other means;383 one concerned a recording 
referred to in a dated but non-dispositive testamentary instrument;384 and one 
concerned a recording of unknown date.385 
And consider the flip side of this problem: a testator could create an elec-
tronic will during an emergency yet manage to survive it. In a majority of ju-
risdictions, if the donor of a gift causa mortis cheats death, the gift is revoked 
by operation of law.386 But, of course, gifts causa mortis involve immediate 
transfers occasioned by mortality; it stands to reason that if donors recover, 
they will also want to recover their property. By contrast, emergency wills take 
effect upon death. A testator galvanized by an emergency to formulate an estate 
plan has no reason to revoke it once the danger has passed.387 
                                                                                                                           
 376 See Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594, ¶¶ 25, 49; Mahlo [2011] QSC 243, ¶ 4; Hubschi Estate, 52 
E.T.R. 4th 216, ¶¶ 15, 17; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Metz, civ., Aug. 17, 2018, 17/01794 (text message); Van der Merwe 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at 544, 
545–46; Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (text message). 
 377 See Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209. 
 378 See Macdonald 2002 (5) SA 64 (N) at 64, 67–68. 
 379 See Quinn [2019] QSC 99, ¶ 30; Radford [2018] QSC 306, ¶ 5. 
 380 See Wai Fun Chan [2015] NSWSC 1107, ¶ 35; Estate of Standish [2018] VSC 629, ¶ 1; 
Elphinstone Estate, 31 E.T.R. 4th 252, ¶ 11; Pfaender [2018] NZHC 161 at [13]. 
 381 See Mellino [2013] QSC 336, l. 12. 
 382 See Russell [2016] SASC 56, ¶ 12. 
 383 See Cassie [2007] NSWSC 481, ¶ 7 (“[A] video recording made . . . probably in August 
2003.”); Wilden [2015] SASC 9, ¶ 3 (“The DVD . . . appears to have been made on 11 May 2005.”); 
Estate of Carrigan [2018] QSC 206, ¶ 13 (“[D]uring the recording . . . a telephone ringing in the 
background [is] consistent with [a call made] at 5:24pm”); Will of Ladduhetti (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Victoria, McMillan, J, 20 Sept. 2013) (relying on evidence stated in the affidavit of Sandy 
Allen Maloney). 
 384 See Edwards [2000] NSWSC 846, ¶ 6. In this case, because an executed will referred to an 
audio tape that the court certified as a will, the executed will technically functioned to republish the 
audio-will. See id. ¶ 37. 
 385 See Buckley, 672, P.2d at 830. 
 386 See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.19, at 141 (Walter B. 
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. zz (taking the minority view that the gift remains effective unless the donor 
“revoke[s] within a reasonable time after the donor is no longer in apprehension of imminent death”). 
 387 For this reason, if a will refers expressly to a peril faced by the testator, courts prefer to con-
strue the statement as explaining the inducement for testation, rather than as establishing a condition 
for the will’s effectiveness. See 1 PAGE, supra note 58, § 9.5. 
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Still, if a testator succeeds in navigating a peril and lives on, a gap will 
yawn between the time when the will was created and when it matures. During 
that interval, the risk of fraud and other evidentiary difficulties with informal 
wills again looms large. Presumably for this reason, a nuncupative will is val-
id, in jurisdictions that allow them, only if the testator succumbs to the peril.388 
Following a brush with death, the testator has time to spare; he or she must 
then replace an emergency oral will with a traditional will. Lawmakers could 
justifiably impose the same obligation on the creator of an emergency e-will, 
on the same basis. 
Yet in one other respect, the law applicable to emergency wills should di-
verge from that of emergency gifts. By the weight of authority, a donor cannot 
make a gift causa mortis in anticipation of suicide.389 Although suicide consti-
tutes a self-created peril, it is peril nonetheless, and it is typically an impulsive 
act, leaving victims short of time.390 Suicidal testators have executed an out-
sized fraction of both electronic and audio- and video-recorded wills.391 Law-
makers should validate those wills irrespective of whether the attendant crisis 
was physical or psychological.392 
                                                                                                                           
 388 See Baird, 79 P. at 166 (dicta); In re Will of Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 62 (Pa. 1833) (dicta) (ob-
serving that “if [the testator] recovers he . . . has time to make a written will”). The Model Probate 
Code codified this rule, which appears by statute in four jurisdictions. MODEL CODE, supra note 101, 
§ 49 (a); see IND. CODE § 29-1-5-4(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.340(1) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-
3.5(a) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-106(a). Under German and Swedish law, emergency wills 
become void if the testator survives the peril by three months, see BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 2252 (Ger.); ÄRVDABALK [ÄB] [INHERITANCE CODE] 10:3 (Swed.), or six 
months under French law, see CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 984, 987, 994 (Fr.), or “[w]hen 
the emergency situation is over” under Chinese law, see P.R.C. Law of Succession, supra note 327, 
art. 17. 
 389 For references, see Hirsch, supra note 314, at 846 n.237. No reported American case has ad-
dressed this issue in connection with nuncupative wills. 
 390 One study reporting data from China found that 92% of respondents made the decision to 
commit suicide less than a day before the attempt, 58.8% less than two hours before the attempt, and 
40% less than ten minutes before the attempt. See Veronica Pearson et al., Attempted Suicide Among 
Young Rural Women in the People’s Republic of China: Possibilities for Prevention, 32 SUICIDE & 
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 359, 362 (2002). 
 391 See supra notes 347–348 and accompanying text. 
 392 See Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 2012-11-16 T5746-11 (so ruling). Query, however, wheth-
er e-wills prompted by other sorts of self-created perils, such as daredevil pastimes, should qualify as 
emergency wills, given that testators have greater psychic opportunity to prepare ahead of time for a 
planned hazard. See Radford [2018] QSC 306, ¶¶ 4–5 (motorcycling); Tingsrätt [TR] [District Court] 
2012-11-16 T5746-11 (parachuting, prior to suicide). Also, should subjective phobias suffice to create 
emergencies, or should the peril have to be objective? Phobic testators sometimes write “emergency” 
holographic wills before boarding planes. See Osterkamp v. Weeks (In re Estate of Nelson), 250 
N.W.2d 286, 287 (S.D. 1977). For gift causa mortis cases raising this issue, see Hirsch, supra note 
314, at 846 n.238. 
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B. Anti-Electronic Wills 
Lawmakers who would address the law of electronic wills definitively 
need to do more than establish them within the discrete category of emergency 
estate planning. They need also to disestablish e-wills within the general cate-
gory of leisurely estate planning. The prevailing mélange of enigmatic defini-
tions, ambiguous harmless-error rules, and liberal choice-of-law rules enables 
courts, if so inclined, to countenance e-wills without a word of new legislation. 
Cases like Taylor v. Holt, Estate of Castro, and Estate of Horton are proof 
enough of that.393 To avert more such litigation, lawmakers must take affirma-
tive steps to clarify the status of e-wills across the board, allowing them when 
they wish to allow them and forbidding them otherwise. 
The current state of affairs arose unwittingly. That the Floridians enacted 
a definitional provision whose plain meaning makes possible electronic wills 
and then proceeded to brawl furiously over e-will legislation, oblivious to ex-
isting definitions, says it all.394 In point of fact, the Floridians would never 
have provided for e-wills deliberately in so inscrutable a fashion. Legislators 
do not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”395 But, manifestly, the herd sometimes 
strays from its assigned path, and then it is up to legislators to get a grip on 
their menagerie.396 
To restore clarity in the wake of technological change, legislators should 
amend the law in several ways. Initially, they should modify state statutes of 
wills unequivocally to exclude digital communication from the definition of a 
“writing” and of a “signature” as required for wills. Legislators can do so by 
adding new definitions limited to this one statute, leaving in place general def-
initions that pertain to other instruments or materials. Such a provision would 
operate as the foundational anti-electronic will statute. Yet, as our review of 
existing law has shown, a foundational statute alone cannot suppress e-wills 
with assurance. 
Legislators should also amend choice-of-law statutes that validate wills 
created beyond the testator’s domicile expressly to except electronic wills from 
the statute’s purview.397 To be sure, voiding e-wills that testators validly creat-
ed elsewhere could confound their expectations. But wills of this sort are suffi-
                                                                                                                           
 393 See supra Part IV.A. 
 394 See supra text accompanying notes 261–263. 
 395 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J).  
 396 The problem of unintended consequences is familiar to any student of legislation. For addi-
tional examples, see Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimer Law and UDPIA’s Unintended Consequences, 36 
EST. PLAN., Apr. 2009, at 34 passim. 
 397 The drafters of the Uniform E-Wills Act anticipate such legislation. See May 2019 Memo, 
supra note 138, at 2. Likewise, in seventeen states where, by statute, local law defers to the formaliz-
ing rules of the domicile as concerns real property located in those states, see supra note 102, legisla-
tors should carve out an exception for e-wills: If an e-will stands at issue, real property located in the 
state should be governed by the law of the situs, as under the common law. 
890 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:827 
ciently exotic that few testators are likely to presume their universal validity, as 
empirical evidence presented earlier suggests.398 
One commentator posits that “the full faith and credit clause may require 
that a [state] court probate an electronic will that is valid under the laws of an-
other state.”399 That would be so—if at all—only under unusual circumstances. 
In any event, the Full Faith and Credit Clause poses no constitutional obstacle 
to a choice-of-law provision that bars e-wills from probate. 
The Clause demands fidelity “in each State to the public Acts . . . and ju-
dicial Proceedings of every other state.”400 In other words, the Clause binds 
state courts to respect statutes enacted and judgments rendered in sister states. 
Nevada’s electronic-will statute provides that an electronic will executed re-
motely in the state “will be governed by the laws of this State and subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this State” if either a witness, notary, or quali-
fied custodian for the will is located or organized in Nevada.401 Does that mean 
a beneficiary can go to Nevada, obtain a court order validating an e-will creat-
ed there, and insist that a court in the decedent’s domicile grant probate under 
the Clause, even though the domicile acknowledges only paper wills? The an-
swer is no. The Clause requires a state to abide by extraterritorial judgments 
only insofar as choice-of-law principles qualify those judgments as control-
ling.402 Even then, courts have asserted the right to reject extraterritorial law 
when it offends the public policy of the forum, notwithstanding the Clause.403 
At any rate, under conventional choice-of-law principles, the law of the domi-
cile governs probate of personal property, whereas the law of the situs governs 
probate of real property.404 Assuming, then, that a testator dies domiciled in 
State A, the fact that he or she executed a will with the assistance of a qualified 
custodian in State B makes no difference: The law of State A controls, and any 
deference State A pays to the law of wills in State B comprises a matter of local 
discretion, not a constitutional imperative. 
                                                                                                                           
 398 See supra text accompanying notes 293–294. 
 399 Herbert A. Stroh, From the Chair, 24 CAL. TR. & EST. Q., no. 1, at 3 (2018). 
 400 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 401 NEV. REV. STAT, § 133.088(1)(e) (2017). 
 402 See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 297 (1992) (“[O]nly a single determinate set 
of choice-of-law rules can implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In this way, the Clause is like 
the contemporaneous Rules of Decision Act, which tells federal courts to apply state law in cases 
where it applies, but does not say when state law applies.”); see also PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 54 (6th ed. 2018) (examining the case law); Millonig, supra note 220, at 35, 37 (drawing the 
same conclusion and citing to other sources). 
 403 See, e.g., Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 528–29 (N.Y. 1961). But cf. id. at 535 
(Froessel, J., concurring) (questioning the majority’s conclusion that its judgment was compatible 
with the Clause). 
 404 See supra note 99. 
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As matters stand, only nine of the forty-six state choice-of-law statutes 
validating wills executed according to the formalizing rules of relevant sister 
states do so without qualification.405 Thirty-seven cover only written wills, 
thereby excluding nuncupative wills created outside the domicile.406 Ten are 
also confined to signed wills, thereby limiting the application of a sister state’s 
harmless-error rule.407 And one excludes both nuncupative and holographic 
wills.408 An additional exclusion for electronic wills would coincide with these 
restrictions. None has ever provoked a challenge under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. 
If a testator owned real property in a state other than the domicile, then 
the law of two (or more) states would govern the validity of his or her will. But 
under choice-of-law principles, the validity vel non of an electronic will in the 
domicile would have no bearing on its validity in a situs-state, and vice versa. 
Probate as to personal and real property would proceed “as if devised by sepa-
rate wills.”409 The Clause would require neither state to bow to the formalizing 
rules of the other, because each proceeding “establish[es] nothing beyond the 
limit of the State where the probate took place.”410 
Only in the unusual situation where a court takes jurisdiction over probate 
proceedings other than in the normal course might the Clause operate. If a 
court in the domicile were to probate real property located in another state, 
then it would have to follow the formalizing rules of the situs; by the same to-
ken, if a court in a situs-state were to probate personal property, then it would 
                                                                                                                           
 405 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 406 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 221 (2013). The states 
enforcing this restriction are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida (by implication), Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois (by implication), Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 407 This restriction originated in a former Uniform Act, long before the advent of the harmless-
error provisions that made the restriction significant. See UNIF. WILLS ACT, FOREIGN EXECUTED 
(1910), quoted in 7 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 101, § 45.4.1.1, at 3185 n.14. The restriction exists to-
day in: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. 
 408 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502(2) (West 2003). This statute is not expressly confined to writ-
ten wills, however. See id. (referring to “[a]ny will”). 
 409 Trotter v. Van Pelt, 198 So. 215, 217 (Fla. 1940). 
 410 Id. (citing to prior cases); see also, e.g., First Presbyterian Church v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s 
Estate), 35 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1949) (“It is generally held that the full faith and credit provision 
. . . does not render foreign decrees of probate conclusive as to the validity of a will, as respects real 
property situated in a state other than the one in which the decree was rendered . . . .”) (citing to prior 
cases); Marr v. Hendrix, 952 S.W.2d 693, 694–95 (Ky. 1997) (same); In re Estate of Biggs, 134 
S.E.2d 737, 740 (W. Va. 1964) (same). In the most recent case, the issue was treated summarily and 
then appealed on other constitutional grounds. See Lee v. Estate of Payne, 148 So. 3d 776, 777–78 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), appeal denied 132 So. 3d 221 (2013).  
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have to follow the formalizing rules of the domicile.411 In these cases, the 
Clause would function to enforce traditional choice-of-law principles, not to 
override them. To the extent, then, that a state seeks to give effect to electronic 
wills created by citizens of sister states, the Clause serves to constrain the state 
asserting such jurisdiction, rather than the state where the testator was domi-
ciled. Nevada’s e-will legislation permits Nevada courts not merely to prove, 
but to probate e-wills “executed or deemed to be executed in [Nevada] or pur-
suant to the laws of this State,” if the custodian of the will had an office 
there.412 In such a case, a party could invoke the Clause to insist that the pro-
bate court in Nevada defer to the statute of wills (and the choice-of-law statute) 
of the domicile. In the absence of such deference, a court in the domicile 
would have no obligation to honor letters testamentary or other orders issued 
by a court in Nevada regarding the disposition of a decedent’s property located 
outside Nevada.413 
Three other doctrines raise different issues. If a testator executes a will on 
paper that incorporates by reference bequests on a computer file—what we 
have called a semi-electronic will—difficulties of proof and risks of fraud arise 
similar to those that would plague a fully-electronic will.414 Yet, there is also a 
difference: Incorporation by reference comprises a remedial doctrine for testa-
tors who know no better than to express dispositive terms beyond the four 
walls of an executed will.415 As such, the doctrine operates to waive formal 
requirements. And if we are waiving requirements, then allowing a testator to 
incorporate digital images along with writings appears but a small step.416 Un-
like legislation validating e-wills, a statute allowing semi-electronic wills 
                                                                                                                           
 411 See Dennis v. Circuit Court (In re Estate of Warner), 468 N.W.2d 736, 738–40 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1991) (observing with regard to a petition for original probate outside the domicile that, were the 
petition granted, the court would apply the law of the domicile). 
 412 NEV. REV. STAT. § 136.185(1) (2017); see also H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 64.2-
443(C) (Va. 2018) (unenacted) (similar provision). 
 413 Given the traditional restriction of probate either to the domicile or situs of real property, other 
states might reject Nevada’s extraordinary claim of probate jurisdiction over e-wills executed in Ne-
vada in any event. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-408 (amended 2019), 8 pt.2 U.L.A. 101 (2013) (render-
ing determinative final orders from probate proceedings in another state only if “the decedent was 
domiciled at his death in the state where the order was made”). 
 414 Counsel raised the possibility of validating an electronic record via incorporation by reference 
in one of the extant e-will cases, where a paper suicide note accompanied the electronic one, but the 
court failed to address the argument. See Brief in Support of Standing and Recognition of Will, supra 
note 186, at 9; Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 207–15. In dicta, an Australian court asserted that an 
executed will referring to a preexisting audio-tape could incorporate the audio-tape by reference. See 
Edwards [2000] NSWSC 846, ¶¶ 32–36. 
 415 “Incorporation by reference thus touches the lawyer’s activities as a morbid anatomist of wills 
rather than as a draftsman . . . .” Armistead M. Dobie, Testamentary Incorporation by Reference, 3 
VA. L. REV. 583, 584 (1916). 
 416 A computer file even has an advantage over paper vis-à-vis incorporation by reference: 
metadata can date the record a testator is incorporating, which is essential to applying the doctrine. See 
supra text accompanying note 59. 
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should have a marginal impact on behavior ex ante. Such a statute would func-
tion as a safety-net not for distressed, but for ignorant testators. 
The same can be said of harmless-error rules. In those states that grant 
courts a dispensing power, lawmakers need to resolve the ambiguity reflected 
in the Uniform Probate Code’s prototype.417 Were they to amend the dispens-
ing power to permit courts to probate electronic wills, as foreign jurisdictions 
have done,418 and as Estate of Horton allowed,419 lawmakers would not en-
courage their use. Remedial rules primarily affect events ex post, not behavior 
ex ante. Nor would a dispensing power applicable to e-wills facilitate their 
commercialization. Firms could scarcely market e-wills as standard vehicles if 
their validity hinged on a case-by-case evaluation of their authenticity and per-
formative significance. 
A dispensing power applicable to electronic wills would render unneces-
sary separate emergency-will legislation, and it has functioned well enough for 
this purpose in foreign jurisdictions. Canadian and Australian jurisdictions 
have favored this “middle ground” approach, as one Canadian report put it, 
and Canada’s Uniform Law Conference along with Australia’s National Com-
mittee on Uniform Succession Laws have endorsed it.420 To be sure, whether a 
decedent intended to give legal effect to an e-will that was not formalized, or 
to an audio- or video-will, may be unclear. This issue has arisen in a number of 
foreign cases resolved under the dispending power.421 Still, foreign courts do 
appear to have treated the issue thoughtfully, and evidence from California 
                                                                                                                           
 417 See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text. 
 418 See supra notes 197, 201 and accompanying text. 
 419 See supra notes 176–186 and accompanying text. 
 420 BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INST., WILLS, ESTATES AND SUCCESSION: A MODERN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 29–33 (2006) (quotation at 32); UNIF. WILLS ACT §§ 3, 10 (Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada 2015) (as amended in 2003); NAT’L COMM. FOR UNIF. SUCCESSION LAWS, REPORT 85, 
UNIFORM SUCCESSION LAWS: THE LAW OF WILLS pt. 1, at 3–4, pt. 3, at 3–6 (1998); see also LAW 
REFORM COMM’N OF SASKATCHEWAN, REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WILLS 26–33 (Oct. 2004), https://
lawreformcommission.sk.ca/electwills2.pdf [https://perma.cc/URX8-GFMU] (advocating the same 
solution). For the relevant statutes, see supra notes 197, 201 and accompanying text.  
 421 See Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594, ¶¶ 110–112 (finding testamentary intent despite circumstance 
that electronic document was in the form of a letter); Cassie [2007] NSWSC 481, ¶¶ 14–15 (finding 
that a video recording lacked testamentary intent); Nichol [2017] QSC 220, ¶¶ 17, 61 (finding testa-
mentary intent despite circumstance that text message was not sent); Mahlo [2011] QSC 243, ¶¶ 41–
45 (finding that an electronic document lacked testamentary intent); Estate of Standish [2018] VSC 
629, ¶¶ 40–41 (concerning an audio recording of instructions to a drafting attorney where decedent 
indicated that the record should comprise a will if he died before he could execute a will prepared on 
the basis of his instructions); Hubschi Estate, 52 E.T.R. 4th 216, ¶¶ 15, 58 (finding that an electronic 
document reflected the decedent’s “testamentary intentions” despite the fact it began with the sentence 
“Get a will made out at some point”); Pfaender [2018] NZHC 161 at [33] (accepting an audio record-
ing of instructions to a drafting attorney as “compelling” evidence of “the will maker’s intentions”); 
Estate of Feron [2012] 2 NZLR 551 at [18] (HC) (accepting an e-mail by the decedent and attorney’s 
notes as “the skeleton for a will”). 
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suggests that a dispensing power can operate without amplifying rates of pro-
bate litigation.422 
Thus far, the dispensing power has taken root in only a handful of Ameri-
can states, and it shows no signs of gaining traction.423 States disinclined to 
create a general dispensing power could nonetheless create a narrow one appli-
cable to e-wills, along with audio- and video-wills.424 Such a move would rep-
resent a simple and concise alternative to emergency-will legislation. 
Finally, there remains the matter of living trusts. By tradition, settlors can 
create living trusts without formalizing them in any way.425 In that context, 
electronic living trusts appear unobjectionable: If an oral declaration suffices to 
make a trust, then so should an electronic record. Accordingly, lawmakers have 
no reason to enact anti-electronic-trust legislation. 
At the same time, we can question the decision to distinguish the formal-
izing rules applicable to living trusts from those pertaining to wills. Because 
they comprise simulacrums of wills, living trusts should operate under the sub-
stantive law of wills—a guideline the reporters of Uniform Acts and Restate-
ments acknowledge.426 Yet even model lawmakers make an exception for for-
malizing rules, for no sound reason.427 Were they to endeavor to unify the law 
of wills and living trusts more fully, confining the fiction that living trusts op-
erate inter vivos exclusively to the implication that they avoid probate, law-
makers could treat e-wills and e-trusts as counterparts. But this is a structural 
matter transcending the desirability of electronic instruments qua substantive 
law. At least in those states where lawmakers have heeded the call already and 
                                                                                                                           
 422 See David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 2027, 2058–65 (2018). The drafters of the Uniform Act fear that reliance on a dispensing power 
to give effect to e-wills “requires a judicial decision” and thereby “could increase costs for parties and 
courts,” whereas a full-fledged e-wills act can “streamline the process of validating those wills.” UNIF. 
E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, prefatory note. Empirical evidence of the functionality of the dispensing 
power in California should allay this concern. 
 423 Recent state adoptions and updates of the Uniform Probate Code have omitted the dispensing 
power. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-502 & Me. cmt (enacted 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-503 (enacted 2012). 
 424 For an American proposal to permit electronic, audio-, and video-wills by way of an expanded 
dispensing power in a state where a limited dispensing power already exists for paper wills, see Julia 
Kelety, California Can Lead the Way on Electronic Wills, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 15, 2019, at 6. In juris-
dictions lacking a general dispensing power, one tailored singularly for e-wills could resemble a pro-
vision found in the Uniform Act (which drafters could expand also to cover audio- and video-wills), 
leaving out the rest of that act. See UNIF. E-WILLS ACT, supra note 92, § 6 (Alternative A) & Legisla-
tive Note. 
 425 See supra Part I.C. 
 426 See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note, §§ 112, 601 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 368, 453, 545 
(2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 & cmt. a. 
 427 For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 314, at 858–62. But cf. Charles A. Redd, Are 
Will Execution Formalities Outmoded?, TR. & EST., July, 2018, at 10, 11 (suggesting reconciliation 
by abolishing will formalities). 
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require settlors to formalize living trusts in a signed writing,428 e-trusts merit 
validation—and invalidation—to the same extent as e-wills. 
CONCLUSION 
From clay tablets to tablet computing, the technology of communication 
has evolved—and, in due course, so shall our law. This Article calls for a bi-
furcated approach to electronic wills. On one hand, lawmakers should allow 
them when needed to permit testation on the fly. They comprise a viable re-
placement for holographic wills, whose utility as emergency vehicles is fading. 
Indeed, lawmakers could go further and authorize other novelties: audio- and 
video-emergency wills. Under a two-track approach, an eight-track will be-
comes innocuous. 
On the other hand, one does not have be a Luddite to take alarm at the le-
galization of electronic wills for routine estate planning. Along with the evi-
dentiary challenges posed by their proliferation lies the risk of misuse. Firms 
like Willing are all too willing to encourage naïve folk to pay for estate plans 
they hardly need and can ill afford. In the face of aggressive efforts to intro-
duce e-will legislation, lawmakers should take to heart Sir Thomas More’s 
purported counsel to “stand fast a little—even at the risk of being heroes.”429 
Of course, unlike More and his royal antagonist, lawmakers at odds over 
electronic wills are not locked in an eschatological conflict. But the stakes are 
high enough—for firms that stand to profit, and for society, which must foot 
the bill for the contests over e-wills that their enforcement would invite. Virtu-
ous lawmakers cannot hesitate in their choice. 
Politics aside, lawmakers might give the nod to e-wills out of a nebulous 
desire to modernize—“to be proactive,” as a commentator advises.430 The 
drafters of the Uniform E-Wills Act highlight this theme,431 as do industry ad-
vocates. The traditional requirements for will execution “predate the invention 
of the light bulb . . . [and] have remained largely unchanged for hundreds of 
years,” an industry white paper observes.432 
To be sure, attention to social transformation is all to the good; too often, 
our law has straggled behind the march of events. Still, the timelessness of a 
                                                                                                                           
 428 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 429 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 141 (Vintage Int’l ed. 1990) (1960). 
 430 Stroh, supra note 399, at 3. 
 431 See Unif. Act white paper, supra note 121, at 1 (averring that “[t]he . . . Act modernizes the 
law,” whereas “traditional execution requirements . . . [are] an anomaly in the internet age”); Suzanne 
Walsh & Turney P. Berry, Electronic Wills Have Arrived, TR. & EST., Feb. 2020, at 12, 14 (promo-
tional article by drafters of the Unif. E-Wills Act, characterizing a prohibition on e-wills as “conspic-
uously old-fashioned”); May 2019 Memo, supra note 138, at 1 (asserting, without reference to evi-
dence, that “formal will signature and attestation requirements seem outdated and obsolete to many 
people”). 
 432 Modernizing the Law, supra note 220, text below n.5. 
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rule need not make it untimely. The law of fraudulent conveyances predates 
even the invention of gaslight and likewise has changed little since the statute 
of 13 Elizabeth—yet it remains just as functional today as it was in the six-
teenth century.433 Modernity should influence law only insofar as it reshapes 
public policy in concrete ways. The moment for electronic wills may yet come, 
but unless and until the myriad of problems associated with them evaporates, 
and unless and until no alternative exists, lawmakers should treat them warily. 
For now, we can accept the silver lining presented by the feasibility of e-wills 
for testators who are pressed, but otherwise reject (as it were) the cloud. 
I will give the last word to the late Julius Goebel, Jr., a distinguished legal 
historian who witnessed impetuous stabs at law reform in his own time. Goe-
bel hoped that his scholarship would serve to restore lawmakers’ sobriety. Said 
he, in a passage advocates of electronic wills should hearken to today: “The 
alien corn which seems so ravishing to many of our generation may be more 
green than the fields so long and so toilfully ploughed, but there have been 
good harvests here, and the tale of the reapings may move men to cherish the 
old seed.”434 
                                                                                                                           
 433 See 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571) (Eng.). 
 434 JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW 
YORK, at xxxix (1944). 
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APPENDIX 
I here report original translations of two electronic-will cases from France 
and Sweden, respectively. Neither case has previously been noted in the Amer-
ican legal literature, and neither one is available in American legal data-
bases.435 
* * * * 
TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE [TGI] [ORDINARY COURT OF ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION] METZ, CIV., AUG. 17, 2018, 17/01794: 
Sophie Lebreton, Vice-President, pre-trial judge, assisted by Ms. Elodie 
Pierron, clerk: 
Pursuant to article 61-1 of the Constitution, when it is asserted, while a 
case is pending before a court, that a legislative provision violates the rights 
and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, the Constitutional Council can be 
asked to rule on the matter after the case is referred to it by the Council of 
State or the Court of Cassation, which decides whether to do so within an es-
tablished timeframe. 
Pursuant to article 23-1 of the decree 58-1067 dated November 7, 1958, 
passing the organic law defining the role of the Constitutional Council in cases 
filed within the jurisdictions of the Council of State or of the Court of Cassa-
tion, when a legislative provision violates the rights and liberties guaranteed by 
the Constitution, a separate written brief stating the reasons why it violates 
these rights and liberties should be submitted. 
In this case, Ms. Bernadette G argues that article 970 of the civil code, 
which provides that a will is invalid if it is not entirely handwritten, dated and 
signed by the testator, and that no other form is valid, violates the rights and 
liberties provided by the Constitution because by denying the testator the pos-
sibility of making a will electronically, it essentially deprives him of his right 
to dispose of his assets, despite this right being part of the fundamental proper-
ty rights protected by the provisions in articles 2 and 17 of the Declaration of 
the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of August 26,1789, also recognized 
by the Constitutional Council. 
She argues the absolute nature of property rights guaranteed by the Decla-
ration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen, rights reiterated in the Con-
stitution; she also argues that the law of March 13, 2000 modernizing evidence 
law to include information technologies and related to electronic signatures, 
                                                                                                                           
 435 The French case is translated by Lauren Dehasque, and the Swedish case is translated by 
Louise Lund, with additional editing of both translations by author. Following continental practice, 
neither case has a formal name; in France the parties’ identities are also redacted. The original case 
reports are on file with author. 
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which resulted in the adoption of article 1316-3 of the civil code, and partially 
of article 1108-1 of the same code, gives equal weight to both written evidence 
and electronic evidence; she argues that a contradiction exists between article 
970 of the civil code, an article that was never adapted to incorporate these 
changes and that limits the means of expression of a testator’s last wishes, and 
the fundamental nature of the property rights which include the absolute right 
to dispose of one’s assets. 
In response, the members of the family G oppose the referral of the matter 
to decide whether the provisions are constitutional on the grounds that the re-
quest is neither justified nor serious, and that, on the contrary, the legislature 
acted with the intent to protect the testator and it is not against the Constitu-
tion. 
The present case was submitted to the prosecutor’s office which then sent 
a report. 
Reasons: 
About the admissibility of the brief: 
The brief about the violation of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution is presented in a separate document and it states the reasons. It is 
thus admissible. 
About the referral: 
Article 23-2 of the decree previously mentioned provides that the court 
should refer without delay the constitutional question to the Court of Cassation 
if all the following conditions are present: 
1. The provision contested applies to the dispute or procedure, or it con-
stitutes the basis of the dispute. 
2. The provision has not yet been declared to be in compliance with the 
Constitution by the Council of State, unless circumstances have changed since 
then. 
3. The issue does not lack seriousness. 
In this case, the provision at issue applies to the dispute questioning the 
validity of a will by text message. 
The provision has not yet been ruled to be in compliance with the Consti-
tution by the Constitutional Council. 
In deciding whether the issue is serious enough, it is important to remem-
ber that pursuant to article 895 of the civil code, a will is an act by which the 
testator disposes of, in anticipation of when he will no longer live, all or part of 
his assets, or of his rights, and that he can revoke it. 
A will can be holographic, made by public act, or it can be mystic. It can 
also be international. As far as holographic wills are concerned, article 970 of 
the civil code provides that the will is invalid if it is not entirely handwritten, 
dated and signed by the testator. It is not subject to any other requirements. The 
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will must be entirely handwritten and signed by the author, regardless of the 
format or material used. 
Requiring that the will be handwritten limits the risks of falsifying the 
will, prevents mistakes, and ensures that the testator thought about it thorough-
ly. The handwritten document protects the testator’s identity, his independence 
and his freedom of thought. It reflects his decision to approve the terms used 
and it gives them testamentary value. 
Since it is an act that is free and with long-lasting consequences, aimed at 
being effective at the testator’s death, and without the protections offered by an 
authentic or a mystic will, the legislator intended to give greater protections to 
the testator. Thus, being handwritten is required “ad solemnitatem,” i.e., in or-
der for it to be valid, and not “ad probationem,” i.e., to prove whether it is val-
id. 
It follows that no comparison can be made with the rules provided by the 
law of March 13, 2000, adapting evidence law to information technologies and 
related to electronic signatures, or more generally with the rules of evidence 
law. 
Consequently, the provisions in article 970 of the civil code protect the 
expression of the last wishes of the testator and, as a result, his property rights 
and his right to dispose of his assets freely; thus, asking whether it is constitu-
tional appears to be a frivolous question. 
Therefore, the matter should not be submitted to the Court of Cassation. 
For these reasons: 
The high court, pronouncing a different judgment, not appealable inde-
pendently on the substance of the issue, declares the notice admissible, rules 
that because of the lack of serious legal argument, the following issue cannot 
be submitted to the Court of Cassation: article 970 of the civil code, which 
provides that a will is invalid if it is not entirely handwritten, dated and signed 
by the testator and that no other condition is required, violates the rights and 
liberties provided by the Constitution because by denying the possibility to the 
testator of a holographic will to type the will electronically, it essentially de-
prives him of his right to dispose of his assets, despite this right being part of 
the fundamental property rights protected by the provisions in articles 2 and 17 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 26,1789, 
also recognized by the Constitutional Council. 
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TINGSRÄTT [TR] [DISTRICT COURT] 2012-11-16 T5746-11: 
Background: 
In October 2010 Johnny Gullberg sent two messages on Facebook to his 
friend Ronny Tholander in connection with a parachute jump. The messages 
indicated what would happen to his estate if an accident happened. One of the 
messages indicated that the instructions would cease to apply if no accident 
occurred. 
On December 18, 2010, Johnny Gullberg passed away by suicide leaving 
as his legal heir his mother, Susanne Miiltop. At 04:05, a few hours before he 
died, he sent a text message from his mobile phone to Ronny Tholander. The 
text message read: “The apartment is to be sold.. Half goes to you Ronny.. The 
car to Christoffer Forsberg . . . 100,000 to Daniel Villa . . . 100,000 to [M]urre 
[, the] rest to Barbro Wathne[.]” 
The parties agree that it was Johnny Gullberg who sent the text message. 
The parties further agree on the following. “Ronny” refers to Ronny Tholan-
der. “Murre” refers to an acquaintance named Johan Muhrén. Ronny Tholander 
and Johan Muhrén have stated that they make no claim to Johnny Gullberg’s 
estate from the text message. Christoffer Forsberg and Daniel Villa Bégat are 
friends of Johnny Gullberg. Barbro Wathne is his grandmother. Johnny Gull-
berg’s surviving partner Nina Larsson and the estate have entered into an 
agreement regarding division of property. The car is with Johnny Gullberg’s 
grandmother Britt-Marie Gullberg. The apartment is sold for about 2.3 million 
kroner, of which about 700,000-800,000 kroner remains to be distributed since 
debts have been paid. All cash funds are in accounts in Johnny Gullberg’s 
name. Depending on the value of the car, the total value of the estate, after de-
duction of liabilities, amounts to approximately one million kroner. 
The dispute concerns if the text message constitutes a so-called holo-
graphic will according to chap. § 3, first paragraph, last paragraph ÄB [inher-
itance code] and—if so—if the testament is invalid due to the fact that John 
Gullberg’s condition in establishing the text message was such that it equates 
with a mental disorder. The parties agree that the defendant parties have the 
burden of proof that the text message is a holographic testament and that Su-
sanne Miiltop has the burden of proof that Johnny Gullberg’s condition in es-
tablishing the text message was such that it equates with a mental disorder. 
Judgment: 
Does the text message constitute a holographic will? 
Was Johnny Gullberg in a state of emergency when he drafted the mes-
sage? 
According to Chapter 10, § 3, ärvdabalken [inheritance code], in order to 
be an emergency will, the person who established the will out of illness or oth-
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er emergency conditions has to have been prevented from establishing an ordi-
nary will. Regardless of which of the two types of emergency wills are used—
oral or holographic will—the scope is limited to cases where the testator can-
not create a will according to the rules in Chapter 10, § 1 ärvdabalken, due to 
illness or other emergency conditions. In practice, the question has arisen as to 
whether persons who commit suicide can be considered to have been prevent-
ed from creating an ordinary will because they themselves induced the emer-
gency. What has been indicated in practice as essential has been the testator’s 
own perception of the situation, which means that the documents have been 
accepted as holographic wills (see NJA 1938 page 511 and NJA 1950 page 
498). 
The following facts are undisputed or clear. Johnny Gullberg has at times 
in his life been mentally ill. In 2006, he tried to take his own life. The night of 
December 18, 2010, Johnny Gullberg was heavily drunk and, separated from 
Nina Larsson, in a very upset state. He continued to send texts to her but did 
not receive any answers. He called Ronny Tholander who was asleep and 
therefore did not answer. He died around 5:30-6:00 am in the morning. The 
text message to Ronny was sent at 04:05, one and a half to two hours before 
his death. In summary, the District Court finds, in accordance with practice, 
that Johnny Gullberg had reason to perceive the situation as an emergency, 
which justifies deviation from the usual rules for wills. 
Is it a self-written and signed action? 
According to Chapter 10, § 3, last paragraph, ärvdabalken, a holographic 
will is created by a testator’s self-written and signed action. The fact that the 
action has to be written with the testator’s own hand has been interpreted by 
many as not to be typed or printed. This is considered to increase reliability 
because what has been ordained is genuine and seriously meant. In the com-
mentary to ärvdabalken, Walin wonders whether the testator’s wishes can be 
shown even if the order is written on a machine and signed by hand. Walin ar-
gues that the will is self-written if it was the testator who wrote the text. Ac-
cording to Walin, it should be possible, given that emergency situations call for 
liberalization. It is even contradictory to maintain unnecessary formal require-
ments when an emergency exists, if you can be assured that the act derives 
from the testator and his wishes are sufficiently clear (see Walin/Lind, Com-
mentary to Ärvdabalken, part 1 page 293 et seq.). 
The District Court makes the following observations. The current ärvda-
balken was introduced in 1958 and the rules of its tenth chapter remain un-
changed. Today, 45 years later, society has undergone technological develop-
ment that is unprecedented and of course could not have been foreseen at the 
origin of the ärvdabalken. Internet, computers and cell phones have changed 
our way of communicating and, for most people, it is certainly more natural to 
search for information on the Internet instead of at the library, writing the 
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shopping list on the mobile phone instead of on paper, and e-mailing instead of 
plain letter writing. Those who have a mobile phone in their pocket are proba-
bly far greater in number than those with paper and pen. The purpose of the 
provision that a will shall be signed by the testator is to clarify that the testator 
performed the act and that the contents of the document constitute a final or-
der, see NJA 1993, page 341. In recent cases self-written notes were rejected as 
holographic wills because they have not been signed. Two members of the Su-
preme Court dissented and would approve the acts as wills. They stated that 
the formal requirement should not be given a stricter meaning than the purpose 
of the rule indicates, namely to ensure that the order comes from the testator 
and that it is meant seriously. 
It is undisputable that Johnny Gullberg wrote the text message on his mo-
bile phone and sent it to Ronny Tholander, and that it was written a few hours 
before he took his own life. In the message it is clearly defined who will re-
ceive what and it ends with “the rest to Barbro Wathne.” The District Court 
concludes that there is no room for any interpretation other than that the con-
tent of the document constitutes a final act. The fact that Johnny Gullberg in 
his text message excluded people whom he previously expressed a wish to 
benefit cannot change that judgment. Both through the Facebook message sent 
by Johnny Gullberg before a parachute jump two months earlier and the text 
message he wrote just before his death, Johnny Gullberg clearly showed that it 
was important for him to declare his estate plan. By sending the text message 
to Ronny Tholander, Johnny Gullberg clearly indicated that what he wrote was 
a final act. Due to the unprecedented technological development that has taken 
place since the introduction of the current provisions on emergency wills and 
the impact of those developments on the way people communicate, it should, 
in the opinion of the District Court, be possible in this way to declare one’s 
will. It should be emphasized that this reasoning does not in any way refer to 
ordinary wills but should only apply in cases where the testator is in distress. 
The plaintiff’s reasoning in terms of the requirements for qualified electronic 
signatures in order for a digital signature to be considered valid does not apply 
in these situations. In summary, the District Court finds that the text message 
Johnny Gullberg prepared and sent on 18 December 2010 shall be deemed to 
meet the requirements of a self-written and signed act. 
[Additional parts of the opinion concluding that the text message should 
be interpreted to comprise a will and that the testator was not suffering from a 
“mental disorder” as a result of alcohol consumption that would have disem-
powered him from making a will are omitted.] 
The will is thus valid and the case shall be dismissed. 
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HOVRÄTT [HOVR] [COURT OF APPEAL] 2013-06-13 T11306-12: 
Shortly before committing suicide, a man sent a text message showing 
how he wanted his estate to be distributed. The District Court considered this 
to be a valid will, but now the Court of Appeal invalidates it. 
In the District Court, it was established that the text message sent by the 
man a couple of hours before he killed himself was a so-called holographic 
will, according to Chapter 10, § 3, first paragraph, ärvdabalken, and that the 
man did not suffer from a mental disorder when he sent the message. The will 
was therefore, according to the court, valid, and the man’s mother’s claim for 
annulment of the will was dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal now concludes that the text message is indeed a le-
gal document with a text that is clear and contains information on how the 
man’s estate should be distributed. Furthermore, like the District Court, the 
Court of Appeal concludes that it is certain that the message expresses the 
man’s utmost wishes and that he intended to declare his will. As a result, the 
text message is a will. 
According to Chapter 10, section 3 of ärvdabalken, the will must be self-
written and signed by the testator. The law permits no exception from these 
requirements. In the case, it was undisputed that it was the man who wrote and 
sent the will and the Court of Appeal, like the District Court, finds that the text 
message in itself fulfills the requirement to be self-written. 
However, it is not possible to sign a text message. Based on the formal 
requirements of the statute, it is thus not possible to declare your will in the 
manner that the man has done here. The will must therefore be declared inva-
lid. 
 
 
 
